Syrian writer calls for inclusive constitution reflecting Syria’s diversity

ANHA agency conducted an interview with Syrian writer and journalist Abdul Aziz Hamdoush to explore his vision on the foundations upon which the new Syrian constitution should be based, ways of addressing issues of diversity and the rights of different components, and the most suitable form of government for Syria in the coming phase, following the appointment and selection of the majority of parliament members in Syria and discussions about the approaching convening of its first session.

The interview is as follows:

Q: What are the most important principles and characteristics that the new Syrian constitution should include to ensure the establishment of a pluralistic democratic state and gain the acceptance of Syrians?

Syria entered a decisive historical phase after the fall of the previous regime on December 8, 2024, the abolition of the 2012 Constitution, and the subsequent criticism directed at the 2025 Constitutional Declaration for its failure to adequately address Syria’s pluralistic reality. Therefore, drafting a permanent constitution represents the cornerstone, the highest social contract, and the primary preventive and remedial formula for preventing the recycling of the causes of the crisis and avoiding the creation of a new environment of tension. It is also essential for healing the wounds of suffering and ensuring sustainable civil peace.

We must begin by understanding the importance of a constitution not merely as a rigid legal document or a transitional political statement, but as the supreme social contract that binds the citizens of one nation together and regulates the relationship between the individual and the state. The upcoming constitution should embody the historical lessons and legal and political experiences derived from the Syrian crisis and should be worthy of the sacrifices made. Accordingly, the constitution must serve as a legal reference on two fundamental levels:

The first is preventive, through the formulation of “supra-constitutional principles” that recognize ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity as a historical reality that transcends political changes and forms of government, while establishing clear limits on the distribution of powers and preventing overreach.

The second is remedial, by providing an unequivocal framework for resolving disputes and interpreting constitutional provisions through independent judicial institutions that can protect the country from chaos in times of political deadlock.

To achieve this, the constitution should include a set of fundamental principles:

First, explicit recognition of Syria’s diverse social mosaic as a shared national heritage, along with the protection of linguistic and cultural rights for all communities.

Second, institutionalizing full and equal citizenship without discrimination and abolishing ethnic or religious privileges in access to senior public positions, so that competence and democratic election become the primary criteria, thereby strengthening national belonging.

Third, ensuring a complete separation of powers and safeguarding judicial independence financially and administratively so that the judiciary remains a refuge for those seeking justice.

Fourth, adopting broad decentralization by granting provinces extensive developmental and cultural powers that eliminate marginalization while preserving the unity of the country's territory, with sovereign matters remaining under the authority of the central government.

Finally, constitutionalizing human rights and international human rights conventions, criminalizing arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance as crimes not subject to statutes of limitations, and embedding mechanisms of transitional justice and redress as mandatory requirements for national recovery.

Q: What lessons can be learned from previous Syrian constitutions, and to what extent did they succeed in representing the country's ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity?

A review of Syrian constitutional history reveals a sharp fluctuation between protecting diversity and monopolizing power.

The 1920 Constitution emerged with a highly advanced liberal spirit. It recognized broad administrative decentralization and granted extensive powers to local regions. It is often described as the finest constitution in Syrian history and represented a project for a democratic parliamentary monarchy. However, its effectiveness ended after only four months due to the French occupation.

During the French Mandate, the Syrian Federation system was established in 1922, at a time when Syria was divided into sectarian entities. Subsequently, the 1930 Constitution affirmed the unity of Syria but granted the country only limited independence and sovereignty, constrained by Article 116.

The 1950 Constitution, adopted after independence, established a balanced parliamentary system that sought to prevent authoritarianism by placing effective executive power in the hands of a prime minister accountable to parliament.

However, in terms of identity politics, it was exclusionary. It failed to clearly recognize the cultural and linguistic identities of non-Arab communities and opened the door to controversy regarding the religion of the President of the Republic, despite the largely symbolic nature of the office. This reflected the broader conflict between secular and religious political currents.

