Syria on anniversary of Revolution… ongoing challenges facing country

In recent years, Syrians have witnessed many developments and events, and there have been numerous factors and reasons that deepened the Syrian crisis. Among them was the Ba'ath regime’s insistence on the policy of excluding all opinions and forces, in addition to the Turkish occupation’s use of mercenaries as a tool, leading eventually to the fall of the Baathist regime and the transitional phase that followed.

The spark in the south and the regime’s attempt to impose a military solution

Amid the spread of the winds of the “Arab Spring,” Syrians launched their popular movement on March 15, 2011. It began in Daraa in the south following an uprising against the Ba'ath regime after it arrested several children for writing anti-government slogans. These protests quickly expanded.

In March 2012, the Ba'ath regime directed its military arsenal toward Homs, attacking the Baba Amr neighborhood and declaring control over it after fierce fighting that lasted about 26 days. In July of the same year, the Syrian crisis took another turn when state television announced the deaths of Defense Minister Dawoud Rajha, his deputy Assef Shawkat, and Hassan Turkmani, assistant to Bashar al-Assad’s deputy, in an explosion that targeted the “Syrian National Security” building in the Rawda district of Damascus.

Turkey floods Syrian cities with mercenaries and extremists

Turkey opened its airports to receive mercenaries from all over the world and facilitated their passage into Syrian territory. It also turned its borders into crossings through which weapons flowed to mercenaries in Syria and provided them with all forms of material, moral, and medical support. Meanwhile, Iran mobilized Shiites wherever they were and sent them to Syria to fight alongside the Syrian regime.

With the increasing arrival of foreign mercenaries from around the world and the use of sectarian and nationalist incitement in the region as a means of recruiting fighters, ISIS mercenaries occupied vast areas of Syria and Iraq in the summer of 2014.

Russia intervenes directly

In 2014, Syrian regime forces suffered a major collapse, as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) took control of large areas in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Daraa, Homs, and Quneitra, leaving the regime’s presence limited mainly to major cities.

As a result, Russia intervened and signed an agreement with the regime in August 2015 granting Russian military forces the right to use the Hmeimim Air Base at any time without payment and for an indefinite period. Beginning in September 2015, Russia strengthened its military presence in Syria.

A different path in North and East Syria… social contract and elections

Simultaneously with the collapse experienced by the Syrian regime and its withdrawal from Syrian areas, leaving residents vulnerable to ISIS mercenaries, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) took on the task of preserving the three cantons of the Democratic Autonomous Administration DAA that were declared in Rojava in January 2014: Jazira, Afrin, and Kobani. This administration later expanded to include areas of North and East Syria.

The Autonomous Administration worked to implement the theory of the Democratic Nation, based on the principles of the brotherhood of peoples. It succeeded in bringing together all components of the region, strengthening civil peace, and preserving and developing vital Syrian facilities.

The U.S. administration observed the effectiveness of the YPG and YPJ in combating ISIS. Therefore, after the announcement of the International Coalition to Combat ISIS in 2014, coalition forces provided air support to the YPG and YPJ, especially during the Battle of Kobani in September 2014. This support continued later until the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which helped liberate Syrian territories from ISIS.

Numerous negotiations burden Syrians

Russia, Turkey, and Iran held 22 rounds of Astana meetings starting on January 23–24, 2017, to discuss the Syrian crisis without the participation of those directly affected. However, the goals and outcomes of the discussions were clear: the continuation of Russian-Turkish understandings and attacks on the project of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

Turkey exploited this agreement to occupy Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Tel Abyad (Gire Spi), as well as parts of the countryside of Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo. In return, Russia enabled the Assad regime to regain control over large areas of Syria. During these meetings, Russia also worked to gather armed groups in northwestern Syria, especially in Idlib before later turning against its Astana partners and supporting a military operation that ultimately led to the fall of the Assad regime.

Geneva witnessed numerous rounds of negotiations between the parties to the Syrian conflict starting on June 30, 2012. However, they failed for several reasons, most notably the absence of representatives of the Syrian people and disagreements among the concerned parties over the interpretation of the agreement’s provisions. Likewise, the Sochi Syrian Dialogue Conference on January 30, 2018 failed to produce any significant results, and eight rounds of meetings of the “Constitutional Committee” were unable to achieve any progress.

Southern Syria raises its voice again

With the success of the Democratic Autonomous Administration project in the North and East Syria region, residents of Swedia sought to follow a similar path. To some extent, they managed to limit the role and authority of Syrian regime forces. Young men in the region refused compulsory military service, and local forces as well as some councils and political offices were formed. This led to clashes between the residents of Swedia and the regime’s security agencies.

