Syrian Political and Academic Expert: SDF-Damascus Agreement faces major obstacles

The agreement is linked to temporary security arrangements, and there are many obstacles that prevent it from becoming a lasting solution. These include ongoing disagreements over the nature and structure of the state, Turkish interventions, and the closed ideology of the Interim Government.

The news center reported that both the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Interim Government have continued to implement the agreements between them regarding northern and eastern Syria, the latest being the January 29 agreement. In recent days, some progress has been made in implementing this agreement, including the appointment of SDF General Command member Siban Hamo as Deputy Minister of Defense for the eastern region, the return of about 400 families to Afrin, and the opening of additional roads. Some prisoners have also been exchanged between the two sides, but the agreement remains incomplete.

On the implications of these developments and their impact on Syria and unresolved Syrian issues, ANHA Agency conducted an extensive interview with Dr. Yahya Al-Aridi. The text of the interview is as follows:

Q: How important is this agreement as a potential step toward a political solution in Syria?

The importance of this agreement lies in its being a temporary security arrangement, not a sustainable settlement for a political solution in Syria. Its clauses reflect an attempt to manage the balance of power on the ground rather than address the root political causes of the crisis related to the future nature of the Syrian state and the social contract among its components.

Most of the agreement’s clauses are about containing armed conflict. Instead of recognizing the Kurdish forces as legitimate local forces that could be cooperated with, the agreement aimed to contain these forces within the state structure, apparently as an attempt to dismantle them over time. The lack of clarity on this matter could lead to a repetition of armed conflict.

From a geopolitical perspective, the agreement appears to give the transitional authority a chance to gradually restore sovereign control over areas that had been outside its direct influence for years. Integrating autonomous administration institutions into state institutions and deploying Interior Ministry forces represents, practically, a step toward dismantling the semi-independent political structure formed in northeastern Syria during the war.

In this context, the agreement can be understood as part of a broader strategy aimed at recentralizing political and security authority, which may be interpreted by some local actors as an attempt to impose a new political reality based on the gradual subjugation of areas outside central control.

One of the main weaknesses of the agreement is that it does not rely on a comprehensive constitutional or political framework. Understandings regarding civil or educational rights for the Kurdish community are general and not tied to a clear constitutional process that could turn these rights into legally binding state obligations.

Therefore, the agreement does not constitute a political settlement for the Kurdish issue in Syria but is merely a temporary administrative and security understanding. Any sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue requires a clear constitutional framework, a definition of decentralization or local governance, and legal guarantees for cultural and political rights—elements not clearly reflected in the agreement’s clauses.

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The agreement also raises the issue of the political legitimacy of the transitional authority. Concluding security and administrative understandings with major local forces like the SDF can be interpreted politically as a practical recognition of the transitional government’s authority, portraying it as capable of representing the Syrian state and negotiating on its behalf. This benefits the transitional authority, which is structurally linked to radical extremist groups. Clearly, a political solution in Syria is unlikely while this authority exists.

Q: How do you assess what has been achieved so far since the signing of the agreement?

What has been achieved so far is limited to managing the conflict and preventing escalation. This is a strategic testing phase between two parties, each trying to gauge the other’s strength and intentions. So far, the agreement has not resulted in structural changes to military control or the political administration in the region. The SDF still maintains its core military structure, and there has been no actual transfer of authority to central institutions or a fundamental restructuring of local governance.

The relationship between the two parties remains highly cautious. Each side understands that any rapid move toward full integration of forces or institutions could carry strategic risks. Therefore, the slow implementation of the agreement’s clauses can be interpreted as a gradual test of intentions. The transitional authority is testing whether the SDF is ready to give up part of its military and political independence, while the SDF is testing whether the authority’s ultimate goal is partnership within the state or re-imposition of central control.

Practically, the slow implementation must be understood in the broader context of regional power balances. Northeastern Syria is a nexus of multiple forces: the United States, Turkey, Russia, and local actors. In this complex environment, the agreement may serve both parties as a way to buy time until the contours of regional balances become clearer. The transitional authority seeks to gradually consolidate its political position without opening a new front that could drain it, while the SDF aims to preserve its gains while awaiting international policy outcomes for the region.

Q: Which clauses were supposed to be implemented but haven’t been yet?

Three main areas were expected to see tangible progress since the signing of the agreement, but remain stalled:

Military File:

This is the most complex, as it concerns defining the state’s monopoly on military force. The agreement was supposed to establish a clear framework for the relationship between the Syrian army and the SDF, either through gradual integration mechanisms or by defining which units would be absorbed into the official military structure.

