New demands for transitional justice in Syria: What are causes, consequences perceived as such?

In Syria, victim memory meets the state’s politics, and the demand for transitional justice gets entangled with power dynamics. The most worrying thing, however, is that lack of justice will become the trigger that brings Syria to ground zero.

New demands for transitional justice in Syria: What are causes, consequences perceived as such?
23 June, 2026   03:27
NEWS DESK

Over fourteen years since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, and over a year and a half since the fall of the Baathist regime in Syria, the Syrian people are now experiencing a situation that seems too familiar and frightening: sporadic security tension, demands of bringing those loyal to the regime and members of the militia to account, and an increase in hate speech.

Recently, popular uprisings took place simultaneously in a number of Syrian provinces, including Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, the Syrian coastline, and Deir ez-Zor. People expressed their grievances by slogans that called for justice and for punishing those who were guilty of committing crimes during the Baathist rule.

It comes as no surprise for many Syrians that this question resurfaces now because transitional justice, which is one of the main issues raised by the new period, has not materialized yet. The few cases of justice were perceived as symbolic, as not enough to heal the scars of long years of warfare.

Nevertheless, the issue of human rights is not the only way to look at the process that is taking place now. In opposition press and on different political platforms, there has been another version of events developed recently, connecting the process with the regional and international geopolitical confrontation taking place in Syria.

From this perspective, the concurrent developments in northern Syria, which are strongly influenced by Turkish interests, cannot be disconnected from the transmission of pressure messages to the authorities of Damascus.

The proponents of such an analysis claim that Ankara wished to remind everyone that it is the strongest player in the Sunni public domain in its territory, and it is still able to manipulate public opinion when it feels that its allies are stepping out of the red line.

The analyses take it even further by arguing that what is really at stake is the stance taken by the interim government with respect to the involvement in regional wars, specifically in Lebanon. The opposition narratives claim that for Israel the new leadership represents an instrument which can be used to change the power relations on its northern border in case of a conflict with Hezbollah, while Turkey resists getting involved in another military action which will end up in an open conflict with the Islamist groups.

At the center of these narratives is Ahmad al-Sharaa, described as a leader caught between conflicting pressures. On one side, analyses speak of American and Israeli pressure demanding that he prove his ability to fulfill the expected security and regional roles in exchange for continued political and military support, citing statements by the U.S. president claiming he played a role in bringing al-Sharaa to power.

On the other side, other assessments point to clear Turkish objections to any step that could expand the conflict beyond Syria’s borders.

Between these pressures, some analysts suggest internal divisions within the ruling authority itself: one current favor deeper involvement in regional arrangements as a guarantee of survival, while another fears such moves could trigger internal instability that would be difficult to contain, especially given the fragile security and economic situation.

There are also reports of increasing European pressure, alongside French diplomatic efforts in which alternative or supporting political and military figures are being discussed to manage the next phase. This is seen as a sign of what some describe as growing international impatience with the difficulties of the transition and the continuation of internal crises.

Despite all these narratives, many Syrian observers and politicians argue that the answer to the key question why calls to hold regime loyalists accountable are gaining such widespread public resonance now lies in the absence of transitional justice.

Thousands of families who lost loved ones in prisons, under torture, or in massacres still have no answers about their fate, and have not seen transparent, large-scale trials for those responsible for violations.

Over time, many victims’ families have come to feel that justice has been sidelined in favor of political and regional calculations.

This delay has revived an old demand in a new form: if the state does not act, does society have the right to demand accountability on its own? Here lies the danger, according to human rights advocates, who warn that the line between justice and revenge becomes increasingly fragile, and that legitimate demands for accountability could turn into collective retaliation or sectarian and political score-settling.

According to statements from Syrian official institutions responsible for transitional justice and missing persons, the number of missing people in Syria since decades of Baathist rule is estimated between 120,000 and 300,000. The total number of victims, including the dead, wounded, and displaced, remains incomplete due to the difficulty of documentation and the scale of violations over many years.

ANHA