Researcher: Continuous of imprisoning Ocalan peace will not achieve

As part of an assessment of the ongoing legal and political process in Turkey concerning the Kurdish issue, which follows the “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society” issued by Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan on February 27, 2025, Sahar Ahmed Hassan, an Egyptian researcher specializing in modern and contemporary history and a member of the Center for Modern and Contemporary Egyptian History at the Egyptian National Library and Archives, spoke to our agency about recent developments and their implications for the Kurdish issue and the political process in Turkey.

Regarding the possibility of the peace process succeeding while Abdullah Ocalan remains imprisoned, Sahar Hassan said that the process “can continue despite Abdullah Ocalan remaining in prison, but its success in achieving lasting peace will be much more difficult.” She explained that his release “is not a direct legal prerequisite for launching the implementation of the peace process,” but that the issue is linked to his political and symbolic role and his ability to influence the Kurdish side.

She pointed out that he is “not simply an ordinary prisoner when viewed within the Kurdish process,” as he was the figure who called on February 27, 2025, for an end to the armed struggle, the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and a transition to the democratic process.

She added that keeping him in prison while relying on his influence to advance the peace process “creates an unbalanced equation,” as he is being asked to contribute to ending the conflict without being granted a political status commensurate with that role.

Sahar warned that his continued imprisonment could undermine trust between the parties, particularly if the Kurdish side perceives that the state is “demanding disarmament and an abandonment of armed struggle without taking tangible political steps regarding Ocalan’s status and Kurdish rights.” This could create the impression that the process is limited to “dismantling the military aspect without addressing the roots of the issue politically.”

She stressed the need to distinguish between the success of a disarmament process and the success of a comprehensive peace process. Turkey may, she explained, “be able to dismantle the PKK’s military structure and reintegrate some of its members without releasing Ocalan, but achieving lasting political and social peace requires addressing issues of rights, identity, and political participation, as well as finding a convincing solution to Ocalan’s status.”

She argued that the danger lies in the process turning into a one-sided deal based on “disarmament, the dissolution of the party, the return of fighters, and the end of the armed conflict,” without being matched by democratic reform, guarantees for political and cultural rights, legal safeguards, and measures addressing the situation of the person who issued the call and political prisoners.

She emphasized that “the end of armed conflict does not necessarily mean the end of the Kurdish issue,” stressing that there is a difference between ending a war and building peace. Turkey, she said, “may be able to end the war without releasing Ocalan, but it will most likely need to address his case if it wants to turn the end of the war into lasting peace.”

The Legal status of life sentences and the “Right to Hope”

She explained that it is necessary to distinguish between an ordinary life sentence and an aggravated life sentence. She said that, in principle, a person sentenced to an ordinary life term may become eligible for conditional release after serving 24 years in prison, pursuant to Article 107 of Law No. 5275 on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures. This means that a life sentence in Turkey “does not necessarily mean imprisonment until death”; rather, there is a legal mechanism for reviewing the prisoner’s status in preparation for conditional release.

As for aggravated life imprisonment, she noted that, as a general rule, conditional release may be possible after 30 years of imprisonment, provided that the legal requirements are met. However, she pointed to important exceptions.

She explained that Article 107/16 of Turkish Law No. 5275 excludes prisoners serving aggravated life sentences for certain crimes against state security, the constitutional order, or national defense from conditional release when such crimes were committed as part of the activities of a terrorist organization. She noted that this category is not eligible for conditional release under the current law.

She added that Turkey “legally recognizes the possibility of reviewing the status of a person serving a life sentence,” but that the application of this principle varies depending on the nature of the sentence, the crime, and the exceptions stipulated by law.

She said the issue becomes more complicated in the Kurdish context because the question is not merely whether conditional release is available after a specified period, but also whether the exceptions applicable to certain offenses apply to those serving aggravated life sentences, and whether their legal status could be changed as part of a peace, disarmament, and reintegration process.

She stressed the need to distinguish between the “right to hope” as a principle under European human rights law and conditional release as a mechanism provided for under Turkish law, emphasizing that the two concepts “are not the same thing.”

European Court rulings and a possible avenue for addressing the issue

Asked whether implementation of judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights could provide an avenue for addressing Abdullah Ocalan’s situation, Sahar Hassan said that this “could provide an important avenue,” arguing that the legal track could become a political entry point within the peace process, although it would not automatically mean his release.

She noted that a legal basis already exists, particularly in judgments issued in his case, explaining that the European Court of Human Rights has stated that a life sentence without the possibility of conditional release or a genuine mechanism for reviewing the continued enforcement of the sentence may be incompatible with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

She stressed that the point is not for the European Court to order his release, but rather for Turkey to comply with the principle established by the Court, namely, providing a genuine legal mechanism for reviewing life imprisonment.

She argued that implementing European judgments could open the way to changing Abdullah Ocalan’s legal status through “amending Turkish legislation, establishing a mechanism for reviewing life sentences, and examining his case under that mechanism, potentially leading to conditional release or a reduction of the sentence in accordance with the law.”

She stressed that this approach differs from granting him a special “political amnesty,” because it would make the resolution of his situation part of a general legal framework consistent with European standards. The process would begin with a review of the sentence and a determination of the legal consequences of that review, which, depending on the legislation and procedures adopted by Turkey, could take the form of conditional release, sentence reduction, or another form of terminating or modifying detention.

Regarding the need for Abdullah Ocalan to participate directly in the process and whether this would require ending his imprisonment and allowing him greater access to his lawyers and political figures, she said that his direct participation would make him “an active and continuing party in managing the transitional phase,” noting that simply keeping him in prison with limited communication may not be sufficient.

She emphasized the need to distinguish between ending his imprisonment and releasing him, on the one hand, and expanding his rights to communication and dialogue while he remains in prison, on the other. Effective participation, she explained, requires regular, lawful, and sustainable channels of communication, including meetings with his lawyers, meetings with political delegations, and the possibility of communicating with parties involved in the process. She considered regular communication “not merely a procedural detail,” but rather a fundamental element in enabling him to perform the role attributed to him in advancing the process.

She added that it was he who issued the call on February 27, 2025, for an end to the armed struggle, followed by the PKK’s announcement ending its armed activities and dissolving its organizational structure. Consequently, excluding him from the next phase “creates a contradiction,” as he is being asked to initiate the peace process and is then excluded from meaningful participation in its implementation.

She argued that participation does not necessarily mean his immediate release, but rather “enabling Ocalan to participate effectively first,” by opening regular channels of communication with his lawyers, politicians, and the parties involved, while his legal status could subsequently become part of the broader political settlement.

Sahar Hassan concluded by saying that the success of the current phase does not require the immediate release of Abdullah Ocalan. However, its long-term success “requires gradually ending his political and legal isolation,” opening regular channels of communication with him, and eventually reconsidering his prison status if the process demonstrates genuine progress.

She considered the most realistic approach to be a combination of “a European legal track and a Turkish-Kurdish political track,” thereby placing his case within the framework of the peace process rather than turning it into a separate political amnesty issue detached from the broader process.

ANHA