Mazloum Abdi: Merger means partnership, cannot be imposed by force  

The Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, described the integration as partnership. "The new Syria will be constructed based on a new partnership among all the components of the country," he said, "and it can't be forced. The people of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor wish to administer their own lives."

Mazloum Abdi: Merger means partnership, cannot be imposed by force  
4 August, 2025   06:40
NEWS DESK

The Middle East is witnessing accelerations of developments to set the future phase, and it can be said that Syria, primarily north and eastern Syria, stands at the focal point of these developments. The field is saturated with frantic diplomatic maneuvering, and the latest meeting of North and East Syrian delegation with Damascus was enigmatic, while the slighter meeting to be held in Paris has been postponed. The Kurds in North and East of Syria are working relentlessly for establishing real partnership and for participation in determining the fate of their country.

In most Syrian cities and provinces, instability and abuses continue to exist, yet negotiations continue concerning the Syrian constitution, the nature of the government, foreign policy, and many other topics.

North and East Syria becomes increasingly important as a focal point for the process in the context of the dynamics of events, while the United States, France, Turkey, and a number of other players make conflicting assessments and pursue different positions on these issues.

We thus raised all these questions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and asked him about relations with Damascus, current differences, obstacles, postponing the Paris conference, relations with Turkey, efforts in regard to Syria's future, the components' position and role, Kurdish efforts, and relations with international powers.

He answered all these questions.

Owing to the importance of the topic, the discussion will be provided in two parts. In the first, we emphasize concerns of relations with Damascus, points of conflict and overlap, the future Syrian government structure, and the positions and stands of the elements.

The first part of the interview is as follows:

Four months have passed since you and Ahmed al-Sharaa signed the March 10 (2025) Agreement. Four months may be short, but events in the Middle East move at a very high speed. As such, how do you assess these four months?

The March 10 Agreement was at a pivotal point. Last month, the region was witnessing war, and we were fighting in a difficult battle. There were also some problems in Syria, and there were clashes elsewhere in Syria. There was a need at this point to reach an agreement of this nature. It was needed for the ceasefire, the end of the war, and opening the door for negotiations, and agreeing on what the future of Syria would be. We agreed with the government of Damascus on these issues. At least no actual steps were taken in real life during these four months, but something was accomplished. There exists a ceasefire now, and we want to maintain it in a permanent state. Therefore, the meetings will continue.

Some things have been finalized, pragmatic steps have been taken, and these talks and meetings will continue. There is a desire to do so. The March 10 accord was signed directly by me and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. We agreed as two Syrian sides, and now there are many issues and points to be implemented. It was required that the existing international powers in Syria participate in this process so that we could take rational measures. Those interested nations in the Syrian case are now participating in these meetings. We wish to carry out this agreement together.

After the agreement, several delegation-level meetings were visited by Damascus and North and East Syria delegations. However, the July 9 meeting was very controversial, as it was marred by contradictions and discrepancies. What were the most significant differences that emerged during the meetings?

The prime reason for that meeting was to begin a new phase, where the implementation of the March 10 agreement was the main agenda. American and French officials made their inaugural appearance at the gathering. The gathering took place to announce officially about the initiation of a new series of gatherings, which also included the Americans and French. Confidence-building measures were scheduled. Many issues were discussed, and I can say that we reached an agreement on many issues, some of which were in the interest of North and East Syria, some of which were in the interest of all Syria, and others were common issues.

There were some issues that were not yet resolved and were not on the agenda. They were discussed in the last meeting but we were unable to decide on them. However, we will be addressing them in the upcoming phase. Thus, no conclusive outcome resulted out of that meeting. But there was an agreement to continue having meetings. We can say that, even with the disagreements, it did not appear that preparations for the meeting were sufficient to reach a final and successful outcome. Therefore, they were left for future meetings to be addressed.

Could you please clarify the issues that were not agreed upon or discuss further?

In fact, the two parties have never talked about them before, and meetings require preparation. The two sides must know ahead of time what the meeting is about, listen to the other party's view, and complete preparations. There were some things that we had not talked about and the two parties had not yet expressed their views on, so we could not come to a conclusion there, and the meeting was postponed.

After the July 9 meeting, the US representative to Syria, Tom Barrack, who also attended, had some criticism of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and there was some discontent and dissatisfaction expressed in the media. How do you see these trends towards North and East Syria, and has his position changed since those remarks?

