PMF and Peshmerga between integration pressures and power dynamics in Iraq

The issue of weapons in Iraq has returned to the forefront of political and security discussions in recent months, amid growing talk of arrangements aimed at restricting arms to state control and reorganizing the status of armed actors.

PMF and Peshmerga between integration pressures and power dynamics in Iraq
9 June, 2026   04:10
NEWS DESK

While pressure and discussions have focused on the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the factions associated with it, increasing questions have emerged about whether these efforts could eventually extend to the Peshmerga forces in Southern Kurdistan, a prospect firmly rejected by the Kurdish leadership.

In this context, the U.S. envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, welcomed any steps that would place weapons under the authority of the Iraqi government. Some PMF factions view this as an attempt to reduce their independent military role and end their influence.

Amid these developments, several factions, including Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib al-Imam Ali, and Saraya al-Salam, announced their readiness to cooperate with measures aimed at regulating weapons and integrating into state institutions. Other factions, most notably Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, continue to reject disarmament or the dismantling of their independent military structures.

In contrast, the Kurdistan Regional Government rejects any attempt to link the PMF issue to the future of the Peshmerga forces. Kurdish parties emphasize that the Peshmerga are not an armed faction operating outside state institutions, but rather a regular military force whose status is based on the Iraqi Constitution and the powers granted to the Kurdistan Region under Article 121, which authorizes the regional government to organize its own security and military forces.

Kurdish leaders argue that comparing the PMF with the Peshmerga overlooks the legal and political differences between the two. While debate continues over PMF-affiliated armed groups and the extent of their independent military decision-making, the Peshmerga are recognized as an official force operating within a clear chain of command and under a constitutionally recognized framework in Iraq.

In late May 2026, Peshmerga Ministry Secretary-General Bakhtiar Mohammed denied the existence of any official request to integrate the Peshmerga into a federal institution or a future security ministry. Kurdish officials also stressed that any such step would require fundamental constitutional amendments affecting the nature of Iraq’s federal system.

Some Kurdish officials go even further, arguing that integrating the Peshmerga or abolishing their special legal status could open the door to reconsidering the constitutional status and powers of the Kurdistan Region itself.

However, the debate surrounding the PMF and the Peshmerga is not limited to legal or organizational matters. It is also linked to a broader struggle over the nature of the Iraqi state and the balance of power within it.

The issue of weapons has become an arena where domestic calculations intersect with the interests of regional and international powers seeking to influence Iraq’s balance of power in line with their own security and strategic priorities.

In this context, the United States is pushing for greater state control over weapons and a reduction in the influence of what it describes as “Iran-aligned armed groups,” based on what it calls its vision for regional security and its interests in the region. Critics, however, argue that Washington often evaluates Iraqi actors according to their proximity to U.S. interests, raising questions about whether efforts to restructure Iraq’s security landscape are aimed equally at building strong state institutions or at reshaping internal power balances in line with broader regional arrangements.

Turkey views the Iraqi scene from a different perspective, though one equally shaped by concerns over influence. Ankara has expressed reservations about the growing influence of the PMF in areas close to its borders and strategic interests, driven by concerns over expanding Iranian influence in Iraq. At the same time, it closely monitors any development in Kurdish political or military capabilities due to concerns about potential implications for its own domestic affairs, making its position on Iraqi security issues closely tied to what it describes as its “national security.”

Observers believe that Iraq once again finds itself at the center of regional and international competition seeking to shape its security structure and internal centers of power. While various actors speak of supporting the Iraqi state and strengthening its institutions, such positions are often influenced by geopolitical calculations and overlapping interests, making the issue of weapons part of a broader struggle for influence in the region.

Between these two paths, the contrast is clear: the PMF faces increasing pressure to redefine its military role and relationship with the state, while the Peshmerga continue to defend their special constitutional status and reject inclusion in any integration or dismantling project.

ANHA