Nusaybin Border Gate: Trade potential still on hold amid political challenges

Syria is considered one of the countries with a distinguished geographical location, serving as an important junction between the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe, and historically functioning as a meeting point along the ancient Silk Road.

To this day, Syria occupies a significant position in global geography as a transit gateway between East and West through its 23 official border crossings.

The land corridor stretching from the Turkish border to the Jordanian border once witnessed heavy traffic, with between 100,000 and 115,000 trucks crossing annually in both directions through Syria.

Before 2011, these transit activities generated approximately $3 billion in economic revenues for the state treasury as part of a trade network connecting Turkey and the Gulf countries, in addition to trade routes linking Europe with the Gulf region.

Syria’s official border crossings with neighboring countries are distributed as follows:

Five crossings with Iraq (Al-Tanf, Al-Bukamal, Al-Waleed, Tel Kocher, and Semalka), along a shared border of approximately 605 km.

Ten crossings with Turkey (Bab al-Salama, Bab al-Hawa, Jarabulus, Grî Spî, Kasab, Al-Rai, Nusaybin, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Hammam, and Serekaniye), which shares Syria’s longest border, extending about 911 km.

Six crossings with Lebanon (Al-Masnaa, Al-Dabbousieh, Al-Arida, Jousieh, Talkalakh, and Matraba), along a border of approximately 375 km.

Two crossings with Jordan (Nassib and Ramtha–Daraa), with a shared border extending about 370 km.

Most of these crossings are currently operational, while others remain closed for various reasons related to coordination, reactivation, and necessity.

In addition, there are dozens of unofficial crossing points, the majority of which are located along the Lebanese border, including around 20 unofficial crossings. There are also two unofficial crossings with Israel—Quneitra and the Golan—along a border stretching approximately 76 km, as well as four unofficial crossings with Turkey, the most prominent being Hatya, opposite the city of Jisr al-Shughur in Idlib.

In Hasakah Governorate, which covers an area of approximately 23,000 square kilometers, there are two official crossings with Turkey to the north (Nusaybin and Al-Darbasiyah) and three with Iraq to the east and southeast (Al-Waleed, Tel Kocher, and Semalka), making the governorate one of the most significant hubs for trade exchange in the Middle East.

Trade volume between Syria and Turkey reached nearly $2 billion in 2011 before the border crossings were closed. This trade was primarily conducted through two key crossings: Nusaybin and Bab al-Hawa.

The two countries were also parties to a Free Trade Agreement signed in 2004 and implemented in 2007, which contributed to an annual increase in bilateral trade of approximately 30 percent.

Since 2011, the Syrian-Turkish border has undergone profound transformations, ranging from complete closure in some areas to reopening in others for various purposes, including commercial activities, the return of displaced persons and travelers, and facilitating the entry of foreign individuals into the country.

By the end of 2012, the collapsed Baath regime had lost control over most of the border strip with Turkey, particularly in northern Aleppo, Idlib, and Raqqa. As a result, the border became an open corridor for foreign fighters entering Syria, especially those who joined ISIS mercenary groups.

Between 2012 and 2014, smuggling activities reached their peak, and civilian crossings into Turkey became relatively easy and inexpensive. At that time, smuggling costs did not exceed 500 Syrian pounds (a few dollars), compared to costs that can reach nearly $2,000 today.

In contrast, during the same period and from the very beginning, Turkey worked to close all border crossings adjacent to areas administered by the Autonomous Administration, foremost among them the official Nusaybin border crossing. Officials of the Autonomous Administration viewed this as one of the tools of the declared war against the region through the imposition of a blockade.

Although several border crossings between Turkey and Syria have now been reopened—crossings that had been closed during the Baathist regime era, such as the Kasab crossing and the Tal Abyad border crossing—the Nusaybin border crossing remains closed, as does the Kobani crossing.

The importance of the Nusaybin crossing lies in the fact that it is the closest point connecting Al-Hasakah Governorate, particularly the city of Qamishli, with Turkey. It also serves as a commercial gateway for the exchange of goods and represents the shortest and most direct trade route for transporting merchandise to Iraq, a factor that could significantly stimulate the region’s economy.

In addition, it constitutes a key hub for regional land transportation projects, as it links the Gulf region and the Mediterranean Basin by land to Turkey and onward to Europe. By contrast, the activities of the Al-Darbasiyah crossing have been limited primarily to civilian movement.

During the preparation of this report, our agency obtained information indicating that preparations for the completion of the Nusaybin crossing’s reopening have continued on both the Syrian and Turkish sides. These efforts range from appointing operators to installing surveillance cameras over the past two days, despite the absence of any official announcement confirming or specifying an opening date.

The crossing was originally scheduled to enter service at the beginning of last May under understandings reached between the Interim Government and the Turkish authorities. However, the process stalled, particularly following difficulties in the integration talks between the Autonomous Administration and the government concerning judicial and justice-related issues.

Meanwhile, officials within the Democratic Autonomous Administration and members of the integration committees believe that the delay in reopening the crossing is not merely related to technical or administrative matters. Rather, they argue that it is being used as a political pressure tool against the region and its residents in order to push the Autonomous Administration to make concessions during ongoing negotiations over integration arrangements with the government.

At the same time, Turkey is currently routing part of its trade destined for Iraq through Syrian territory via the Tal Abyad and Bab al-Hawa crossings, eventually reaching the Tel Kocher border crossing with Iraq. Administration of the crossing has recently been transferred to the Syrian government after previously being managed by the Autonomous Administration.

This comes as observers point out that there are geographically shorter border routes available for trade between Turkey and Iraq, including the Nusaybin border crossing.

ANHA