Journalist: Ankara transfers from crisis management to consolidate its presence in Syria

More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, and following the political changes that accompanied the formation of the interim government, growing questions have emerged regarding the roles of regional and international powers in Syria, particularly Turkey's role, its strategic objectives, and the implications of its policies for the country's political and security landscape.

In this context, ANHA's agency conducted an interview with journalist and researcher Bêjdar Altan, who closely follows Turkish affairs in Syria, to discuss his assessment of Turkey's expanding influence, the instruments Ankara employs to advance its interests, the impact of these policies on Syria's future, and the nature of Turkey's relations with the regional and international actors involved in the Syrian file.

How do you assess the growing Turkish role in Syria at this stage? What strategic objectives is Ankara seeking to achieve inside Syria?

Turkey's role in Syria has evolved since 2011 from a policy focused primarily on regime change to a more comprehensive strategy centered on security, regional dominance, and the establishment of long-term influence.

According to Altan, from the outset of the Syrian protests, Turkey clearly defined its role by supporting various armed extremist groups, including the so-called Islamic State (ISIS/Daesh), among others. He argues that Ankara initially sought to benefit from these groups during the early stages of the conflict. At the same time, it opened its borders to Syrian refugees and later organized some of them into armed factions that served its strategic objectives, as part of a broader approach aimed at extending Turkish influence inside Syria through local Syrian actors.

Key strategic objectives

According to Altan, Turkey's primary objectives in Syria are:

Preventing the establishment of any form of autonomous administration or Kurdish political entity along the Syrian-Turkish border, which Ankara views as a threat to its national security and seeks to eliminate.

Integrating into Syria's new military and security architecture, enabling Turkey to become the leading actor in training, equipping, and shaping the doctrine of the new Syrian army, while building what he describes as a strategic partnership with the new authorities in Damascus.

Establishing a long-term sphere of influence and a buffer zone through effective territorial control, demographic engineering, and the integration of local economies with Turkey.

Strengthening Turkey's regional standing by positioning itself as the principal actor in rebuilding Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, while consolidating its place within what Altan describes as a "Sunni axis" intended to balance the influence of Iran, Israel, and the Gulf states.

What tools does Turkey use to expand its political, security, military, and economic influence in Syria?

Altan says that after taking military control of Jarabulus, al-Bab, Afrin, Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), and Tel- Abyad/ Ras al Ain through cross-border military operations, Türkiye consolidated its presence by relying on armed factions aligned with Ankara, including the Syrian National Army (SNA) and other groups.

He adds that following the fall of the Assad regime, this military presence expanded further through Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Although many of these factions were formally incorporated into the interim government's Ministry of Defense in Damascus under military formations designated as Divisions 62, 72, 80, 86, and others, Altan claims that Türkiye retained between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters as what he describes as a "parallel army." According to him, these forces are stationed in camps in Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Hatay, and Gaziantep, where they serve as a reserve force that could be deployed in the future either against HTS or, in particular, against Kurdish forces.

He further states that Turkey has recently expanded its network of military bases and outposts from Serê Kaniyê to Afrin, extending its presence into Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Deir ez-Zor, where it has established permanent military bases, observation posts, and joint military training centers.

According to Altan, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has, for more than a year, deployed advanced surveillance systems, radar installations, wireless communications equipment, and sophisticated electronic monitoring systems in the vicinity of Latakia and Jableh. He also claims that between three and four military airfields in Hama Governorate are primarily used to operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For this reason, he says, the interim government's Ministry of Defense has reinforced the deployment of three large military divisions equipped with the latest military hardware in and around Hama Governorate.

Altan also claims that the Ras al-Bassit area in the Latakia countryside contains numerous facilities operated by the Turkish side. According to him, many of these installations were established under the guise of hotels or tourist resorts, while personnel from the Turkish intelligence service are stationed inside them.

He further states that since the end of 2025, the Turkish intelligence service has increasingly operated indirectly through commercial companies and economic initiatives. In addition, Turkey's Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure signed an agreement with Syria's interim government to strengthen economic and technical cooperation in southern Latakia, with a particular focus on developing digital infrastructure and telecommunications networks.

According to Altan, Turkish telecommunications networks now operate directly in parts of northern Syria under Turkish influence, while in other areas Syrian networks have been linked to Turkish systems.

He notes that Turkcell activated international roaming services in Syria in late 2025, which he regards as part of the logistical arrangements facilitating the movement of individuals between the two countries for the benefit of Turkish intelligence operations.

He also states that during 2025 and 2026, the interim government launched the SilkLink project to expand Syria's fiber-optic network and connect the country with neighboring states, including Turkey. Contracts were subsequently awarded to several companies to implement the project.

Altan further claims that Turkey has installed advanced maritime and aerial surveillance systems, as well as sophisticated communications towers, in the Ras al-Bassit area. Most personnel working on these projects reportedly came from Türkiye, while Syrians fluent in Turkish and English were employed primarily in technical positions.

He also says that an air defense site in the coastal city of Baniyas has been converted into a facility housing a Turkish radar installation, alongside personnel from the interim government's naval forces and vessels used to facilitate maritime operations. According to Altan, the site contains no missile systems but is equipped solely with radar installations and specialized vehicles. He says the facility is overseen by an individual known as Sheikh Abu Omar, from Hama Governorate, who is considered a close associate of the interim government's Minister of Defense.

According to Altan, personnel at the site include members of the Amshat Division, Hamzat Division, al-Khattab Brigade, Division 76, and Divisions 82 and 86.

Finally, Altan states that Turkey has installed an HTRS-100 radar system at Damascus International Airport to monitor air traffic. While Ankara says the system is intended to enhance civil aviation safety, some Israeli analysts believe it could also be used to collect intelligence on aircraft movements.

