Al-Ahwazi: U.S.–Iran truce hinges on nuclear file and Hormuz

The Secretary-General of the Ahwazi Popular Democratic Front and head of the Front of Non-Persian Peoples in Iran, Salah Abu Sharif al-Ahwazi, spoke about the ceasefire between the United States and Iran following nearly 40 days of conflict and a devastating war in which Israel also participated alongside Washington. He offered a political and military reading of the truce and its short- and long-term implications.

Abu Sharif made his remarks to ANHA agency in response to questions about the significance of the truce, the possibility of it evolving into lasting agreements or peace arrangements, and his assessment of which side could be considered the victor at this stage.

He said: “In our assessment, it is not yet possible to speak of a decisive and final victory for any party, especially since the American objectives of the war have not yet been achieved. At the same time, the Iranian regime has lost senior leaders and a significant portion of its military, security, and economic capabilities.”

He added that each side is attempting to market the outcome as a temporary gain. The United States and its allies, he explained, are promoting the idea that they dealt severe blows to Iran’s military capabilities, while Tehran believes it has endured and imposed itself as an unavoidable actor—particularly after demonstrating its ability to influence the Strait of Hormuz and draw all parties into a direct negotiation track.

Abu Sharif noted that current indicators suggest what has been achieved is a “fragile balance of deterrence” rather than a complete victory, adding that peoples under Iranian control, including the Ahwazi people, remain outside the scope of this understanding so far.

Objectives of the Truce: Washington Seeks “Surrender,” Tehran Regroups

On the main objectives of each side, Abu Sharif said Washington’s primary aim is to push Iran toward surrender under its terms, while also presenting the outcome domestically in the United States as a victory and forcing the Iranian regime to accept American conditions.

He added that U.S. goals also include reopening the Strait of Hormuz, consolidating regional security, and translating this into both domestic and international political gains.

On the other hand, he said the Iranian regime is using the truce to catch its breath, halt the strikes, and secure gains such as compensation or the release of frozen assets, while preserving its regional influence and military proxies and presenting itself domestically as unbroken.

He pointed to reports suggesting Tehran has also linked progress in the understanding to reducing attacks on its allies, particularly in Lebanon.

Abu Sharif stressed that, in his view, what is happening cannot truly be considered a truce from the American perspective, stating: “In short, we believe there is no truce for America, but rather a page of the war aimed at achieving U.S. conditions.”

The Next Phase After Two Weeks: Three Scenarios

As for the expected next phase after the two-week period, Abu Sharif said it depends on whether ongoing negotiations in Islamabad will yield arrangements broader than a temporary ceasefire.

He outlined three possible scenarios: extending the truce and entering a limited understanding; returning to controlled escalation if major issues stall; or the outbreak of a new round of confrontation if either side feels the other is stalling or using the time to reposition.

He added that the Ahwazi people, as well as other non-Persian groups, are monitoring developments through the lens of their impact inside Iran. The next phase, he noted, could open a new political opportunity or lead to a harsher wave of repression by the Iranian regime against the peoples under its control.

A “Fragile Truce” with Real Risk of Collapse

Assessing the likelihood of the truce continuing, Abu Sharif said its extension is possible but not guaranteed, noting that reports describe it as “fragile and lacking fully clear terms,” while mutual distrust remains extremely high.

He explained that extending the truce depends on tangible progress in urgent issues, but warned of a high risk of collapse if disagreements persist over American conditions—especially regarding the nuclear program, the role of Iran’s regional allies, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

He added: “The current truce is closer to a tactical pause than a stable peace, and it will collapse if Iran rejects all conditions. Victory is a necessity for the American president, while rejection is a necessity for the survival of the Iranian regime.”

Impact on the Middle East: Temporary De-escalation Without Addressing Root Causes

On the truce’s impact on regional stability, Abu Sharif said that if it holds, it may temporarily reduce the risk of sliding into a full-scale regional war—especially given its connection to broader talks and sensitive issues such as the Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon.

However, he stressed that real stability will not be achieved, in his view, as long as the core problem persists—namely the Iranian regime’s “expansionist policies and its reliance on militias, armed proxies, and interference in the affairs of regional states.”

He concluded that while the truce may temporarily lower tensions, it does not necessarily address the structural causes of instability in the Middle East.

Local Communities: Reduced Losses vs. Fears of Internal Repression

Regarding the truce’s impact on regional populations, Abu Sharif said these communities are in greatest need of de-escalation, especially after weeks of war that left thousands dead and caused widespread infrastructure damage across multiple countries.

He added that any ceasefire could immediately reduce casualties, fear, economic pressure, and disruptions to energy and daily life. However, he warned of serious concerns that the Iranian regime might exploit the truce to reorganize its security apparatus and intensify internal repression against populations under its control, including the Arab Ahwazi people.

He emphasized that protecting civilians should not be limited to halting bombardment but must also include ending repression, arrests, and discrimination within Iran.

Condemnation of Iranian Attacks and Support for Legal Measures

In conclusion, Salah Abu Sharif al-Ahwazi reiterated his condemnation of what he described as “Iranian aggression” against Arab countries and the Kurdistan Region, affirming his full solidarity with all legal measures to confront this “blatant aggression.”

He added: “Allow me, through your platform, to reiterate our condemnation of Iranian aggression against brotherly Arab states and the Kurdistan Region, and to affirm our full solidarity with all legal steps to confront this blatant aggression.”

a.k

ANHA