Southern Syria: shifting power, military influence

Throughout the years of the Syrian revolution, various military formations have emerged and operated across the governorates of Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda. Their areas of influence and local and regional affiliations have often overlapped. Successive political and military developments have failed to eliminate the multiple centers of power, leaving the region to enter its current phase with a complex security landscape. So, which forces currently control and operate in southern Syria, and what are their backgrounds?

2011–2014: The emergence of armed factions and the spread of Jabhat al-Nusra

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, local groups in Daraa, where the protests first erupted, gradually began transforming into military formations as attacks by the Baathist regime intensified and protests spread across the southern governorates.

During 2012 and 2013, armed factions expanded across Daraa and Quneitra. Formations operating under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged, comprising various local groups, before subsequently moving toward establishing broader military frameworks to coordinate operations and administer areas of influence.

In parallel, Jabhat al-Nusra began expanding its presence in parts of Daraa and Quneitra during the early years of the conflict, becoming an additional armed actor in the region. Its areas of presence overlapped with those controlled by armed opposition factions, amid continued clashes and the gradual loss of control by the former regime's forces over large areas.

Throughout 2014, the proliferation of factions and competing military allegiances continued in southern Syria, alongside the expansion of armed opposition influence in parts of Daraa and Quneitra. The region thus entered a new phase of competition between local formations and organizations with differing orientations.

2015–August 2018: ISIS expansion and the takeover of Yarmouk Basin by the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army

Between 2015 and 2018, southern Syria witnessed the expansion of ISIS mercenaries through local groups that pledged allegiance to the organization. The most prominent of these was the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, established in 2016, which took control of parts of the Yarmouk Basin in western rural Daraa, becoming an independent military entity separate from the other factions operating in the region.

The emergence of this formation added another armed actor to the map of influence in southern Syria. Its areas of control overlapped with those of opposition factions, and the region witnessed repeated military confrontations between the various parties, including the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS.

The ISIS-affiliated Khalid ibn al-Walid Army remained present until the summer of 2018, when the former regime's forces, backed by Russia, launched a military campaign in southern Syria. The campaign ended in August 2018 with the elimination of the group's control over areas of the Yarmouk Basin, ushering Daraa and Quneitra into a new phase of armed-force restructuring.

Summer 2018–December 2024: Russian-Brokered reconciliation agreements and the restructuring of factions

Following the military campaign in southern Syria in the summer of 2018, Russia sponsored reconciliation agreements in Daraa and Quneitra aimed at ending hostilities and restoring the areas to the control of the former regime, in exchange for settling the status of a number of fighters and surrendering heavy and medium weapons.

However, these agreements did not lead to the complete disappearance of the former factions. Rather, some groups reorganized themselves within new local frameworks and under different names, while retaining military capabilities and territorial influence in various areas.

During the second half of 2018, the Eighth Brigade, led by Ahmad al-Awda, emerged as a prominent formation. It was incorporated into the Russian-backed Fifth Corps, alongside the Central Committees and other groups, some of which were affiliated with the Fourth Division and the security agencies of the former regime.

From 2019 through 2024, multiple security and military allegiances continued to coexist in Daraa. Areas of influence were divided among local groups, formations linked to Russia, and entities affiliated with the former regime's security apparatus. The governorate also witnessed repeated assassinations, clashes, and security tensions, particularly in western rural Daraa and the Yarmouk Basin.

Meanwhile, Quneitra remained under the influence of the Israeli presence in the occupied Golan Heights, alongside the deployment of the former regime's forces in other areas. Suwayda, for its part, retained its distinct security and social characteristics, with local armed groups continuing to operate there.

December 8–10, 2024: The fall of the regime and the formation of the southern operations room

Following the collapse of the former regime on December 8, 2024, southern Syria entered a new military phase. The Southern Operations Room was formed by factions from Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda. It played a role in seizing military and security installations belonging to the former regime and advancing toward Damascus in support of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which recently announced its dissolution after assuming power.

