Head of Gulf Studies Center: There is no trend towards a final; decisive solution in Iran

Amid reports of a new Iranian proposal for U.S. President Donald Trump's administration, and anticipation of a meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, the ground conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is escalating; the Israeli army announced casualties among its soldiers due to the ongoing clashes in southern Lebanon.

Araghchi's visit is the last stop of a diplomatic tour that also included Pakistan and Oman. On the other hand, Axios reported that Iran, thru Pakistani intermediaries, proposed a new offer to the United States to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, with nuclear negotiations postponed to a later stage.

The crisis in negotiations between the United States and Iran escalated over the weekend after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's visit to Pakistan on Friday and Saturday ended without any progress.

Iran is working on expanding its options.

The head of the Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Sharif Abdel Hamid, spoke to ANHA agency about this, saying: "The path has not stopped, but it has not been decided. If we look at the Iranian Foreign Minister's shuttle diplomacy between Riyadh, Muscat, Islamabad, and on his way to Moscow, we find that it reflects a pre-decision phase." Iran is working on expanding its options and opening multiple channels, allowing it to redistribute pressure rather than eliminate it.

He added, "Precisely, the current path is a maneuvering path under pressure, not a fully-fledged settlement path. The Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Muscat does not mean that Tehran has reached the brink of retreat; rather, it indicates the activation of a traditional channel historically used when Iran wants to reduce direct friction, test the other party's intentions, and buy time without announcing a retreat."

And from here, according to Abdul Hamid, "the negotiation process does not move in a straight line, but rather in winding paths aimed at keeping all options open. One of the most important determinants of the current phase is what is called the 'dissolution of the credibility of the warning.' The repetition of American deadlines without decisive action has created in Tehran the conviction that the threat does not necessarily mean action, and that negotiations can be prolonged without paying the full price. Therefore, the process has reached a delicate point where Iran no longer negotiates from a position of fear, but rather from a position of calculating the distance between the threat and its execution."

He saw that "Iran is under military and political pressure, and the United States is under constitutional and temporal pressure, which has made both parties negotiate under duress, but each is betting on the other's weakness. The current stage of the process can be summarized in that it has not yet entered the final settlement phase, as there are no indicators of a complete agreement or decisive concessions, and it has moved beyond the stage of uncontrolled escalation, with the difference between them being not power but formulation."

Many determinants and regulations for the progress or failure of the negotiation process

Regarding the determinants and regulations of the progress or failure of the negotiation process, Abdul Hamid saw "the factor of time as a mutual pressure tool, which is no longer a neutral element but has become a peak element of negotiation. Hence, Tehran seeks to prolong the negotiation period." The American decision-maker faces institutional time constraints, most notably those related to the War Powers Act of 1973, which limits the president's ability to continue operations without authorization. The closer this threshold approaches, the greater the chances of a settlement, or conversely, the higher the likelihood of escalation if a quick resolution cannot be reached.

He added, "Repeated warnings without decisive action create what can be termed a 'deterrence gap.' If this gap persists, Tehran tends to expand its margin of maneuver and delay concessions. However, if it is broken by a qualitative military action, the balance of negotiations may quickly shift."

According to him, "the movement through intermediaries like Oman or Pakistan not only reflects a desire for mediation but also represents an attempt to distribute pressure and test multiple settlement formulas, which avoids early commitment to a single path. Hence, the wider these channels expand without coordination, the greater the chances of disruption. However, if they unite around a common formula, it transforms into a genuine path for progress."

He believes that "the decisive factor here is not the content of the agreement, but rather how it is politically presented. The U.S. needs an achievement that can be marketed domestically as a strategic success, while Tehran needs to avoid the image of retreat or humiliation. Hence, each party is looking for a formula that allows them to claim a win, which increases the likelihood of failure."

The Trump administration is not heading toward a final solution.

Regarding the steps of the Trump administration, he pointed out that "its behavior does not reflect a clear direction toward a final settlement nor a complete decision for comprehensive escalation, but rather reveals a crisis between war and negotiation." Trump's declaration of complete victory, alongside the failure to end the war and the lack of decisive actions such as opening the Strait of Hormuz and the continued threat of bombing, is not a coincidence but rather evidence that the American administration is trying to secure a political gain without having actual military resolution.

