Syrian writer calls for partnership over control in Damascus

The implementation of the January 29 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Interim Government continues. However, some indicators suggest that the Interim Government has not been fully serious in fulfilling all its commitments, especially regarding lifting the siege on , and there is no sign yet of amending the constitutional declaration to secure the rights of all Syrians, including Kurds.

ANHA agency conducted an interview with Syrian writer and political activist Ali Al-Amin Al-Suweid. The full text follows:

Q: The provisions of the agreement between the SDF and the Interim Government are reportedly being implemented smoothly and flexibly. How do you view the importance of this?

A: Initially, the Syrian government did not explicitly announce the final terms of the agreement with the SDF. The lack of transparency itself indicates reservations about its content and a plan to potentially renege if favorable international and regional conditions arise.

Talking about smooth implementation should not hide the fact that these understandings, regardless of details, stem from mutual incapacity, not from a genuine commitment to partnership by Damascus. Damascus does not voluntarily reach out to the SDF—it is compelled by international pressures, often hidden behind public support statements, and because it recognizes that regaining control by force is no longer feasible. Meanwhile, the SDF participates because it knows that relying on U.S. support is not permanent, and European backing, led by France, has led to the acceptance of some of its requests.

The significance of this process is that, for the first time in decades, the state in all its forms is confronted with the idea of partnership rather than control. Yet the danger is that Damascus may use this openness temporarily to improve its negotiating position and then backtrack at the first opportunity.

Unless this flexibility evolves into a new national vision, we are on the brink of continued instability or frozen crises rather than resolution.

Q: How can the results of these understandings be consolidated, especially regarding political and constitutional measures by the Interim Government?

A: Unless Damascus moves from crisis management through waiting and pressure via proxies to confronting it with political courage, all agreements will remain hollow. Consolidating any agreement first requires changing the rules: announcing the agreement to the Syrian people, emphasizing commitment to it, not fearing genuine decentralization, establishing clear power distribution, and enabling real participation in decision-making.

This cannot be limited to good intentions or cosmetic amendments. Political reform must be enshrined in the constitution; otherwise, every understanding remains fragile, waiting for a moment when international balances shift, allowing one side to undermine the other.

Continuing the rigid centralized approach effectively reproduces the state while awaiting a new social explosion, which will only occur if encouraged. If the Syrian state’s structure does not open to diversity and accountability, stability will remain an illusion.

Q: What is required from the Interim Government to reassure Syrian communities, especially Kurds, and secure their rights?

A: No one is reassured by rhetoric without substance. Damascus must move from control to partnership. Any talk of reassuring Kurds without explicit constitutional recognition of their rights—and the rights of all other Syrian communities to manage local affairs and express cultural identities—is merely repeating the evasive approach that has accumulated crises.

Ending the security-focused approach toward Kurdish issues, as well as the Suwayda and other areas, is not optional but necessary. A state that fears its diversity wastes its own survival potential.

What is needed is a clear political program ensuring equality in rights and duties, making Syria’s diversity a source of strength rather than vulnerability. Only then can these understandings transform from an emergency maneuver into a cornerstone for a genuine national settlement.

The biggest challenge for Damascus today is not buying time but gaining trust. Time is no longer on its side. Unless it redefines itself as a citizen-based state rather than an authority-based state, it will lose the remainder of its domestic legitimacy.

ANHA