The purpose of that meeting was to decide and act immediately. That's what the American representative expected, but it didn't turn out that way, so he did some criticism. The problem wasn't the content of the meetings, but the timing. We, on our part, appreciated that, but it was not possible to move in the desired direction with these preparations. I had phone calls with the representative of Donald Trump after the Damascus meeting. Then we met in Amman and discussed this issue thoroughly. Our discussions with Mr. Barak and his team are ongoing. I believe they also understood what the fundamental issues are and on what they need to work. The issue is not unilateral, but comprehensive issues. So, patience is needed, and we must be able to work on them together. I believe that they have also reached this conclusion. He has said to the media repeatedly that the Syrian Democratic Forces are ready for the meetings and have their own preparations, that they are serious, and wish to take concrete steps. They have now reached this conclusion. There are also some studies that suggest only the Kurds are in the lead, as if you're fighting in the name of the Kurds, but other components are not taken into account. Is that right or wrong? Is it obvious you're seeking an independent state?

In fact, we haven't talked about the Kurdish issue yet. The Syrian Democratic Forces haven't spoken about it, and we will, naturally. I will talk about that later in the discussion. But for now, we have other topics, practical, and more military and institutional in character. They relate to some of the things we need to do. The main thing is that these sessions are carried out in an orderly manner. We have not yet broached their content, so judgments of this sort are not accurate. We have not even begun.

A few days ago, in an interview, you said that you are not against the existence of one state and one army. This was greatly evaluated, with some parties even calling it a new position. Can you clarify this matter?

In Syria, especially among some parties, when you say something decentralized, they claim Syria has been partitioned. And if you tell them something else, they say: We don't know what's going on. So it's really crucial that we are clear about these matters. We've said it before, we've said it repeatedly, and we say it again: In the March 10 agreement, we agreed that Syria will not be divided. Syria is a state, and it's a state for all of us, and we are all Syrians. There are different components, but we are Syrians, we are living in Syria, and we have a homeland. And of course, this homeland will have a state. This is a state, not two states. It will have one army, and there cannot be two armies. And of course, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will be part of this army.

There can be only one army in any single country, not two. It must be internationally recognized as one for all of Syria.

The current Syrian flag is also being utilized here, and there is nothing incorrect about that. I do not think anyone in Syria actually feels differently.

However, sometimes things must be said explicitly to close the door on certain discussions.

They are waging a private war against us, and tales and analysis are being devised. Always they say, "They want to split the country, they want the wealth of the state for themselves." This is not so. In fact, we are the people who defended the borders of Syria more than anyone else. We protected this state's institutions in our areas, kept them from destruction, and placed them at the service of the people. There is a coexistence of all the components in this area: Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs. they all live together. In other words, there is a Syria in miniature here. These are some of the falsehoods deliberately aimed at the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, unfortunately.

That is why we have said again and with emphasis: We have no problem with the unity of the state, the army, and its institutions. On the contrary, we would like to be this state's most powerful and leading element, and to play a fundamental role therein. The March 10 agreement was clear: there will be integration, the institutions will be combined, and together we will build a new state, a new state that will be the new Syria, a state belonging to all of us.

The issue of integration is always on the agenda. Some interpret this word in different ways. What do you mean by integration?

Integration is partnership. Among all Syrians, among the elements of Syria, and among all the administrations that exist, there must be a new Syria built on the basis of a new partnership. It cannot be achieved by force, and from the beginning, we have opposed any attempt to achieve it by force. Secondly, it must be achieved by understanding. It is required that we sit and talk together. All of the constituents of Syria must reach an agreement. If a new constitution for Syria is drafted tomorrow, all the constituents of Syria must agree on it and recognize its government. The national institutions must also be designed in such a way that each side will feel they are its national institutions.

In recent periods, "local democracy" has been a much-used and widely discussed concept. How can it be? And how can the components and the regions take their place in it, according to their own will and vision?

Two points must be clearly stated. It is a fact that Kurds are one of the components, and the Kurds are an inseparable component of Syria. This is a specific issue, and its solution is also specific. But now, when we're talking about North and East Syria, and areas like Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Tabqa, and so on, the problems there are not the same. The solution to the Kurdish issue is not the solution to Deir ez-Zor's and Raqqa's problems. We cannot say we will resolve the Kurdish question and other questions in the same way.

The different components must be dealt with separately. When we talk about northern and eastern Syria, and the cantons of this region, it is only logical that the mechanisms for resolving them will differ from one region to another. In areas like Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, we have listened to the people; they would like to have their own local administration and would like to govern themselves. There, of course, the problem is not ethnic but administrative, and part of it is political. But for other components, like Syriacs and Kurds, there is also a national issue, and it must be resolved along with those issues.

