​​​​​​​Perspectives of American-Turkish relations in Biden era, where to?

It is imperative that the upcoming US President-elect Joe Biden's administration will dramatically change the current nature of Turkish-American relations, which have been greatly curtailed, and turned into a kind of strange relationship between the outgoing US President Donald Trump and Turkey's Erdogan, both of whom had a very personal approach about foreign policy, according to Al-Monitor.

Under Biden, US foreign policy is set to return to institutionalization, contrary to unprecedented Trumpism which has frequently been isolationist and dismissive of international bodies.

Judging by the interviews, statements, and writings Biden conducted during the past year, one can infer that US foreign policy under his leadership will be based on four main principles: strengthening global democracy, strengthening security cooperation with allies, strengthening globalization protection of the middle classes and prioritizing global free trade hand in hand with environmental protection.

'Two different approaches'

Turkey appears to have been the subject of heated discussions within Biden's foreign policy team, with two diverging approaches.

The first supports reconciliation, and they see Turkey as a key ally and a major country on the southern side of NATO, the United States cannot afford to allow it to move away from the Western defense bloc.

They believe that the harsh US attitude and devastating economic sanctions against Turkey could inflame the authoritarian tendency of the Erdogan government and strengthen his grip on power, and therefore, Washington should entrench Turkey in the Western defense bloc at any cost, using economic, diplomatic and security incentives, while pushing the country to soft democratic reform through smart posts, strengthens the opposition.

Turkey also knows this approach, a Turkish pro-government newspaper, Burhanuddin Duran, the head of a prominent pro-government think tank in an article links Erdogan's latest promises to economic, judicial and democratic reforms at home to the advent of a "new era in international politics" following Biden's victory.

According to proponents of reconciliation with the Turks, Ankara can assist the Biden administration in efforts to repair transatlantic relations and contain Russia in Libya, Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus regions.

It seems that defenders of conciliation policy have the upper hand on Biden's foreign policy team, and it seems fair to expect the Biden administration to pursue a conciliatory approach during the first several months in office to test Ankara's response, and failure to accommodate Ankara could lead to a shift to an alternative approach to confrontation and coercion.

'The' stick 'strategy and nine hot spots'

Another team, which is estimated to represent a third of Biden's foreign policy team, believed in a "stick strategy" against Turkey that would unleash an immediate and comprehensive package of sanctions and rely on coercive diplomacy, including economic, security and political means.

The ground already in place for Biden to go on such an approach, as Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense systems has placed it within the Anti-American Adversaries Act orbit, and even if two penalties of the Act imposed, they could have serious problems for Ankara.

There is also an American investigation against Halkbank, a Turkish public lender accused of helping Iran evade US sanctions, which many in Washington say could be expanded to implicate members of the Erdogan family.

In general, the crisis spots in Turkish-American relations are so many and dangerous that Biden and Erdogan will really struggle to find a compromise, and one can list at least nine hotspots posing threats might spoil bilateral relations.

It can be said that the Kurdish cause and a possible new Turkish military operation in northeast Syria is the main crisis hotspot, as Biden prefers dialogue with the Kurds and secondly, Biden is likely to remove the brakes that Trump used in the Halkbank case, which is also related to how he deals Biden with the Iranian file.

The third issue is Turkey's expected operating of the S-400 systems and its continued expulsion from the joint manufacturing program for stealth aircraft, just as the four S-400 batteries are ready for deployment in Ankara, and Washington has threatened sanctions if they are fully operationalized, and it is unlikely for Ankara to takes this step before Biden takes office in January.

Increasing energy competitions in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean will pose another challenge to bilateral relations, as the United States moves to increase military cooperation with Greece and Greek Cypriots amid Ankara's rapprochement with Moscow.

Ankara fears that Biden will take these efforts further, and he has previously accused Ankara of committing "provocative actions" in the region.

It is likely that Turkey's energy cooperation with Russia, including the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant that the Russians are building in southern Turkey, will turn into another crisis file with the United States in the coming period.

Sixth, Turkey's domestic issues may fuel tensions with Washington amid a deteriorating democracy, basic rights and freedoms.

Seventh, the Biden administration will return to institutional dialogue with Ankara, primarily through the Foreign Ministry, but Ankara may reject such an amendment because all decision-making processes are now concentrated in the presidential palace.

Just as the renewed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh could cause friction between Washington and Ankara, which strongly supports Azerbaijan, and moreover, Biden supported moves to recognize the massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

Finally, Biden is unlikely to tolerate the Turkish government's populist use of anti-American rhetoric the way the Trump administration has.

In short, the Biden administration will inherit a plethora of major differences with Turkey, and it appears that Erdogan no longer has a team capable of putting bilateral relations on a healthy path.

Moreover, Moscow is likely to increase pressure on Ankara in Syria, Libya, the Black Sea, Karabakh and energy issues in response to Turkish efforts to get closer to Washington.

All in all, Ankara appears to be preparing for a difficult balance between Moscow and Washington next year.

(A)

ANHA