The fall of the regime led to the disintegration of the existing military and security structure, opening the way for a reorganization of armed forces and areas of influence. It also prompted the deployment of factions from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, as it was then known, to the region, coinciding with the advance of Israeli forces into the buffer zone and parts of Quneitra and rural Daraa, where they established new military positions and outposts.

In the days following the regime's fall in December 2024, Israel began expanding its military deployment beyond the positions where its forces had previously been stationed. Its troops advanced toward strategic locations in the buffer zone and the vicinity of Mount Hermon, marking a fundamental shift in the security landscape of southern Syria.

December 2024–2025: renewed Israeli deployment and attempts to integrate factions

In February 2025, the Ministry of Defense began establishing the Southern Division, which was renamed the 40th Division on March 11 of the same year, under the command of Colonel Bunyan Ahmad al-Hariri, one of the former leaders of Ahrar al-Sham.

The division was not formed from a single military force. Rather, it brought together members of former opposition factions in Daraa and Quneitra, groups affiliated with the Central Committees that emerged following the Russian-brokered reconciliation agreements in 2018, as well as individuals with backgrounds in Ahrar al-Sham and the Sham Legion, groups linked to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), newly recruited volunteers from the governorate, and tribal groups.

The Central Committees, particularly those in western rural Daraa, along with groups affiliated with HTS before its dissolution, were among the most prominent components involved in the integration negotiations. Discussions were held on bringing these groups together under a single command, supervised by the defected Colonel Baraa al-Nabulsi and the defected First Sergeant Ahmad al-Qasim.

Separate negotiations were also held with the Eighth Brigade, led by Ahmad al-Awda, which announced its dissolution on April 13, 2025, and transferred its human and military resources to the Ministry of Defense. However, no confirmed information is available to establish that all its members joined the 40th Division as a cohesive unit.

Initial proposals for the division envisaged four brigades distributed geographically across Daraa, its eastern and western countryside, and Quneitra, in addition to a formation associated with reserve forces and Suwayda. Subsequent reports, however, described a structure comprising three brigades, seven battalions, and approximately forty companies.

Nevertheless, the integration process did not immediately eliminate the influence of local groups or their military and social networks. Disagreements persisted over leadership ranks, the distribution of responsibilities, and the future of personnel, while certain areas continued to retain their distinct local and security characteristics.

In Swedia, local Druze forces continued to maintain their military and security influence throughout 2025. Large areas of the governorate remained outside the effective control of the transitional government, while the National Guard, affiliated with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, emerged as the sole military authority representing the Druze, alongside local bodies responsible for managing security and administrative affairs.

In Quneitra, meanwhile, the administrative and security presence of the transitional government overlapped with positions reached by Israeli forces following the fall of the regime, in addition to the continuing reality of Israel's occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights.

Thus, during 2025, southern Syria shifted from the military and security control structure that had existed under the former regime to a new reality in which government institutions, local formations, and Israeli forces deployed at newly established positions coexist.

September 2025: The Syrian-Jordanian-American roadmap for Swedia

In September 2025, Syria, Jordan, and the United States agreed on a roadmap to address the repercussions of the events that took place in Swedia in July of the same year. The stated objectives were to support stability, address the consequences of the events in the governorate, strengthen the political and security process, and prevent instability, weapons, and smuggling networks from spilling over into Jordanian territory.

This initiative came amid continued disagreements between Damascus and the Druze National Guard in Swedia, as well as diverging regional positions regarding the governorate's future and the nature of its political and security administration.

February–July 2026: The emergence of formations declaring opposition to the Israeli presence

Recently, armed formations operating under various names have emerged, announcing that they have carried out operations against Israeli forces in southern Syria and presenting themselves as "resistance forces opposing the Israeli military presence."