What is the goal of intensifying the Turkish presence in northern and eastern Syria?

Turkey, after intensifying its military operations against the Autonomous Administration areas in North and East Syria, has also expanded its security and intelligence activities in the cities of Manbij, Raqqa, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor, and has established special groups and units there to carry out covert operations.

These measures, alongside military activity, aim to consolidate Turkish influence in the region thru indirect means. The recent attacks and attempts to incite chaos in the rural areas of Qamishlo and Hasakah are signs that the Turkish intelligence agency (MIT) has begun implementing a new strategy based on forming groups with a tribal character. There are groups linked to Turkish intelligence and elements of ISIS operating in the Tel Hamis area under the name "Knights of the Tribes." Some members of these groups move in the uniforms of the internal security forces affiliated with the Damascus government, and one of these groups consists of ten members, in addition to forming other cells that include elements from the Syrian National Army factions and ISIS.

The goal of these cells is to create chaos within the areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), carry out attacks against security headquarters and centers, and incite tension and clashes between Arabs and Kurds. These groups are organized in coordination between the Turkish intelligence agency and officials close to it within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Some factions are presented as a "tribal army," while at the same time, young men from the tribes are being recruited, and former ISIS mercenaries are being sent to the area in civilian clothes.

The Turkish intelligence agency also established what is called the "Liberation of the Island Brigade" under the guise of one of the tribes, which includes former leaders of ISIS. This is part of the plan and the attacks that have been witnessed in the neighborhoods of Sheik Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, and later in the areas of Deir ez-Zor, Tabqa, and Raqqa.

Turkey is also working to connect its intelligence and security networks extending along the border directly to Ankara. For example, in Aleppo, communication and postal networks have become linked to Turkish infrastructure and are overseen by the Turkish embassy in Damascus, which is managed by a former official of the Turkish intelligence agency.

The aim of this is to portray the Kurdish political and military presence under the banner of "counter-terrorism" as a security threat, and thus criminalize it politically.

As for the economic aspect, Turkey has strengthened its influence in northern Syria thru: adopting the Turkish lira in transactions, linking trade routes to the Turkish economy, and implementing projects in the fields of energy and agriculture.

In the city of Aleppo, contracts were signed for 15 years with Turkish companies linked to the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party to manage a number of industrial facilities. Additionally, several individuals holding both Syrian and Turkish nationalities have been appointed to state institutions and the parliament in Damascus, with their number estimated to be over a hundred so far.

How does Turkey's expanding influence affect Syria's sovereignty and political future?

Altan argues that Turkey's expanding influence has negatively affected Syrian sovereignty on two key levels: the erosion of the Syrian state's effective sovereignty and its impact on the country's future political system and state structure.

The First Level: erosion of sovereignty

According to Altan, the military, administrative, and economic institutions established in northern and northwestern Syria, which are directly linked to Ankara, are officially presented as mechanisms to preserve Syria's territorial integrity. In practice, however, he says they have created a decentralized system of governance that operates to varying degrees under Turkish influence. As a result, he argues, the Syrian state's effective authority over these areas has steadily diminished.

The Second Level: shaping the future of the state

Altan argues that integrating the military and security institutions of the new government in Damascus into a framework that relies heavily on cooperation with Türkiye will result in Syria's political future being shaped more by Ankara's security priorities than by the priorities of Syrians themselves.

"In my view, this could lead to the reduction or elimination of any form of Kurdish self-rule through new constitutional arrangements, the reconstruction of the Syrian economy in a way that increases its dependence on Türkiye, and the consolidation of Ankara's role as the main 'gateway' influencing regional balances related to Syria."

According to Altan, the ultimate outcome of these policies would be the preservation of Syria as a formally unified state, while in practice transforming it into a sphere of influence centered around Türkiye.

He argues that early signs of this development have already appeared in the formation of the government and parliament in Damascus, which, he says, were shaped more by the interests and balances of external powers than by an internal democratic process.

The struggle for power in Syria is no longer solely an internal matter; it has become an ongoing regional and international conflict.

Are Turkey and the international and regional powers involved in the Syrian file engaged in competition or cooperation?

According to Altan, the Syrian landscape shows that Turkey combines competition with tactical understandings with various actors, as the nature of each relationship differs depending on the party involved and the issue at stake.

First: Relations with the United States

Altan says that relations between Ankara and Washington are characterized by competition regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdish issue, as the two sides have different strategic priorities.

At the same time, he notes that coordination continues between them on other matters, including combating the Islamic State (ISIS/Daesh), managing airspace, and certain aspects of limited operational coordination.

He adds that, in recent months, Türkiye handed over 12 ISIS members to Iraq, and says that most of them no longer represented a significant interest for Ankara.

Secondly: The relationship with Russia

The relationship with Moscow, since the Astana process, has been based on understanding in issues such as: "Idlib, airspace management, and some bases located on the Syrian coast," and the two parties are competing in the long term over who will have the stronger say in energy projects and military infrastructure within Syria.

Third: The relationship with Iran

Turkey and Iran cooperate on some issues related to logistical supply routes and weapons heading to Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, there is competition between them for regional influence, as Turkey seeks to build a Sunni axis that limits the influence of the Iranian axis and its associated militia networks.
The relationship with Israel

Regarding Israel, the relationship between the two sides is based on continuous competition. Turkey seeks the establishment of a relatively strong Syrian state, but one that remains within its sphere of influence, while Israel prefers the Syrian state to remain limited in capabilities, preventing it from becoming an influential regional power.

ANHA