The most dangerous turning point came with the 1973 Constitution under Ba'ath Party rule. Article 8 legally institutionalized the party’s monopoly over both the state and society. In a serious legal violation, professional associations, popular organizations, and youth groups (Pioneers, Youth Union, and university students) were effectively nationalized, along with cultural and intellectual life. “Arabism,” according to the exclusive Ba'athist interpretation, was imposed as the defining identity of the Syrian state rather than a broader national identity, while other identities were marginalized and excluded. Diversity itself became a security concern, transforming the constitution from a legal framework into a tool for disciplining society and a security mechanism for preserving the ruling authority.

The 2012 Constitution came as a formal attempt to absorb public anger. Although it ostensibly abolished Article 8, it retained the President’s extensive powers and failed to reflect Syria’s true diversity. As a result, it remained an instrument serving the regime rather than a constitutional reference capable of providing preventive and remedial solutions to the crisis. Instead of addressing the causes of the conflict, it inherited and perpetuated them.

All of these constitutions—particularly the Ba'ath-era constitution—created conditions of tension, distrust, and marginalization because they failed to accommodate Syria’s inherently pluralistic nature. This contributed to making political change a violent process.

Q: How can the new constitution guarantee the rights of all Syrian components and strengthen coexistence and civil peace after years of conflict?

The permanent constitution must completely dismantle the old authoritarian system. It should not merely serve as a document regulating power but should become a consensual social contract that guarantees the rights of all communities and promotes civil peace.

To achieve this, the constitution should adopt the concept of an “inclusive and open national identity” by explicitly recognizing pre-national identities and the various ethnic, religious, and cultural affiliations of Syrians, including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Muslims, and Christians. It should protect their cultural and linguistic rights by granting local languages official status within their respective geographic areas alongside Arabic, thereby addressing fears of assimilation and historical denial.

The constitution should also strengthen coexistence by eliminating sources of ideological privilege and avoiding discriminatory provisions regarding access to senior public offices. Electoral choice and professional competence should be the decisive criteria. Furthermore, it should constitutionalize an expanded decentralized system that clearly distributes powers and grants regions broad authority in local administration, internal security, and economic development, while reserving the four sovereign matters—defense, foreign policy, currency, and borders—to the central government.

Drawing on historical lessons, the constitution should prohibit political exclusion and prevent any party from monopolizing public life or being constitutionally designated as a “leading party.” It should also guarantee the right to work and a dignified standard of living as rights linked to citizenship rather than political loyalty. Collective dismissals and administrative purges based on ethnic or political affiliation should be criminalized to prevent livelihoods from becoming tools of coercion.

To protect these rights, a system of checks and balances must be established through a strict separation of powers, limiting the executive branch’s authority and creating an independent Constitutional Supreme Court with financial and administrative autonomy. Such a court would resolve political deadlocks and disputes concerning constitutional interpretation and legal boundaries.

Finally, the constitution must institutionalize mechanisms of transitional justice and redress. Independent bodies should be established to determine the fate of missing persons and restore confiscated property. Torture and enforced disappearance should be criminalized as offenses not subject to statutes of limitation, making the judiciary the sole authority for healing deep social divisions rather than allowing a culture of mutual revenge to prevail.

Q: What form of government is most suitable for Syria in the coming phase, and how can the demands of different communities be addressed within the framework of the Syrian state?

The most appropriate system of government for Syria—one capable of addressing the demands of various communities and preventing the re-emergence of authoritarianism—is a pluralistic parliamentary system based on broad decentralization.

We believe this model represents the safest legal and political formula for dismantling the legacy of excessive centralization and reversing the effects of concentrated executive power. It is built on a structural triangle that combines consensual parliamentarianism, decentralization, and equal citizenship. This approach transforms the constitution into a remedial framework that reassures communities regarding their developmental and cultural particularities at the local level while ensuring their participation in sovereign decision-making at the national level, thereby preventing any single actor from monopolizing the country’s future.

Historical experience, particularly that of the 1950 Constitution, demonstrates that presidential and semi-presidential systems in societies emerging from crises often face the problem of concentrating and personalizing power. A parliamentary system can avoid this by distributing authority and facilitating its peaceful transfer. Executive power would be exercised by a prime minister emerging from a parliamentary majority or a broad political coalition, thereby encouraging partnerships and sustainable consensus in governing the country.

