Kurds in Syria: From Marginalization to Partnership – 3

Kurds in Syria: from the revolution to partnership in building the State

When the Syrian revolution began in the spring of 2011, Kurdish society had accumulated, over decades, a range of issues related to citizenship, identity, language, nationality, property ownership, and political freedoms.

The revolution therefore came at a time when the Kurdish issue had moved beyond demands for resolving the nationality question to include recognition of Kurdish identity and guarantees for cultural, linguistic, and political rights, alongside the broader demands raised by Syrians for freedom, justice, and an end to authoritarian rule.

On April 7, 2011, and in an attempt to address some of the Kurdish demands, Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 49, which granted Syrian citizenship to those registered in the foreigners' records in Hasakah Governorate. However, the decree did not include those whose civil records were unregistered, leaving a segment of people deprived of citizenship outside the scope of the measure.

As protests expanded and spread to different parts of the country, Kurdish political forces adopted varying positions toward the Syrian uprising. Nevertheless, for the first time in decades, the Kurdish issue became a central part of the debate over the future of the Syrian state and its political and constitutional structure.

A new administrative experience in NE, Syria

Following the liberation of areas of Rojava from Ba'athist control after the July 19 Revolution began in the city of Kobani in 2012, local political and social forces began establishing institutions to administer areas that had fallen outside the control of the central government.

This experience gradually evolved from popular councils and administrative structures into a more organized model involving Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and other communities. In 2014, the Autonomous Administration was formally established in the regions of al-Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin in its initial form.

The experience did not present itself as a separate Kurdish project detached from Syria. Rather, it put forward a model for administering local areas within a political framework based on the participation of different communities, the development of local institutions, and the management of residents' affairs, while disagreements with Damascus continued over the form of the state and the degree of decentralization.

In the following years, the institutions of the Autonomous Administration expanded to encompass civil, service, educational, and security sectors. The experience of local governance in North and East Syria subsequently became one of the most prominent issues raised in discussions about the future of the Syrian state.

the war against ISIS and the establishment of the Syrian Democratic Forces

As ISIS mercenaries/ Daesh expanded across Syria and Iraq, the areas of Rojava became one of the main fronts in the fight against the militants. In October 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were established as a military alliance comprising Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and other forces and communities. The SDF subsequently became the principal force leading military operations against ISIS across large areas of North and East Syria.

The Syrian Democratic Forces fought major battles against ISIS, most notably the Battle of Kobani in 2014 and 2015, followed by military operations that culminated in the liberation of Raqqa, which ISIS had declared the capital of its so-called caliphate. This eventually led to the end of ISIS's territorial control at its last stronghold in Baghouz in 2019.

This role transformed the Syrian Democratic Forces into a key factor in the Syrian equation and further elevated the Kurdish issue at both the regional and international levels.

However, the rise of the Kurdish issue in this manner was not welcomed by Turkey, which had opposed the Autonomous Administration project since its establishment through armed factions that it formed, funded, and directed to attack Kurdish areas. When these factions failed to achieve their objectives, Turkey deployed its own military into Syria and began attacking the project, starting in 2016 in the countryside of Manbij and al-Bab, followed by Afrin in 2018, and Serekaniye/ Ras al-Ain and Gire Spi/Tal Abyad in 2019. Turkey also continued its attacks using drones until recently.

The Kurdish issue in the search for a Syrian solution

During the years of war, the Kurdish issue was no longer separate from the debate over Syria's future. Instead, it became closely linked to questions concerning the constitution, decentralization, power- and resource-sharing, and guarantees for the rights of the country's various communities.

This period witnessed meetings, conferences, and attempts at dialogue between Kurdish and Syrian political forces, alongside discussions within the Syrian opposition and at international forums regarding the form of the future Syrian state.

At the same time, Kurdish forces emphasized at various stages that their demands were not incompatible with Syria's unity, but rather concerned redefining the relationship between the center and the regions on the basis of participation, citizenship, and equality.

The fall of the regime and a new chapter

The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024 brought about a fundamental change in the Syrian landscape and opened the door to a new transitional phase. During this phase, the rebuilding of state institutions and the relationship between Damascus and the regions and forces that had previously been outside the control of the former government emerged as some of the most prominent issues on the agenda.

Against this backdrop, Damascus, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Autonomous Administration entered into negotiations over the nature of their relationship. On March 10, 2025, General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces Mazloum Abdi and Syrian Transitional Government President Ahmed al-Shara'a signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civilian and military institutions in NE, Syria into the institutions of the Syrian state. The agreement also provided for guarantees of Kurdish citizenship and constitutional rights, alongside a ceasefire and the rejection of partition projects. It further stipulated the integration of border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields under state administration.