The data, according to him, "indicates the absence of a complete agreement or a viable settlement framework, and hence the idea of a near solution is unlikely according to this logic, meaning we are facing a managed escalation rather than a comprehensive explosion for now. Iran is betting on wasting time, while America is betting on breaking Iran quickly." The Trump administration is not heading toward a final solution nor preparing for a comprehensive war; rather, it is managing a phase of reshaping the conflict based on establishing a narrative of victory while keeping tools of pressure and limited escalation in place.

A coordination vacuum in Iran, not a structural division

Regarding the effects of the war on the nature of the Iranian regime and the occurrence of disagreements or contradictions between the regime's factions, he believed that "what is said about the 'division within the Iranian regime' as a realistic phenomenon is incomplete in its significance, meaning it is real in its manifestations but does not necessarily indicate a genuine structural disintegration of the regime. There are some indicators, such as the existence of a gap between the diplomatic track (Abbas Araghchi) and the military track (the Revolutionary Guard), and a field rejection of political decisions, as happened in the case of the Strait of Hormuz, at a time when the Supreme Leader is absent and has no role."

He added, "There is a coordination vacuum following the assassination of Ali Larijani and the inability of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to fill it. All these indicators mean that there is a real imbalance in the coordination mechanism between the centers of power, reaching the point of 'partial paralysis' in decision-making." But despite all these indicators, they do not confirm a complete collapse or a final strategic division, because what we see is a functional conflict between the factions, not an existential split in the system.

According to Abdul Hamid, "This influence leads to the disruption of the negotiation decision-making process and the inability of the Iranian delegation to provide a clear response or adhere to what is proposed due to the absence of a decisive reference. The United States is no longer sure whether what is agreed upon with the negotiators is executable, and this has been reflected in the cancelation of diplomatic moves (such as the disruption of the U.S. Vise President's visit)."

He confirmed that "the internal division gives Tehran a margin for procrastination, but at the same time, it hinders reaching a settlement, turning the negotiation into a permanent suspension." The division within the Iranian system is real at the level of decision-making mechanisms, but it does not amount to the disintegration of the system; rather, it reflects a struggle between its tools and is considered one of the main reasons for the stalemate.

The proxies are not a tactical option that can be relinquished. Regarding the possibility of Iran abandoning its proxies in the region, Abdul Hamid believes that "the proxies are not a tactical option that can be relinquished, but rather they are the essence of the Iranian power model itself. Iran was founded on an equation that it applies: a decision-making center in Tehran + an extension of influence through proxies in the region. Therefore, abandoning these proxies does not mean changing policy, but rather it means losing the tools of external influence and direct exposure to adversaries, and the conflict turning from a 'war from afar' to a direct confrontation. Therefore, completely abandoning the proxies is highly unlikely because it is equivalent to abandoning the philosophy of influence itself."

But on the other hand, according to Abdul Hamid, “the state and function of the arms can change. If we look now, we find a qualitative shift in the Lebanese arm represented by Hezbollah. We find it in a state of exhaustion. The Syrian arena has moved out of the Iranian orbit. In Iraq, there is no longer an area of ​​absolute influence as it was previously. In Yemen, the Houthis have become the most active arm, and this is their role coming. From here, we are facing a transition from a cohesive network of arms led by Tehran to a turbulent network of varying capabilities that does not operate with the previous efficiency. This means that the arms have lost central discipline and the ability to work as a single system. From here, Iran’s choice becomes not to abandon or keep, but either to readjust this network or to be content with using it as tools of disruption, not as tools of resolution. I believe that things are moving towards the second possibility.”

Sherif Abdul Hamid is an Egyptian researcher and political analyst specializing in Iranian affairs. He is the head of the Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, a research center that studies Iranian policies and their regional and international repercussions. He also oversees the journal "Iranian Affairs" and is considered a prominent scholar analyzing political and strategic shifts in Iran and the region, with regular participation in seminars and discussions specializing in Middle Eastern issues.

ANHA