Transitional Government’s policies deepen divisions among Syrian components- Part 3

During the year that followed the fall of the Baathist regime, Syria witnessed a series of political, military, and media measures taken by the transitional government, beginning with the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to power—developments that left deep impacts on the social fabric and relations among Syrian components.

Despite public promises to build an inclusive state, the policies adopted contributed to heightening internal tensions and creating new flashpoints across various regions, as summarized below.

Escalating Sectarian Tension and Declining Social Cohesion

Documented data reveal the killing of 3,908 civilians on sectarian and religious grounds from the fall of the former regime until November 2025, amid an atmosphere of media and political mobilization that turned public gatherings into platforms for incitement against different sects and ethnicities without any official deterrent.

This reality was reflected in acts of social violence, including assaults on Druze students and Kurdish youths, as well as the targeting of dozens of Alawite civilians through killings and arrests.

Syrian Coast… Open Exclusion and Limited Civil Movements

The transitional government adopted a discourse that marginalized members of the Alawite community, tying them to the former regime’s security and political legacy, leaving coastal areas exposed to multiple attacks—the most notable being the large-scale assault in March 2025, accompanied by media incitement and calls from mosque pulpits in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and other Syrian cities to participate.

Despite repeated demands from Alawite figures and community leaders to establish a civil and political reference capable of engaging the government, these efforts were ignored.

 In February 2025, the “Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and the Diaspora” was founded as a religious–political framework bringing together various councils and bodies. Its head, Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, called for protests following the recent Homs incidents, demanding real representation and guarantees for the community’s safety.

In addition, the “Political Council for Central and Western Syria” was announced in August, but its activity remained limited and failed to create any real influence on the ground.

Sweida: Official Marginalization Met with Rising Internal Organization

In Sweida, government policy sidelined local forces that had played a key role in protecting the province from ISIS attacks for years—despite those forces’ attempts to integrate into state institutions by cooperating with the governor and activating civil institutions.

However, throughout 2025 the transitional government intensified incitement against the Druze community both inside and outside Sweida, reflected in attacks on Druze neighborhoods in Damascus Countryside and later in the July 2025 assault on Sweida and its countryside under the cover of local tribes, which resulted in hundreds of casualties.

In response, the Higher Legal Committee in Sweida formed a temporary executive office to manage service and security affairs, launched relief and violation-tracking committees, and saw local factions unite under the “National Guard”—a step to organize efforts under a unified religious–social leadership headed by Hikmat al-Hijri.

North and East Syria… Political Confrontation and an Autonomous Administration Continuing Its Path

North and East Syria was not immune to the media and political campaigns promoted by the transitional government, which accused the Autonomous Administration of separatism and foreign alignment. However, the Administration relied on its updated social contract and civic orientation to contain internal tensions.

In March 2025, the Administration signed an agreement with the transitional government under international sponsorship aimed at integrating administrative, military, and economic institutions. According to representatives of North and East Syria, the agreement was never fully implemented due to government procrastination, and even more so because of Turkish intervention.

Kurdish political forces also presented their joint vision during the “Conference on Kurdish Unity of Position and Rank”, while Hasakah hosted the Syrian Components Conference in August to enhance dialogue among different groups—an initiative rejected by the transitional government.

On the ground, the Administration took notable steps by sending humanitarian aid to Sweida after the recent attacks and to the Syrian coast during the wave of fires—signaling a desire to play a national role beyond its areas of control.

Despite these efforts—and the political and media escalation by the transitional government and its allies—the peoples of North and East Syria reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the March 10 Agreement, without compromising the gains achieved in the region, and stressed that Syria will not return to its pre-2011 state.

Syrian Scene Between Escalation and De-escalation

As the Syrian landscape remains open to scenarios of either escalation or calm, the facts indicate that the lack of an inclusive governmental role is one of the main obstacles to stabilizing Syrian society and rebuilding trust among its components.

ANHA