Egyptian Expert: Turkey uses Kurdish issue for electoral gains, not real peace

An academic specializing in Kurdish and Middle Eastern affairs has criticized Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish issue, arguing that Ankara is using the peace process and dialogue with the Kurds as part of its political and electoral calculations rather than as a genuine effort to address the root causes of the issue, amid growing doubts about the prospects of a sustainable political settlement.

Egyptian Expert: Turkey uses Kurdish issue for electoral gains, not real peace
4 June, 2026   04:25
NEWS DESK

Amid rising political and economic challenges inside Turkey, questions are increasingly being raised about the impact of the country’s internal crisis and electoral calculations on the future of the Kurdish issue and the prospects for resuming the peace process.

In this context, Mahmoud Zayed, an academic at Cairo University specializing in Kurdish and Middle Eastern affairs, said that what is happening in Turkey today cannot be separated from the broader regional developments and their serious implications for a “new Middle East,” in which Turkey has become one of the pillars of its future. He added that Turkey has shifted from a functional regional role to becoming an integral part of the arena of transformation. According to him, its current political crisis is deeply intertwined with upcoming electoral calculations and the Kurdish issue, pushing Ankara to treat the peace process called for by leader Abdullah Ocalan either as a tactical maneuver or a strategic necessity.

Zayed noted that important considerations shape the government’s approach to current developments, including the possibility of constitutional amendments and concerns over electoral outcomes.

He further explained that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are seeking a constitutional and legal formula that would allow him to run for another term or secure political advantage in the event of early elections, pointing out that the Kurdish vote could become a decisive factor in any upcoming election or constitutional referendum.

He added that recent moves by Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli could be interpreted as an attempt to win over or at least neutralize the Kurdish public in order to prevent it from aligning with the traditional opposition.

Zayed also stated that the Turkish government would “exploit” the peace process file as a tool to reshuffle political alliances, taking advantage of opposition divisions and placing it in a difficult position before Turkish public opinion through the narrative of “counterterrorism versus peaceful settlement,” which it raises whenever needed.

He stressed that internal Turkish calculations are directly linked to regional shifts in Syria and Iraq, noting that Ankara views any internal peace process as a tool to secure its external front and prevent the expansion of armed Kurdish influence along its southern borders amid Middle Eastern transformations.

On recent measures taken against opposition forces and their implications for restructuring Turkey’s political landscape, Zayed said that whether the latest judicial and security actions against the Turkish opposition are politicized or not, the current government will use them to create a pre-emptive political structure that goes beyond traditional competition and establishes a political formula ensuring the continuity of the current system and securing its constitutional ambitions.

He warned that this represents a dangerous turning point for Turkey’s political future, replacing ballot boxes with judicial rulings and decisions to manage party life, suppress freedoms, and marginalize strong competitors such as Ekrem İmamoğlu and Özgür Özel.

Mahmoud Zayed added that these developments could also reflect on the trajectory of the Kurdish issue, suggesting that the Turkish government may resort to freezing the peace process with the Kurds led by the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) in order to demonstrate that its previous steps were merely a “tactical maneuver” aimed at dismantling any potential rapprochement with the Turkish opposition, rather than a strategic willingness to make tangible constitutional or rights-based concessions.

He warned that this could lead to a loss of trust that the Kurds had initially extended, and may even pave the way for a return to armed struggle depending on regional and international developments.

Zayed also criticized the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) policies regarding the Kurdish file, stating—“in my view”—that the AKP deals with the Kurdish issue in a purely pragmatic manner, without taking into account what he described as rights that have been “usurped and denied for decades.” He argued that the party’s approach has oscillated between tactical openness and security hardline policies, citing evidence such as the dismissal of elected mayors in Kurdish regions and their replacement with government-appointed trustees.

He continued: “In addition, there is procrastination in responding to leader Ocalan’s peace initiative and a lack of legal steps supporting it. The government has focused instead on symbolic initiatives or political rhetoric (such as Devlet Bahçeli’s call regarding Öcalan), without presenting any concrete legislative or constitutional reform package that guarantees identity, cultural and linguistic rights, or strengthens decentralization. This means that the government’s efforts do not amount to recognition of Kurdish collective identity, but rather aim only at ‘disarming’ armed actors and ensuring security stability without any structural democratic or constitutional transformation of the centralized state.”

Security Hardline Policies Weaken Chances of a Political Solution to the Kurdish Issue

Among the most prominent criticisms directed at the AKP’s policies, according to academic and Kurdish affairs specialist Mahmoud Zayed, is the government’s reliance on a security and military approach in dealing with the Kurdish file, both inside and outside Turkey.

He pointed out that authorities continue to pursue Kurdish politicians and journalists on charges related to “terrorism,” which he described as vague, thereby restricting political activity and narrowing the public space for peaceful expression of Kurdish demands and rights.

He further noted that this strict security approach—based on excessive internal and external use of military and security tools and the prosecution of Kurdish politicians and journalists on broad “terrorism” charges—effectively closes the public sphere to peaceful expression.

On the impact of political and economic crises, Zayed believes they have pushed the government toward adopting greater hardline policies through a pragmatic approach that combines security escalation with political maneuvering according to the demands of each phase.