In February 2026, the establishment of the Movement to Deter the Occupation was announced through a video published on social media platforms. The group stated that its objective was to confront the Israeli military presence and work toward removing Israeli forces from the territories they entered following the fall of the former regime.

In July 2026, the movement announced the opening of a branch in Daraa, a step reflecting the expansion of its declared activities into the governorate, amid continued security tensions and Israeli incursions into parts of Quneitra and rural Daraa.

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Ulul al-Ba's also emerged following the fall of the former regime and announced that it had carried out operations in Quneitra and Daraa. However, more detailed information about its deployment, military capabilities, or organizational affiliations remains unavailable.

In August 2026, the Ulul al-Ba's Front announced that it had targeted an Israeli military position in the Yarmouk Basin. However, the nature of the operation and the casualties it may have caused were not officially disclosed.

In the same context, a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy classified Ulul al-Ba's among formations linked to Iran in terms of propaganda and paramilitary activity, although insufficient evidence is available to conclusively establish the nature of its affiliation or the extent of the support it receives.

ISIS Sleeper cells re-emerge in Southern Syria amid security operations to pursue them

The activities of ISIS sleeper cells have also remained part of the security landscape in southern Syria throughout 2026. On July 9, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced the dismantling of several cells in the southern region and the arrest of senior operative Firas al-Dagher, whom it said had held leadership positions within the organization.

On August 9, the ministry announced the arrest of a nine-member cell in Khan Arnabeh, in rural Quneitra. Those arrested included its leader, Musab Khalil al-Sheikh, known as "the Chinese." The ministry said the cell members had been responsible for collecting weapons and transporting explosive devices and related materials.

On September 17, clashes erupted in the city of al-Sanamayn in rural Daraa during a security operation targeting a group that authorities said was affiliated with ISIS. The clashes resulted in the deaths of three Internal Security personnel and injuries to others. The following day, the authorities announced the seizure of weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, and equipment used in manufacturing explosives. On September 19, Walid al-Fallah, one of the group's leaders, was arrested.

On September 29, Interior Minister Anas Khattab confirmed that operations against the organization's cells in Daraa were continuing, describing them as longstanding groups active in the area.

More recently, on November 1, local sources reported detecting suspicious movements believed to be linked to the organization in the villages of Barak, al-Junaynah, Tayma, and Araja, northeast of Suwayda, prompting an increase in security alert levels.

August–October 2026: escalation of Israeli operations and arrests

A total of 2,176 Israeli ground operations were recorded between January and October 2026, compared with 1,149 operations throughout the entirety of 2025. October alone witnessed 182 operations, incl1uding patrols, raids, arrests, the establishment of checkpoints, and the construction of military positions.

On September 29, 2026, the Ulul al-Ba's Front issued a statement addressing the security operation announced by the Ministry of Interior in the Yarmouk Basin in western rural Daraa. During the operation, the ministry said it had arrested three individuals whom it accused of having links to Hezbollah and planning attacks using rocket launch platforms.

The front stated that the operation targeted its members and supporters in southern Syria, without directly declaring that the three detainees belonged to the group. Meanwhile, Lebanon's Hezbollah denied any connection to the cell or the existence of any security or military activities on its part inside Syrian territory.

Israeli movements during this period have not been limited to temporary incursions. They have also involved engineering works, fortifications, and the expansion of military control and surveillance. Among the most prominent initiatives is the "Sufa 53 Line" project, which involves road construction, vegetation clearance, and the establishment of observation posts and fortifications near the ceasefire line.

Israel justifies its continued military presence in southern Syria on what it describes as security considerations and the prevention of threats emerging along its borders. During August and September 2026, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Mount Hermon and the buffer zone as long as what he described as "jihadist threats" remained. He maintained that the Israeli presence was intended to protect Israeli communities and borders.

Damascus, by contrast, maintains that Israeli incursions and movements constitute violations of Syrian sovereignty and the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. It has called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Syrian territory, warning that the continuation of these activities threatens the security of residents and the stability of the region.

