Experts: Syria-Hezbollah conflict unlikely amid major obstacles

Questions continue to arise regarding the realism of drawing Syria into a confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon amid rapid regional developments and increasing U.S. pressure on Iran and its allies. However, experts believe that this scenario still faces major political and military challenges that make it more of a theoretical proposition than a viable project in the foreseeable future.

In this context, Dr. Tarek Wahba, a professor of international relations and academic researcher, told our agency that discussions of this scenario are primarily linked to the U.S. position. He noted that U.S. President Donald Trump spoke about it publicly while advising Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Wahba suggested that the issue may also have been raised during Syrian interim government leader Ahmad al-Sharaa’s visit to the United States as part of discussions on the nature of military support Washington could provide Damascus if it sought to strengthen its ability to protect its sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Lebanese political analyst and writer specializing in international affairs, Joe Maalouf, told our agency that although Trump has openly mentioned the idea, no practical mechanism or serious steps have been taken in that direction. He noted that such a decision would be politically and militarily costly for Ahmad al-Sharaa. He also pointed out that Turkey, one of Damascus’s most prominent regional supporters, remains far from endorsing such an option under its current policies.

Maalouf added that neither Israel nor the Lebanese state has succeeded in accomplishing such a task, making it extremely difficult to imagine Syria being able to do so.

Wahba emphasized that Syria’s current priority is rebuilding the state and repairing the national fabric among the country’s diverse communities, rather than engaging in new conflicts that could drain resources needed for reconstruction and institution-building. He also noted that al-Sharaa, during his visit to Washington, expressed willingness to engage in talks with Israel on the condition that it return to internationally recognized borders and end its occupation of the Golan Heights. According to Wahba, this position reflects Damascus’s focus on consolidating the foundations of a modern state before becoming involved in any regional confrontation.

For his part, Maalouf argued that claims regarding possible Syrian intervention against Hezbollah are based more on the historical nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations than on current realities. He explained that Damascus still faces internal challenges related to extending state authority across all Syrian territory, making talk of a Syrian role in resolving a complex issue inside Lebanon unrealistic under present circumstances. He viewed such discussions primarily as a form of political pressure.

On the possibility of a confrontation between the two sides, Wahba stated that if such a clash were to occur, it would most likely take place inside Lebanese territory, particularly in Hezbollah strongholds in the Baalbek-Hermel region and parts of the Bekaa Valley. He suggested that a possible objective could be tightening control over illegal border crossings used for smuggling and movement between Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and ultimately Iran.

In contrast, Maalouf stressed that al-Sharaa’s current rhetoric is not hostile toward Hezbollah, nor is Hezbollah adopting an escalatory tone toward Damascus at this stage. He noted that Syrian authorities are focused on securing borders and preventing their use for arms transfers or military operations inside Syrian territory. He added that the absence of hostile rhetoric from either side indicates there are no tangible signs of an imminent confrontation.

Maalouf warned that any potential escalation would not remain limited but could expand to involve multiple regions and actors, making its cost high for both Syria and Lebanon. This assessment aligns with Wahba’s view that any broad confrontation could negatively affect Syria’s state-building efforts and the priorities of the transitional period, which focus on rebuilding infrastructure, developing the military and security institutions, and strengthening the rule of law.

On the regional level, Wahba stressed that any Syrian military action inside Lebanese territory would only be possible under U.S. sponsorship and would require coordination with both the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Such a move could also provoke reactions from Iran, given that Hezbollah is one of Tehran’s closest regional allies. He argued that Israel would be the primary beneficiary of such a confrontation, as it would ease pressure on Israel and force Hezbollah to contend with another front.

Maalouf, meanwhile, argued that a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon would create internal divisions within Lebanon and would be viewed by Iran as a direct attack on its principal ally. Arab states would also find themselves facing complex political and security calculations. Nevertheless, he emphasized that these scenarios remain hypothetical and that he sees no practical indications of such an escalation occurring in the near future.

Both experts agree that the likelihood of Syria becoming directly involved in a confrontation with Hezbollah remains remote under current conditions, given Syria’s priority of maintaining internal stability, the complexities of the Lebanese situation, and the intertwined regional and international considerations surrounding any move of this kind.

ANHA