Hasakah between Arabic, Kurdish: real test of Syria’s multilingual equation

Syria is witnessing attempts by the authorities of the interim government to impose the renaming of schools in Hasakah, Homs, Hama, the Syrian coast, and other scattered Syrian regions, alongside continued insistence on removing the Kurdish language from informational signs in public institutions, as seen in the Palace of Justice in Hasakah City.

Residents of the region believe these actions do not appear to be merely administrative steps related to updating appearances or unifying designs, but rather carry symbolic dimensions connected to the concept of recognizing Syria’s cultural and linguistic diversity.

Official signs are not merely tools for identifying places; they also express the nature of the state managing this public space and indicate which groups see themselves represented and acknowledged within its institutions.

From this perspective, the move to impose school names and replace the bilingual sign (Arabic and Kurdish) in Hasakah with one containing Arabic and English, and later with an Arabic-only sign, sparked popular rejection. Protesters considered it an indication of declining recognition of the region’s cultural specificity.

This step contradicts the political atmosphere that recent understandings between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syria’s interim government are supposed to reinforce, particularly the provisions of the January 29, 2026 agreement. That agreement emphasized respect for the particularity of North and East Syria, guaranteed the rights of its components, and treated diversity as part of a unified national identity, in addition to strengthening local participation and avoiding the imposition of decisions affecting society without consensus.

Accordingly, ignoring the Kurdish language on official signs and attempting to impose names on schools already named after local individuals who died defending the region against the Baathist regime, ISIS/ Daesh and Turkey may weaken trust in the consensual path regarding the region’s special status. It could also revive old fears related to reproducing policies of symbolic exclusion, even in undeclared forms.

Moreover, the substance of Legislative Decree No. 13 issued by Syria’s interim president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, which fundamentally stipulates principles of equality among citizens, non-discrimination, and guaranteeing public rights for all Syrians, is supposed to serve as a reference affirming the inclusiveness of the state and its non-bias toward one component over another.

However, practices such as limiting official signs to a single language or excluding a commonly spoken local language in a specific area may be understood as inconsistent with the spirit of this decree and with its declared objective of building a state founded on equal citizenship.

Equality is not reflected solely in legal texts, but also in daily policies and official symbols that directly affect local communities’ sense of belonging.

Globally, this type of measure is described as “symbolic discrimination” and one of the most sensitive forms of exclusion because it does not take the form of an explicit decision banning a language or criminalizing its use. Instead, it appears through excluding the language from public spaces and the facades of sovereign institutions, creating the impression that recognition of the language remains conditional or revocable.

In the case of Hasakah, where Kurds form a major and majority part of the social fabric, any retreat from using their language in official institutions is viewed more as a political message than a formal procedure, especially when it concerns a judicial institution that is supposed to reflect principles of justice, neutrality, and equality.

With the continuation of such measures, legal experts and observers of Syrian public affairs emphasize that this may leave negative effects on the future of social and political stability in the country. Building trust during a transitional period requires translating political understandings and legal references into tangible steps reflecting respect for diversity.

Treating multilingualism as part of the identity of a new Syria can strengthen the concept of an inclusive state, whereas ignoring it may deepen feelings of marginalization and weaken opportunities to build a stable social contract, especially in regions with a long history of sensitivity toward Arabization policies or cultural exclusion.

Although the January 29 agreement and Decree No. 13 are viewed as steps toward a more inclusive state, their success remains tied to the extent to which field policies align with their spirit and avoid decisions that may be interpreted as retreating from the principles of equality and pluralism that the new phase is supposed to uphold.

examples of similar incidents and their impact on countries’ futures

There are many examples in other countries that experienced tensions or protests due to the removal or marginalization of local languages on official signs. The consequences were often political and social because such actions were understood as signals of symbolic exclusion.

Turkey

In Turkey, repeated incidents involved the removal or banning of bilingual Kurdish signs in municipalities with Kurdish majorities, especially after government-appointed trustees replaced elected mayors. These measures deepened Kurdish feelings that recognition was superficial and temporary, becoming one of the issues fueling political tension and weakening trust between the state and Kurdish society, thereby intensifying polarization.

Spain (Catalonia and the Basque region)

Language became a central issue in conflicts between the central government and regional authorities. Any attempt to reduce the presence of Catalan or Basque in institutions, schools, or signage was met with strong sensitivity and quickly turned into a broad political issue because it was viewed as an attack on identity.

As disputes accumulated, issues surrounding language and official symbols contributed to strengthening separatist tendencies in Catalonia, eventually leading to a major political crisis in 2017.