October 2026: Jordanian airstrikes in Southern Syria

On the evening of Monday, October 26, 2026, Jordanian warplanes launched airstrikes against targets in the governorates of Daraa and Suwayda in southern Syria, as part of an operation named "Jordanian Deterrence – Hammoud."

Jordan said the strikes targeted hideouts and positions belonging to "terrorist organizations" allegedly linked to the attack on Hammoud Church in Jordan's Karak Governorate the previous Friday. It confirmed that several militants had been killed or wounded and their equipment destroyed, adding that the operation had been carried out in coordination with the Syrian government.

In response, the Syrian transitional government stated in a statement carried by SANA on October 27 that the airstrikes had been conducted without prior coordination or notification to the Syrian side and had resulted in civilian casualties, including women and children. It confirmed that an investigation had been opened and that contacts had been established with Amman to follow up on the repercussions of the bombardment.

According to media statements issued by both sides, the airstrikes targeted areas in the countryside of Daraa and Suwayda, including al-Lajat, al-Shayyah, al-Muzayrib, and Nasib in Daraa, as well as al-Shahba, Tal Dalfa, al-Taff, and Sath Zahanin in Suwayda.

On October 28, the foreign ministers of the two countries discussed the repercussions of the airstrikes. Ayman Safadi said the operation had been based on field intelligence and aimed at thwarting imminent threats and attacks. He expressed regret over the civilian casualties. The two sides agreed to establish a joint security committee to investigate the details and repercussions of the operations and develop mechanisms for field and intelligence coordination.

Southern Syria Today: multiple forces and diverging regional interests

As of November 3, 2026, the map of influence in southern Syria remains divided among multiple actors, whose presence and objectives vary from one governorate to another.

In Daraa, the Syrian transitional government maintains an administrative and security presence. However, the existence of various armed groups, local military formations, and tribal networks makes it difficult to establish that any single party exercises uncontested control over the others. This is particularly evident in the Yarmouk Basin and western rural Daraa, where the legacy of the former factional landscape and reconciliation agreements, ISIS cells, and anti-Israeli military formations remains embedded in the region's security and social structures.

In Quneitra, the occupied Golan Heights and the positions reached by Israeli forces following the fall of the former regime overlap with other areas where the transitional government maintains an administrative and security presence. This makes the governorate a direct arena for Israeli movements and the tensions associated with them.

In Suwayda, most of the governorate remains outside the effective control of the transitional government. Local Druze military, security, and administrative forces continue to manage large areas, foremost among them formations belonging to the National Guard, which is affiliated with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri.

At the regional level, Israel approaches security developments in southern Syria through what it describes as the need to "prevent the emergence of any armed force" that it considers a threat to its borders. It uses terms such as "jihadist groups" and "armed threats" to justify its continued military presence, alongside its stated objective of protecting the Druze population.

Jordan, meanwhile, focuses on what it describes as "preventing instability, weapons, and smuggling networks from spilling over" into its territory. It supports a political process aimed at strengthening stability in southern Syria, within the framework of the roadmap agreed upon with Syria and the United States in September 2025 to address tensions in Suwayda.

These developments reveal that current tensions in southern Syria are not solely linked to the post-regime-collapse period. Rather, they represent an extension of military transformations that began in 2011 and accumulated through successive phases involving the proliferation of factions, the spread of jihadist organizations, reconciliation agreements, and the restructuring of local groups, before the region entered a new phase of tension marked by Israeli military expansion and the emergence of armed groups declaring their opposition to it.

With Israeli incursions continuing, local forces remaining fragmented, the integration of former factions into state institutions still incomplete, political and security disagreements persisting between Damascus and certain local actors, and regional positions on the future of the area continuing to diverge, southern Syria faces the challenge of moving from a reality characterized by multiple centers of influence toward a unified framework capable of ensuring stability and protecting its population.