Protests in Swedia took on a continuous nature, coinciding with the announcement by civil society forces and the Syrian Liwa Party of the formation of local administrative committees to perform some service functions of institutions. Organizers stated that this step was intended to prepare for developing and organizing the movement more effectively.

Failed rapprochement between the Assad regime and the Turkish occupation

The Syrian crisis witnessed an important turning point in 2022. Despite years of hostility between Turkey and the Syrian regime and Turkey’s occupation of several Syrian territories, a rapprochement process began between the two sides following the Tehran summit attended by Astana representatives on July 19, 2022.

The presidents of Russia and Turkey met in Moscow on August 6. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan revealed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had proposed during the talks resolving the crisis in cooperation with the Syrian regime. Later, the defense ministers of Russia, Turkey, and the Assad regime met in Moscow. However, these meetings did not develop into a political process and the path eventually reached a dead end.

Arab States give the Assad regime a lost opportunity

After the devastating earthquake on February 6, 2023, most Arab countries contacted the Syrian regime and sent humanitarian aid. Assad visited the Sultanate of Oman for the first time, and Russian efforts succeeded in restoring Syria’s membership in the Arab League. However, this had no tangible impact on the situation in Syria, particularly politically and economically.

According to what became apparent, the Assad regime failed to meet the demands of Arab states, especially regarding distancing itself from Iran, helping reduce the influence of Iranian militias in Syria, and refraining from supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. It also failed to implement political and economic reforms that could help the country emerge from the crisis.

Turkey betrays its Astana partners… The fall of the Assad regime

Despite the many years since the Syrian revolution began and the rising number of Syrian casualties, which deepened the humanitarian crisis, the Syrian regime did not change its policies. Domestically, it continued the policy of exclusion, repression, and adherence to an authoritarian and criminal mentality. Externally, it failed to respond to Russian initiatives and Western pressure aimed at reducing Iran’s influence and that of its militias. It also did not respond to Russian efforts to achieve rapprochement with Ankara.

All of this led to the formation of a regional and international stance against the Assad regime. Assad’s final steps before the fall of his regime, particularly his insistence on maintaining ties with Hezbollah were a major factor in accelerating its collapse.

During and after the fall of the Assad regime, the negative role of Turkey became clear. Over the past years, it had worked to eliminate the role of democratic, national, and civil forces in Syria, while strengthening the influence of radical Islamist groups that include thousands of foreign fighters, particularly from Uyghur and Chechen backgrounds. These forces, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), eventually came to power in Syria.

The post-regime phase… A path similar to the past

Despite Syrians’ hopes that decades of tyranny and oppression had ended, the authorities of the interim government in Syria moved from the outset to attempt to impose their control over the country. They excluded various political, sectarian, and ethnic currents while trying to exploit regional and international support following the fall of Assad.

From the beginning, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham monopolized the management of the transitional phase through what it called the “Victory Conference,” as well as the formation of the Syrian army. At the same time, it launched what was called a “national dialogue” that did not include the true representatives of Syrians. This process even extended to drafting a “constitutional declaration” similar to Baath Party constitutions in entrenching domination and authoritarianism.

This government relied on escalating hate speech and incitement, which led to massacres in the Syrian coast against the Alawite sect. Between March 6 and March 10, 2025, the coastal regions witnessed bloody violence that, according to human rights reports and local testimonies, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians.

These crimes were repeated in Swedia, where attacks were launched by the government and factions affiliated with it, and massacres were committed against the Druze population in an attempt to impose control. However, these attacks were repelled by local Druze factions led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who announced the organization of forces there under the name “National Guard” and the formation of local administrative committees in Druze areas.

Following that, the government began inciting against the regions of North and East Syria, particularly the Kurds in violation of the March 10, 2025 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government. The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya neighborhoods were besieged and attacked. Despite an agreement on the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces and later the Internal Security Forces (Asayish), the attacks continued, reaching Deir Hafer, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, from which the SDF withdrew in order to preserve civilian lives.

After the Syrian Democratic Forces, especially the Kurdish forces—strengthened defensive lines in the areas of Hasakah and Kobani, an agreement was reached on January 29 to continue the integration process between the institutions of the Autonomous Administration and the interim government in Syria. A governor nominated by the Syrian Democratic Forces was appointed, and the integration process is still ongoing. However, according to observers, this path continues to face numerous challenges.

ANHA