He added that, amid economic challenges and rising inflation, the authorities tend to reinforce nationalist rhetoric and highlight security threats in an effort to mobilize public support and divert attention from living and economic pressures.

On the relationship between internal developments and Turkish policy in northeastern Syria, Zayed stated: “I do not exaggerate when I say that Rojava, for the Justice and Development Party government, is a scapegoat onto which it projects its failures before Turkish public opinion, or a sounding board for internal conflicts in Turkey.”

He added: “More clearly, Turkish foreign policy in this file is a direct extension of internal security and electoral calculations, through exporting its failures, exploiting the refugee issue, and promoting its claim of an organic link between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Autonomous Administration. Whenever its political or economic crises worsen domestically, it resorts to exporting the crisis through northern Syria—either by carrying out destructive military operations in parts of Rojava, or by threatening such operations and occupying Kurdish territories under the pretext of creating a ‘safe zone.’ This is not only to silence Turkish public opinion, but also to force it to rally behind the national flag and postpone internal debates over economic failures under the slogan and scare tactic of what the Turkish government calls ‘national security and counterterrorism.’”

He further stated that political polarization inside Turkey stems from “two complex major files: first, the future constitutional relationship with the Kurds; and second, the rapidly evolving field and political dynamics in Syria under its interim government. The danger lies in transforming the Kurdish issue from a structural rights-based question into a mere electoral maneuver or tactic, which leads to an expanding trust deficit and makes a fundamental solution through peaceful dialogue impossible. This results in the government’s relationship with Kurdish forces being governed by ‘crisis management’—exploiting the crisis rather than resolving it.”

He continued that recent field developments in Syria, including ongoing understandings and shifts in northern and eastern regions of the country, have created a new reality that Ankara approaches cautiously, while keeping the option of military intervention open whenever its internal political calculations require it.

Zayed believes that Turkey remains committed to limiting the influence of the Autonomous Administration in northern and eastern Syria and strengthening its presence in areas it describes as “safe zones,” whether for security considerations, or as part of its efforts to address political pressures related to the refugee file, as well as its aim to prevent any geographical linkage between Kurdish regions in Syria and Turkey.

Three Scenarios for the Future of the Kurdish Issue in Turkey

Regarding the future of the Kurdish issue amid current developments, the academic and Middle East affairs specialist said: “Since Mr. Ocalan announced his peace initiative, Turkish Kurds have been making concessions without any reciprocal steps from the Turkish government. Some describe this as procrastination, but I consider it a pragmatic tactic, as I have explained. The future of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, amid these accelerating and intersecting developments, remains oscillating between ambitions for a historic settlement and the constraints of a complex political reality. Despite the historic mutual declarations and calls for disarmament mentioned earlier, the scene has entered a state of ‘de facto freezing’ due to the absence of legal reforms and the continuation of judicial prosecutions that have even reached Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP).”

Mahmoud Zayed presents three possible scenarios for the coming phase:

First scenario: continued stalemate and crisis management attempts.

This means the peace process remains suspended or frozen, without complete collapse and without moving toward parliamentary codification or legislation. In other words, the issue continues in its current state.

Second scenario: setback and return to full escalation.

This involves the complete breakdown of implicit understandings and a return to the familiar security-based approach, under two conditions: first, if Kurdish actors in Turkey become frustrated and lose hope in government reform promises that have repeatedly been delayed; and second, if the government concludes that the Kurdish file no longer yields constitutional or electoral gains, pushing it again to exploit military escalation domestically or across borders.

Third scenario: a comprehensive constitutional deal and settlement.

This is an optimistic scenario with weak probability. It would require the resumption of the peace process through legislative reforms, including the integration of fighters who lay down arms, recognition of certain cultural rights, and Kurdish support for fair constitutional amendments demanded by the government. However, this scenario faces strong nationalist rejection within the governing alliance, as well as a deep trust crisis resulting from recent judicial campaigns against democratic forces and the opposition in Turkey.

On the upcoming elections, Zayed said he does not expect a meaningful positive shift. If the current system continues to dominate, the Kurdish issue will remain a tactical tool through which the government pre-engineers the political scene—by sidelining strong opponents such as Ekrem İmamoğlu, maintaining the detention of leader Ocalan, and fragmenting any alliance between Kurds and the Turkish opposition—resulting in continued complexity and the absence of a fundamental solution.

He added that if the upcoming elections lead to a rise of the traditional opposition, there may be a temporary institutional and pluralistic democratic approach, especially since the DEM Party has shown solidarity with opposition leaders against recent judicial decisions. However, he noted that the legacy of Turkish nationalism within these parties would make structural concessions such as decentralization highly complex and politically sensitive, even in the event of their coming to power.

Zayed concluded that all of these assessments are inseparable from the broader ongoing transformations in the Middle East, stressing that the region’s future will not be the same as before the Russia–Ukraine war and the US–Israeli war on Iran, amid new equations imposed by global powers. He argued that the Kurdish space in the new order will depend on the extent of their leverage and negotiated agreements.

Dr. Mahmoud Zayed – Egyptian academic specializing in Kurdish and Middle Eastern affairs

ANHA