In addition, a bicameral parliament should be established to protect smaller communities from the “tyranny of numbers” and purely majoritarian democratic practices. The two chambers would be structured as follows:

First: The House of Representatives

Representing citizens according to population size through a proportional electoral system that ensures the participation of all political forces.

Second: The Council of Regions or Senate

Representing all Syrian regions equally regardless of demographic size. It would possess exclusive powers concerning sovereign affairs, judicial appointments, and the approval of laws related to the cultural and national rights of different communities. This chamber would also protect the interests of smaller groups through a form of constitutional veto power designed to safeguard their unique characteristics and rights.

Due to that stability is conditioned by the unity of the entity and the dynamism of diversity, the demands of various components must be institutionalized legally through three pathways:

First, the combination of decentralization and central sovereignty, treating it as a shared national framework.

Second, the constitutionalization of cultural and linguistic rights as a national heritage, and recognizing the languages of different components as official within their natural regions.

Third, establishing a positive state neutrality by separating identity from privilege, and ensuring equal distance from all citizens. The state should be defined by an inclusive Syrian national identity without ethnic or religious coloring in its official name, symbols, or institutions, while abolishing all discriminatory conditions.

Q: To what extent can the experience of the Autonomous Administration’s social contract be used in drafting a new constitution, particularly regarding the rights of components and gender equality?

The social contract experience of the Autonomous Administration is a living field experience and a purely Syrian milestone that cannot be ignored. It was formulated under exceptional and harsh circumstances and takes into account the specific needs of local communities.

This experience succeeded in moving beyond an exclusionary monolithic identity mindset by constitutionally recognizing the historical, ethnic, and linguistic existence of all components—Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Syriacs, Armenians, and Circassians.

It also represented a regional breakthrough by breaking male monopolization of power and enforcing a 50% representation quota for women in decision-making positions. This experience should be utilized by constitutionalizing a strict women’s quota system and criminalizing gender-based violence and legislative discrimination against women in order to ensure civil peace.

It has also proven that managing daily affairs through elected local and municipal councils is the most effective way to dismantle bureaucracy and reduce marginalization. This allows the new constitution to adopt an expanded decentralized system that clearly distributes powers to manage local affairs according to the specificities of each region or province, while fully preserving the sovereignty and unity of the Syrian state.

While there are some criticisms of the social contract experience, they do not diminish its value as a national asset demonstrating Syrians’ ability—when freed from oppressive centralization—to develop advanced forms of coexistence and power-sharing. The new constitution must reflect this mosaic as a preventive framework that permanently ends authoritarianism.

Q: What is the most appropriate mechanism for drafting a new constitution that meets all the requirements of Syrian society?

The most appropriate mechanism lies in strict adherence to legitimacy in constitution-making and a consensual structure to avoid rejection, as happened with the 2025 constitutional declaration due to the lack of genuine representation.

To ensure public acceptance, the constitution must be drafted through four integrated procedural and legal stages:

First: Election of a constituent assembly based on fair pluralistic representation using a full proportional system, with strict quotas for ethnic and religious components, and a women’s quota between 30% and 50%, supported by advisory chambers of technocrats and independent judges to ensure legally sound and depoliticized drafting.

Second: Adoption of the principle of “consensus, not numerical dominance,” rejecting rule by majority alone, which can create domination by the largest group and resentment among smaller groups. Sensitive provisions (identity, decentralization, linguistic rights, and resources) must be passed by a qualified majority of 66–75%, forcing political forces into dialogue and compromise.

Third: A public consultation phase through presenting the draft in open hearings across all provinces, and launching digital platforms to receive proposals from Syrians, allowing citizens to feel ownership of the constitution and ensuring it reflects public sentiment.

Fourth: A final popular referendum under independent judicial supervision and international monitoring, giving the Syrian people’s vote the highest constitutional legitimacy and transforming the constitution into a reference that protects equal citizenship and prevents monopolization of the present and future.

ANHA