Syria’s Supreme Constitutional Court: Between completing institutions, debate over independence

What is the Supreme Constitutional Court established by presidential decree in Syria? How are its members selected, what are its powers, and does its formation mechanism and guarantees of independence differ from those adopted in neighboring countries and modern democratic systems?

Syria’s Supreme Constitutional Court: Between completing institutions, debate over independence
8 July, 2026   12:32
DAMASCUS 

Syrian interim government head Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Decree No. (149) of 2026 on Tuesday, appointing Issam Khaled al-Khalif as president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, along with six other members.

The new court includes, in addition to its president, Khairallah Nadeem Ghanoum, Mohammad Mustafa Subaie, Iman Antoine Nouri, Ismail Hammadi al-Khalfan, Rayan Hassan Kaheelan, and Aref Ahmad al-Shaal.

The formation of the court comes more than a year after the issuance of the “Constitutional Declaration,” which stipulated the dissolution of the former Supreme Constitutional Court affiliated with the previous regime and the establishment of a new court tasked with reviewing the constitutionality of laws during the “transitional phase.”

The highest body for constitutional oversight

The Supreme Constitutional Court is the highest judicial body responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and regulations. Its establishment aims to ensure that legislation and decisions comply with the provisions of the “Constitutional Declaration,” thereby reinforcing the rule of law and the separation of powers.

Article 47 of the Constitutional Declaration regulates the court, stating that the previous court would be dissolved and a new Supreme Constitutional Court would be established consisting of seven members appointed by Ahmed al-Sharaa. The members must be “persons of integrity, competence, and experience,” while details regarding the court’s functions and jurisdiction would be determined by a future law.

How were the members appointed?

Under the Constitutional Declaration, Ahmed al-Sharaa has the authority to appoint all members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, without requiring nominations, elections, or approval from any other body.

The Constitutional Declaration also does not specify detailed membership requirements, such as years of experience, judicial rank, or academic qualifications, and only requires that appointees possess “integrity, competence, and experience.”

What are the court’s powers?

Although the Constitutional Declaration referred the regulation of the court’s powers to a special law that has not yet been issued, the decree establishing the court granted it several key authorities, including: Reviewing the constitutionality of laws and regulations, providing opinions on the constitutionality of draft laws at the request of the president, providing opinions on the constitutionality of proposed laws at the request of the president or the speaker of the People’s Assembly, and interpreting provisions of the Constitutional Declaration upon the request of the president or the speaker of the People’s Assembly.

These powers place the court as the body responsible for resolving constitutional disputes and ensuring that legislation complies with the Constitutional Declaration.

Did the Constitutional Declaration define the court’s term?

The Constitutional Declaration did not specify the term of office for the court’s president or members. It also did not regulate procedures for ending membership, dismissal, or reappointment, leaving these issues to the law governing the court, which has not yet been issued.

Legal experts consider the length of judicial terms and guarantees against dismissal among the most important elements of constitutional court independence. They argue that the absence of such provisions creates a legislative gap that should be addressed in the anticipated law.

Legal criticism of the formation mechanism

Legal experts argue that granting the president sole authority to select the court’s president and all its members, without the participation of the People’s Assembly, the Supreme Judicial Council, or any independent judicial body, could affect the court’s independence, given that it is expected to review the constitutionality of laws and decisions issued by the executive authority itself.

Lawyers also point out that the Constitutional Declaration does not establish precise criteria for selecting court members, relying only on general standards of “integrity, competence, and experience” without specifying objective requirements related to qualifications, years of experience, or nomination and selection procedures.

Additionally, the court began its work before the issuance of the special law regulating its procedures, litigation mechanisms, and detailed jurisdiction, which some specialists consider a deficiency in the legal framework of the institution.

How are constitutional courts formed in other countries?

The mechanisms for forming constitutional courts vary from one country to another. However, most modern systems distribute appointment powers among several constitutional institutions to prevent any single authority from monopolizing the selection process and to ensure judicial independence.

In Turkey, the Constitutional Court consists of 15 members. The president appoints members from candidates nominated by the Court of Cassation, the Council of State, and the Higher Education Council, while the parliament elects some members.

In Lebanon, the Constitutional Council consists of 10 members. The Council of Ministers appoints half of them, while the parliament elects the other half, creating a balance between the executive and legislative authorities.

In Iraq, the selection mechanism for members of the Federal Supreme Court is regulated by the Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court Law No. (30) of 2005, amended by Law No. (25) of 2021. It is not based on a unilateral executive decision. Judges are selected through nominations submitted by the Supreme Judicial Council in coordination with the Federal Supreme Court, the Public Prosecution, and the Judicial Oversight Authority, with appointments issued according to applicable constitutional and legal procedures.

At the European level, Germany is considered one of the leading examples of ensuring constitutional judicial independence. Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by both chambers of parliament with a two-thirds majority, requiring broad political consensus and preventing a single party from controlling the court’s composition.

In France, the power to appoint members of the Constitutional Council is shared between the president, the president of the National Assembly, and the president of the Senate, preventing any single authority from controlling the formation of the constitutional body.

Comparison with the Syrian case

Compared with these models, the Syrian Constitutional Declaration grants the president direct authority to appoint the president and all seven members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, without requiring approval from the People’s Assembly or involving the Supreme Judicial Council or any judicial or professional body in the selection process.

The declaration also does not specify the terms of office of court members, procedures for ending membership, or guarantees against dismissal; safeguards considered fundamental to the independence of constitutional courts in many comparative systems.

Several constitutional law experts believe that concentrating appointment authority in the hands of Syria’s interim government head, alongside the absence of regulations regarding terms, dismissal, and renewal procedures, raises questions about the extent of the court’s independence from the executive authority.

Meanwhile, the government argues that these powers are part of the “exceptional nature of the transitional phase,” and that full legal safeguards will be established through the law regulating the court’s work, which has not yet been issued.

A-H 

ANHA