Future of al-Hasakah regions between Jan. 29 agreement, new administrative arrangements

Following the agreement signed on January 29, 2026, between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syria’s Interim Government, under the sponsorship of the United States and France, the process of “democratic integration” between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration officially began.

The agreement entered into force on February 2, 2026. However, progress over the past five months has remained slow due to persistent mistrust between the two sides, ongoing political tensions, and institutional obstacles that continue to characterize the negotiations.

Despite this, communication between the parties has not ceased, and discussions have continued on multiple issues. Nevertheless, some recent steps taken by the Interim Government have sparked renewed debate about their compatibility with the spirit of the January 29 Agreement, particularly proposals concerning the administrative structure of al-Hasakah Governorate. The use of the term “Arab regions” has opened a new discussion regarding the political and demographic configuration of the area.

The January 29 agreement and the status of Kurdish areas

One of the key provisions of the agreement was the preservation of the unique administrative and social structure of the Kurdish-majority areas in North and East Syria. Under the agreement, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the institutions of the Autonomous Administration, and Syrian state institutions was to take place through a model of “democratic integration.”

The status of al-Hasakah Governorate was among the most sensitive aspects of the agreement. According to its terms, the region was expected to retain its institutional framework and local Kurdish identity, while its existing administrative, economic, and social structures would remain free from direct interference. Afrin and Kobani were designated as administrative units linked to Aleppo, while Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) was considered part of Raqqa Governorate.

Al-Hasakah Governorate includes numerous cities and towns, such as Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), Qamishlo, al-Darbasiyah, Amuda, Derik, Gerke Legê Jal Agha, Tirbespiyê , Tel Tamer, al-Shaddadi, al-Hasakah, al-Hol, Tel Kocher, and others. Arab population concentrations are particularly prominent in areas such as al-Shaddadi, Tel Brak, Tel Hamis, Tel Kocher, and al-Hol. Nevertheless, these areas have historically been part of the administrative structure of al-Hasakah Governorate.

The Term “Arab Regions” and new administrative debates

The increasing use of the term “Arab regions” in recent months by some circles within the Interim Government has intensified discussions about the possibility of granting certain areas within al-Hasakah a separate administrative status.

This trend has fueled speculation that areas such as al-Shaddadi, Tel Brak, Tel Hamis, Tel Kocher, and al-Hol could be placed under an independent administration labeled as “Arab regions.” Such possibilities have raised concerns about the fragmentation of the unified administrative structure envisioned by the January 29 Agreement.

The main objections stem from the view that this approach is not merely an administrative measure but could represent the beginning of a process that weakens the geographical and political unity of Kurdish-majority areas. Consequently, many Syrians regard this issue as a strategic matter that goes beyond the simple redrawing of administrative boundaries.

Has the “Arab Belt” policy returned?

These debates are also linked to the “Arab Belt” policy implemented during the Ba'athist era. Initiated in the 1960s, the policy aimed to establish a demographic belt along Syria’s North and East borders by settling Arab populations in predominantly Kurdish areas. This resulted in significant demographic changes whose consequences continue to affect the region today.

Some observers argue that the current discourse surrounding “Arab regions” represents a modern version of that policy. They contend that any new administrative divisions, particularly in northern and eastern al-Hasakah, could undermine the administrative cohesion of Kurdish areas.

In this context, the controversy extends beyond administrative boundaries to include issues of political representation, social balance, and the future governance model of Kurdish regions.

The appointment of Ziad al-Ayyash and the Deir ez-Zor connection

One notable development has been the appointment of Ziad al-Ayyash, who was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the January 29 Agreement, as Governor of Deir ez-Zor.

Al-Ayyash is known for his close ties with Arab tribal communities, particularly in eastern Syria, where he has built an extensive network of tribal relationships. For this reason, his appointment is not widely viewed as a routine administrative change.

According to some assessments, this move could increase the likelihood that Arab-majority areas of al-Hasakah may eventually be linked to an administrative framework centered in Deir ez-Zor, reviving discussions about the “Arab Belt” policy.

The debate over al-Hasakah and al-Shaddadi

Attention has also been drawn to meetings held by the presidential team in al-Shaddadi with representatives of tribal groups, political parties, independent figures, and various local actors.

The participation of political officials in these meetings suggested that the process extended beyond local consultations. The establishment of direct communication channels with the central government in al-Shaddadi has raised questions about the possibility of creating an alternative administrative center.

Although no official announcement has been made regarding the transfer of powers from al-Hasakah Governorate, these developments on the ground have strengthened interpretations suggesting that the integration process may be moving toward a new model of administrative coordination.

A Process caught between integration and competition

Taken together, these developments reflect the challenges facing the integration of the Autonomous Administration’s institutions with those of the Syrian state under the January 29 Agreement, particularly amid ongoing disagreements over local governance and the future of certain areas within al-Hasakah Governorate.

Observers believe that the debate over restructuring the governorate’s administrative framework has moved beyond purely administrative considerations and become part of a broader discussion about the future of Kurdish regions in Syria and the nature of political and administrative arrangements in the coming phase.

ANHA