Legal, political issues undermine legitimacy of Syria’s “People’s Assembly” elections

The Syrian Interim Government continues its push to organize so-called “elections” for the “People’s Assembly,” describing the move as a “new phase towards rebuilding legitimacy.” However, rather than signaling political progress, these elections have sparked intense criticism and exposed profound legal and political challenges to their legitimacy, especially amid the absence of broad national consensus.

Legal, political issues undermine legitimacy of Syria’s “People’s Assembly” elections
23 September, 2025   03:50
NEWS DESK

The announced “elections” by the Syrian Interim Government take place amid deep political and social divisions and a lack of nationwide agreement on the country’s future. Despite government attempts to present them as a step toward “restoring legitimacy,” these elections have drawn widespread criticism due to significant legal and political flaws.

Legal Foundations That Weaken Legitimacy

The “People’s Assembly” elections are being held without an effective electoral law or mechanisms to ensure full representation of all societal components. The electoral system remains based on large constituencies at the governorate level rather than smaller districts, with no electoral lists, and political parties remain largely inactive. The indirect voting system employed risks excluding many groups from parliamentary representation.

The presidential decree announcing the elections made no reference to an operative electoral law guiding the High Committee’s work, following the annulment of the previously valid electoral law by the so-called “Victory Conference” held on January 29, 2025. The committee’s chairperson stated that a temporary electoral law was prepared but this law has not been made public within Syrian circles.

The Interim Government swiftly amended the electoral law without consulting national forces or conducting any popular vote. For example, the campaign period was reduced to just one week, and the High Committee was granted the authority to exclude candidates on vague “security grounds,” a flexible clause enabling exclusion without clear justification.

Observers note that the decree signed by Ahmad Al-Shar’ approving the temporary electoral system serves to legitimize a superficial process while the country remains mired in deep political and economic crises, rendering the elections an empty formality devoid of democratic substance.

Moreover, the temporary electoral system consolidates executive power: Ahmad al-Sharaa appoints one-third of the assembly members and oversees the formation of electoral bodies via carefully selected subcommittees, turning the parliament into a nominal façade and intensifying control over the legislative institution.

Many Syrian opposition circles have described these amendments as “a reproduction of authoritarian practices,” emphasizing that “unilaterally drafted laws cannot produce legitimacy but rather entrench the dominance of one faction at the expense of other Syrians.” In this context, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights affirmed that “any elections held without a comprehensive social contract cannot be considered legitimate or representative of the Syrian people.”

No independent judicial bodies or international organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union have been allowed to supervise the electoral process. The UN has repeatedly emphasized that “elections in Syria must be conducted within a comprehensive political process, under international supervision, and with the participation of all Syrians inside and outside the country.”

Given complex demographic and logistical challenges, including millions of displaced persons and refugees and the absence of identity documents the High Committee resorted to an indirect election mechanism based on electoral bodies appointed by the Interim Government without consultation.

Elections Without Political Foundations

This electoral process excludes key parties such as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, along with various political and civil currents representing the majority of Syrians. The Autonomous Administration described the elections as a “one-sided theater” and stated that “any electoral process that does not include all ethnic and political components is a recipe for failure.”

Residents of Swedia protested for several days, expressing rejection of the elections, which they labeled as an authoritarian measure by the Damascus government. The Supreme Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and the diaspora issued a categorical rejection of the elections, deeming them illegitimate and a cover for appointments that do not reflect the will of Syrians.

The country remains divided due to policies pursued by the central government in Damascus, with elections not taking place in North and East Syria or Swedia.

Additionally, many Syrian areas remain occupied by Turkey and allied militias. Elections in these occupied territories are expected to be symbolic and influenced by these factions. Reports have emerged alleging that some candidates paid exorbitant sums up to $200,000 to secure seats in the People’s Assembly.

Consequently, the elections will be geographically and demographically limited. Many observers maintain that “no election can be representative when nearly half of the Syrian people refugees, displaced, and excluded are absent from the political process.”

Expected Consequences

The newly elected “parliament” will lack national acceptance, likely deepening divisions and obstructing efforts toward political resolution and national reconciliation. Syrian factions that feel marginalized and excluded from the process will see this parliament as illegitimate, contradicting the Interim Government’s claims of negotiations with Syrian forces, especially representatives from North and East Syria and Swedia.

It is also unlikely the elections will gain serious recognition from the European Union or the United Nations, weakening the Interim Government’s position in any forthcoming negotiations.

Past experiences provide instructive parallels: for example, Iraq’s first post-war elections in 2005, despite the country’s political crises, were held under international supervision with broad political participation following lengthy negotiations despite deep divisions.

Similarly, Libya’s 2014 parliamentary elections failed to achieve institutional unity due to lack of consensus and rejection by some factions, a situation that persists today. Syria risks repeating this scenario amid the absence of national agreement and UN supervision.

The People’s Assembly elections announced by the Interim Government lack genuine legitimacy foundations. Unilateral legal amendments, a constitutional vacuum, and exclusion of key forces render them more of a political maneuver than a democratic process. Without a comprehensive constitutional basis, international supervision, and inclusive participation, these elections will merely be another chapter in Syria’s ongoing crisis.

ANHA