Arab diplomatic movement in Syria did not help Erdogan, Putin - Kivara Sheikh Nour
The contradiction of interests thwarted the Russian initiative seeking to normalize relations between Turkey and the Damascus government and dealt a double blow to Erdogan and Putin through Syria, in favor of the Arab countries - led by Saudi Arabia - that are resentful of the decline of its influence.
The scene showed the Damascus government's unwillingness at first to engage in these meetings without its main allies to set preconditions against Turkey, the biggest evidence of its unwillingness to engage in any political action with the occupying power.
Therefore, the Damascus government coalition succeeded, without Russia in postponing the quadripartite meeting until after the Turkish elections, in an effort not to give any positive electoral dimension (according to Erdogan) through the direct meeting between the two presidents.
The spokesman for the Turkish occupation state, Ibrahim Kalin, said that the next quadripartite meeting (Russian, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian) in Moscow will be held after the Turkish presidential elections.
"The next meeting in Moscow will take place after the Turkish presidential elections. Our friends are working on setting a date for a new meeting in Moscow," Kalin added.
Kalin's statement indicates the failure of the Russian efforts to normalize relations between the Damascus government and the Turkish occupation state before the elections, so that (Moscow) would have the upper hand in Syria and give an electoral impetus to Erdogan in the presidential race, thinking that it would create a rift in NATO by joining Erdogan to its Eurasian path.
Despite pressure from Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold a meeting between Assad and Erdogan in Moscow so that Erdogan can succeed in the elections, Assad prefers the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, for several reasons, including that the latter is an Alawite like Assad, and the latter seeks to overthrow Erdogan, as a response to Erdogan's relentless attempts to overthrow al-Assad over the past decade, as al-Assad believes that time is in his favor whereas his diplomatic isolation over the past ten years has begun to fade.
The head of the Turkish occupation state sought throughout the last period to hold a meeting with al-Assad and through the Russians, motivated by several reasons, to legitimize his occupation of the Syrian lands, as Erdogan wanted before the elections, to send a message to his extremist supporters (religious and nationalists) that he is in the process of returning the Syrian refugees to their country.
Furthermore, Turkey's resentment of Syria's return to the Arab embrace, as the occupying power realizes that the return of Arab relations with the Damascus government will greatly strengthen the latter's position during the talks which may increase the demands.
The repeated Syrian insistence on Turkey's withdrawal from the lands it occupied is nothing but the greatest evidence that the Damascus government receives sufficient support from its Arab surroundings to move away from any non-Arab path, represented by the Astana Pact (Russia-Iran-Turkey), in addition to the formation of an alliance ( Syrian-Turkish) against the Autonomous Administration, which the Turkish occupation state tried to end it by various military and non-military means.
The Damascus government, under the direction of its allies, and as a result of the political changes in the Syrian arena following the recent earthquake that struck the country and drove it out of its Arab isolation, did not initially want to engage in these meetings, and al-Assad's public statements and his foreign minister set preconditions (the exit of the occupying forces and Ankara's cessation of support For mercenaries) in front of Turkey, the biggest evidence of its unwillingness to engage in any political action with Ankara, and its reservations about these meetings increased after the absence of its main ally, Iran.
However, Iran's subsequent accession to the meetings contributed to softening the position of the Damascus government temporarily, and it accepted to send its deputy foreign minister to Moscow, where the parties agreed at the time that preparations were underway to hold a meeting of foreign ministers in early May.
However, the sudden security meeting that included Iran this time constituted a regression from the political course that Moscow is planning (the meeting of deputy foreign ministers, then the meeting of foreign ministers, then the meeting of the four heads of state). Kalin's statement is the biggest evidence of the failure of the Russian-Turkish efforts to normalize relations between the Damascus government and the Turkish occupation.
a.k
ANHA