Belgium

In Belgium, language played a central role in divisions between the Flemish (Dutch-speaking) and Walloons (French-speaking). Disputes over signage, administration, and public services reached levels that caused repeated governmental crises and, at times, long periods without a stable government.

The Belgian experience shows that ignoring linguistic balance can affect not only local protests but also the stability of the entire state.

Canada (Quebec)

In Canada, disputes concerning the status of French on commercial and official signs led to prolonged political and legal confrontations and to strict legislation protecting French.

Although Canada is a stable country, language issues remained among the main factors driving the separatist movement in Quebec. Two referendums on independence were held, illustrating how language can evolve from a cultural issue into a political threat to state unity.

These examples indicate that signs, symbols, and language are not secondary details but part of the politics of recognition. When the language of an indigenous component is marginalized in public space, the result is often increased tension, weakened trust in institutions, and transformation of the issue into a long-term political factor that may threaten national consensus. This is why dealing with language issues in Syria is more connected to stability and state-building than to mere formalities.

constitutional and legal guarantees

Legal experts stress that the absence of a clear constitutional text guaranteeing linguistic pluralism may partly explain why some authorities in Syria resort to such measures. When executive bodies are not constrained by explicit constitutional provisions, they become able to treat language as an “administrative detail” subject to political moods or changes in government.

In the Syrian case, as long as Kurdish (and other component languages) are not formally guaranteed in the constitution or binding law, recognition remains vulnerable to reversal at any moment, even if the language has been practically used on the ground for years.

Others argue that an important point must be noted: even if a language is not mentioned in the constitution, this does not make its removal a natural or neutral action. Modern states are also judged by their practical behavior toward citizens. Excluding the language of an entire community from official signs is interpreted not merely as an “official language” issue, but as a political message about the limits of recognition, especially in multiethnic regions such as Hasakah.

Both sides agree that ensuring the permanent presence of Kurdish (or any other local language) on signs and in institutions cannot be achieved through slogans alone, but through clear legal and administrative mechanisms, most importantly:

1. Constitutional text

The best long-term guarantee is including an explicit constitutional article affirming that Syria is a multiethnic and multicultural state, and that component languages are respected and used in public spaces within their areas of prevalence, with mechanisms for implementation specified.

2. Language law or binding local administration law

Even before adopting a constitution, a law could be issued mandating bilingual or trilingual signs in linguistically diverse provinces. The law should define:

When is the local language used?

In which institutions?

Which authority is responsible for implementation?

What penalties or measures apply in cases of violation?

3. Permanent executive decisions and ministerial instructions

The government could issue an official circular to ministries (Justice, Interior, Local Administration, etc.) requiring institutional signs in Hasakah and other Kurdish-majority areas to include at least two languages according to demographic realities, ensuring the matter does not remain subject to local discretion or security decisions.

4. Linking the issue to non-discrimination principles

Any legal text or decree such as Decree No. 13 that discusses equality must be practically translated into linguistic rights. Equality concerns not only jobs and political rights but also public symbols, including language in institutions.

5. Oversight body or independent cultural diversity commission

The existence of an official body or council specializing in cultural and linguistic pluralism would help prevent regression and provide society with a legal mechanism to submit formal complaints whenever any language is removed.

6. Adopting the principle of “language according to geography”

This means Arabic remains the general state language, while in regions such as Hasakah, Qamishlo, Afrin, Kobani, and others, Kurdish becomes an officially recognized language in signs and services according to local realities. This model is implemented in many countries and does not threaten state unity but rather strengthens it.

Examples of countries applying the principle of “language according to geography”

Several countries maintain one or more official state languages while also recognizing regional or local languages used in signage, services, and local administration in specific areas.

Notable examples include:

Switzerland: Four official languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh), used according to cantons.

Belgium: Three official languages (Dutch, French, German), applied regionally.

Spain: Spanish is the official state language, while Catalan, Basque, and Galician are officially recognized in their respective regions.

India: Hindi and English at the federal level, with dozens of local languages recognized in states and used in administration and education.

Canada: English and French are official languages, with French widely applied in Quebec.

South Africa: Eleven official languages used according to regions and institutions.

Iraq: Arabic and Kurdish are official state languages, with Kurdish widely used in the Kurdistan Region KRG in education, administration, and signage.

According to observed examples, similar international experiences, and applicable international laws, the absence of constitutional guarantees makes recognition of a language fragile and revocable. Political intent alone is insufficient; clear legal texts, implementation mechanisms, and accountability are necessary so that the presence of a language on signs and in institutions becomes a permanent right rather than a temporary decision.

ANHA