What are you doing to realize this? You explained the components, and there are also Arabs, Armenians, and Syriacs in the autonomous regions. What are your steps toward the components other than North and East Syria? How can they articulate themselves and participate in the administration?

We can state that the present discussions are being built on two levels: a general level and a component level. We have not yet reached a full discussion for all components, Kurdish or otherwise. We are currently talking about the zones of North and East Syria as being in Syria, but because some 12 years ago they were separated from it, and other zones, such as Idlib, were also separated, so one of our most essential topics today is how we can be reunited. That is why we are discussing all Syrian territories, discussing military, administrative, and institutional matters, discussing the path of autonomous administration because it is an ongoing government that remains active.

But we are not yet at the stage where we can pose questions of national rights. When there is the need to talk about national rights, the current body (the North and East Syria representatives) will speak and state its opinion. The first section of the March 10 deal addresses these issues. Then we need to enter the specifics. Representatives from communities must sit and negotiate directly with the government and agree.

There, there were some meetings regarding the regime type in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. What were the outcomes of the aforementioned meetings? What do the communities require there?

There were two main objectives for these meetings. The first was to involve their representatives in the ongoing discussion. They already have representatives in the Committee for North and East Syria. This committee was formed so that later on, their official representatives could be decided in the discussion, so that they could present their views and have a visible voice.

The second objective was to test whether individuals in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa would want our forces to remain there, most of whom are themselves from those areas. We also sought to determine how they viewed the issue of integration.

The inhabitants of these areas were quite candid about self-rule. They said, "We wish Syria to be one and for a stable situation to exist, but we are veterans and we want to rule ourselves."

For instance, those living in Deir ez-Zor explained to us that they have a pre-existing administration there with between 20,000 and 30,000 civil and security staff, and that they have to keep going. There is a military unit made up of locals also, and the locals wish to see this continue, and not be ruled by a person from abroad. They stated that if they are to have a governor, it should be at their own discretion.

Deir ez-Zor is presently divided into two regions: one under the autonomous administration, and the other under Damascus. But they also said that there must be coordination and cooperation between the two regions.

Residents of Raqqah did, however, say that the governor and director of public security should be elected by them, and they do not want institutions imposed on them or bypassed by outside their area. They fear that this will not be organized, that it will not be together coordinated, that there will not be true integration, and that areas will rather become like Sweida and Daraa, i.e., on the periphery.

On our behalf, the Syrian Democratic Forces, we've demanded that we are supportive of an orderly process of integration and will abide by what is agreed. Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor are demanding their own local governance, and that their administration and personnel remain in place and work.

I said that Deir ez-Zor has its own characteristics, and that there are two sides to it, east and west of the Euphrates, so it should become a single governorate. Some parties say that the city center is in Damascus's hands, and therefore powers should be transferred to the transitional government in Syria. What is your opinion on this?

Not everyone may believe it, but the inhabitants dwelling on the east side of the border believe otherwise. They say, "It should be one governorate, but we must build it together." They want to reach an understanding that is based on respect and dignity, and they repeat this phrase quite often. This cannot be achieved by dissolving institutions in the name of centralization but must be achieved through joint action and protecting what already exists. The two parties (east and west of the Euphrates) can form a governorate as a single one in an equal ratio.

The question of security is most frequently discussed. Apart from the army, there exist border crossings and security forces. What now? And how to eliminate this problem?

We already have a ready scheme here, and it has been presented to all the international powers we are negotiating with and to the government of Damascus. I do not want to go into details, but this is something related to the foreign affairs of the state, and therefore it is important that it be linked to Damascus.

Lastly, relations with other nations are dealt with at the state level, but since the crossings are in our country, naturally we become part of them too. There has to be an institution that is linked to the center, but it does not mean it doesn't include the residents of the area.

Such economic resources as oil and others are still under hot debate. How will they be used in times of war and peace? And how will they be used to improve society?

This is one of the matters we will be discussing in Paris as well. The moment has come to raise this issue officially, clear the lines for it, and come to an understanding. Oil belongs to all of Syria, and all Syrian regions must benefit from it. We have said this time and time again, and we will say it again: we will attempt to solve this issue in the spirit of understanding and rapprochement.

But we have to realize that this region, beyond the Euphrates, has been abandoned by the Syrian state for centuries. After decades of abandonment and war, there is certainly a necessity to rebuild this region, and part of the oil money must be allocated there. What we have to do now is get together and settle on these points.

Tomorrow: Debate on the Kurdish issue, relations with Turkey, the position of international stakeholders, the possible meeting in Paris, and the fight against ISIS.

ANHA