The agreement represented an important turning point, as it shifted the relationship between the two sides from a reality of separate administration and limited coordination toward an explicitly declared process of integrating institutions into the state, while leaving key issues still requiring negotiation and implementation.

From the political agreement to integration

The March 2025 agreement was not fully implemented within the initial timeframe set for it, and disagreements continued over the details of integration, the form of administration, and the future of the military and security forces. In early 2026, military tensions between the two sides escalated before the negotiating process resumed and led to the January 29 Agreement.

Following the announcement of the agreement, a more detailed process began to implement the integration of the military, security, and administrative institutions affiliated with the Autonomous Administration into the institutions of the Syrian state.

On August 20, 2026, Mazloum Abdi announced that the process of integrating the military, security, and administrative institutions into the institutions of the Syrian state had been completed, noting that the next phase would focus on political efforts to enshrine the rights of the Kurds and other communities in the Syrian constitution.

August 25, 2026: The end of the Syrian Democratic Forces' mission as an independent force

Days after the announcement that the integration phase had been completed, the most significant milestone came on August 25, 2026, when Mazloum Abdi announced from the People's Palace in Damascus the end of the Syrian Democratic Forces' mission as an independent military force, confirming the integration of its forces into the institutions of the Syrian state.

The announcement came after Abdi met with Transitional Government President Ahmed al-Shara'a in Damascus, as part of the continued implementation of the agreements that began in March 2025.

The Syrian Democratic Forces were integrated into brigades of the Syrian Army, while the civilian and security institutions entered the process of integration into state institutions.

With this, the curtain fell on a phase that had lasted for more than a decade, during which the Syrian Democratic Forces played a prominent military, security, and political role in northern and eastern Syria, while the future of Kurdish political and constitutional rights remained tied to the next political phase.

Fawaz Othman: The constitution and decentralization as guarantees for rights and Syria's unity

Fawaz Othman, a researcher in Kurdish history and civilization, believes that the next phase should be based on genuine partnership among Syria's various communities, and that the Kurds should be partners in building the state rather than merely a component demanding its rights.

Othman says: "What is needed is a democratic, pluralistic, decentralized state that preserves Syria's unity and guarantees the participation of all its communities. The administrative experience that emerged in northern and eastern Syria can also serve as a source of lessons."

Othman noted that the fundamental guarantee lies in a clear, democratic constitution that recognizes the Kurds as an integral component of the Syrian people, guarantees equal citizenship and political participation, protects the Kurdish languages and culture, and prohibits ethnic discrimination.

He added: "I believe that nationally agreed-upon decentralization constitutes an important guarantee for enabling residents to participate in administering their regions while preserving the unity of the Syrian state."

Kurdish identity and Syrian identity

Othman rejects framing Kurdish identity as being in opposition to Syrian national identity, arguing that pride in Kurdish language and culture can coexist with full belonging to Syria.

He says: "There is no contradiction here between Kurdish identity and Syrian national identity. Kurds can take pride in their language and culture while, at the same time, being fully belonging Syrian citizens. What is needed is recognition of the Kurdish language and culture, along with teaching and protecting them, because an inclusive Syrian identity should be based on diversity rather than on eliminating particularity."

From AANES to political action

With the announcement on August 25, 2026, of the end of the Syrian Democratic Forces' mission as an independent military force, the center of gravity of the Kurdish issue shifted from the military and administrative structures that had emerged during the years of war toward the political and constitutional track.

This means that the fundamental question has become how to enshrine the rights that the Kurds have demanded for decades within the structure of the new Syrian state.

In this context, the anticipated constitution, the form of local administration, guarantees for cultural and linguistic rights, equal citizenship, and political participation have become among the key issues that will determine the nature of the next phase.

A New Syria: partnership, not exclusion

Fawaz Othman emphasizes that Syria's future cannot be built on the exclusion of the Kurds or any other community, and that addressing the Kurdish issue fairly could contribute to strengthening the country's unity and stability.

He concluded: "A new Syria cannot be built on the exclusion of the Kurds or any other community. The Kurdish issue is a national Syrian issue, and a fair resolution to it strengthens the country's unity and stability. What is needed is a genuine partnership based on mutual recognition, equal citizenship, and democracy within a united Syria. Syria has room for everyone.

ANHA