So far, there are no clear indications of an actual restructuring of military arrangements. Appointing SDF-affiliated figures to the Ministry of Defense—such as Siban Hamo—does not by itself create a joint military structure or unified military doctrine. The key question remains: Will the SDF become part of the Syrian army, or remain a semi-independent force under a special security arrangement? This question goes to the heart of the relationship between the center and regional actors in Syria’s future state.

Political File:

The agreement was supposed to address the future of autonomous administration in northeastern Syria, including defining the relationship between local institutions and the central authority. However, there is no clear vision yet on whether the autonomous administration will continue in its current form, be transformed into a local governance model within a decentralized administrative framework, or be dismantled and fully reintegrated into central state institutions. Due to this lack of clarity, the political relationship between the two sides remains unresolved in a transitional and uncertain space.

Economic File:

This is one of the most geopolitically sensitive issues, as northeastern Syria contains the largest share of Syria’s oil and gas resources. The agreement was supposed to establish a clear mechanism for managing these resources, including which party oversees them, how revenues are distributed, and the roles of central vs. local institutions. However, this file has seen no tangible progress, because natural resources are not just an economic matter—they are linked to influence and the ability to finance authority. The agreement provides a framework for understanding, but has not yet resulted in the actual restructuring of political and security systems in North and East Syria.

Q: What are the main obstacles preventing the implementation of the agreement?

The most fundamental factor obstructing the agreement is not just the mechanisms for integrating forces or managing local institutions, but the conflict over the nature of the Syrian state. There are conflicting visions for Syria’s post-war structure:

The transitional authority leans toward reproducing a strong centralized state that monopolizes political and military power and reunifies institutions under central control—the model that governed Syria before 2011.

Kurdish forces argue that any genuine political settlement must include some form of decentralization, granting local administrations wide powers over their political, economic, and cultural affairs.

Regional factor and Turkey’s role:

Turkey represents a major geopolitical constraint. Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it considers a threat to national security. Any political or military arrangement giving the SDF a stable position within Syria’s state structure may be interpreted in Turkey as legitimizing a hostile security entity near its borders. This makes implementation dependent on broader regional calculations beyond the direct control of the two local parties.

Influence of the U.S. military presence:

The U.S. military presence in northeastern Syria is crucial in shaping the balance of power. It provides the SDF with a security and political umbrella, limiting the ability of any other party to impose a unilateral settlement by force. At the same time, it restricts the transitional authority, which cannot act militarily or politically in the region without considering U.S. positions. This balance confines the agreement to a narrow margin of temporary understandings rather than allowing it to evolve into a final settlement.

Nature of the transitional authority:

This represents one of the most significant obstacles. The authority cannot be relied upon to deliver on its promises or to construct Syria’s political future through dialogue or compromise. Since assuming power, most agreements with the Kurdish component have been driven by international pressure within geopolitical balances. It is unrealistic to depend on a government linked to extremist ideologies and a centralized, exclusionary agenda to craft a sustainable political settlement.

Q: What could result from continued delays in implementing the agreement?

Continued delays open the door to several possible scenarios:

Most likely, the agreement risks becoming merely a political umbrella for managing tensions between the parties, without addressing core issues related to authority, governance, and resource management. Lack of transparency during some negotiation stages—particularly by the transitional authority, which struggles to balance pragmatic political requirements with its ideological rhetoric—further fuels uncertainty and distrust about the agreement’s future.

Another scenario is that continued delays could reopen space for military escalation or regional interventions, especially as international and regional balances shift. In a highly fluid Middle Eastern environment, any change in the positions of major regional or global powers could rapidly alter the equation, prompting local actors to resort to military force to strengthen their negotiating positions.

A final word on these agreements:

The agreements made between the SDF and Al-Jolani’s authority cannot be read merely as field arrangements or temporary security understandings; they carry a deeper political impact by granting Al-Jolani a degree of political legitimacy through his treatment as an authority capable of representing the state and negotiating on its behalf. Even if implicit or unannounced, this legitimacy helps consolidate his position within the Syrian scene at a highly sensitive transitional moment.

However, relying on Al-Jolani as a guarantor of Kurdish interests or as a partner in building a stable political future for Syria remains a risky bet. Historical experience in the region shows that regimes or forces with a closed ideological background often view temporary understandings as tools for reshuffling power balances rather than long-term strategic commitments.

Therefore, protecting Kurdish interests and Syria’s future as a multi-component state cannot rely on narrow bilateral understandings. It requires a broader national framework based on a political alliance among Syrian civilian and military forces that intersect in rejecting the reproduction of exclusionary governance patterns.

The most realistic path is to build a national political front aimed at redefining a comprehensive Syrian political project based on pluralism and partnership. Political legitimacy should be grounded in broad national representation, not in military balance or facts on the ground. Only within such a framework can any legitimacy imposed by force be undermined, opening the way for a political process that truly reflects the interests of all Syrian communities.

ANHA