Kurdish representation in Syrian parliament: from State formation to present

The selection of parliamentary members from Syria's Kurdish regions took place amid a widespread boycott and sharp Kurdish criticism, against the backdrop of ongoing controversy over the limited Kurdish representation and the absence of genuine political partnership. This has once again brought to the forefront the issue of marginalization and exclusion that has accompanied Kurdish participation in Syrian state institutions for decades.

The early years: Syrian National Congress and the first parliaments (1919–1946)

With the establishment of the Syrian National Congress in Damascus in 1919 considered Syria’s first modern legislative body, prominent Kurdish figures participated as part of the country's political and military elite, at a time when ethnic identity was not the primary determinant of political activity.

Among the Kurdish personalities who emerged during this period were:

Yusuf al-Azma, Minister of War and commander of the Battle of Maysalun.

Jamil Mardam Bey, one of the leading figures of the National Bloc, who came from a family of Kurdish origins.

Fakhri al-Barudi, the well-known Damascene politician of Kurdish descent.

During the parliaments formed under the French Mandate and later after Syria’s independence in 1946, several Kurdish deputies from Aleppo, al-Jazira region, and Damascus entered parliament. However, there were no independent Kurdish nationalist blocs, as political alignments were based on traditional parties and ideological currents.

The era of military coups and union with Egypt (1949–1963)

Between 1949 and 1963, Syria experienced a series of military coups that reshaped the country's political and parliamentary life. During this period, Kurdish military officers and politicians played pivotal roles in the state, most notably:

Husni al-Za'im, the first Syrian president to come to power through a military coup in 1949.

Fawzi Selu, who served as President of the Republic in 1951.

Adib al-Shishakli, who relied on Kurdish figures and tribal leaders as part of his power base.

In the parliaments of the 1950s, Kurdish names appeared among independent deputies or members affiliated with nationalist and leftist parties, particularly from al-Hasakah and Aleppo provinces. Nevertheless, Kurdish representation remained individual rather than collective and was not based on any official recognition of the Kurdish issue.

With the establishment of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt in 1958, Kurdish political activity declined significantly, while the state increasingly adopted a more rigid Arab nationalist discourse toward non-Arab identities.

Post-Ba'ath rule and the exceptional census: The beginning of political decline (1963–1970)

Following the Ba'ath Party's rise to power in 1963, the Kurdish issue entered a new phase characterized by political and security restrictions, particularly after the exceptional census conducted in al-Hasakah in 1962, through which more than 120,000 Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship.

In the parliaments formed during this period, independent Kurdish representation declined significantly. Participation was largely limited to figures close to the authorities or affiliated with the Ba'ath Party, including tribal leaders from al-Hasakah and al-Jazira region.

During this era, Syrian Kurdish political parties began to emerge clandestinely, most notably the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (Barti), founded in 1957. However, these parties remained officially banned and had no representation in parliament.

Hafez al-Assad Era: The People's Assembly Under National Front Dominance (1971–2000)

After Hafez al-Assad assumed power in 1970, the People's Assembly was established in its permanent form under the 1973 Constitution, becoming firmly dominated by the Ba'ath Party and the National Progressive Front.

Throughout these decades, parliament consisted of:

Ba'ath Party members,

National Progressive Front parties,

Independents aligned with the government,

Tribal and religious figures.

Although Kurdish deputies were present in most parliamentary terms, their proportion remained limited compared to the Kurdish population in Syria, and their participation was largely confined to individuals close to the ruling authorities.

Among the Kurdish figures who appeared during this period were:

Mahmoud Agha, a representative of the Jazira region,

Tribal leaders from al-Hasakah and Kobani,

Deputies affiliated with government-backed Ba'ath Party lists.

Meanwhile, opposition Kurdish parties remained completely excluded from parliamentary life, while their activists were subjected to arrests and persecution, particularly following the rise of Kurdish protests during the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Kurdish political estimates, Kurdish deputies accounted for only between 3 and 5 percent of the People's Assembly in most parliamentary sessions, despite estimates placing the Kurdish population at between 10 and 15 percent of Syria’s total population.

During parliamentary elections in this period, several Kurdish figures entered parliament, most notably:

Fuad Aliko,

Mahmoud Daoud,

Abdul Hamid Haj Darwish,

Kamal Darwish,

Mohammad Marwan Zarki,

Marwan Shikho,

who served as members of parliament between 1990 and 1994.

Bashar al-Assad Era: Limited opening and controlled representation (2000–2011)

Following Bashar al-Assad's accession to power in 2000, Syria experienced a limited political opening known as the Damascus Spring. However, this did not fundamentally improve Kurdish representation.

The Qamishlo Uprising of 2004 marked a turning point. Dozens of Kurds were killed during widespread Kurdish protests, deepening the divide between the state and the Kurdish population and renewing demands for genuine Kurdish political representation within state institutions.

After 2011: The Syrian war and the transformation of representation

With the outbreak of the Syrian protests in 2011, the Kurdish political landscape changed dramatically. Several Kurdish political forces emerged as key actors, including:

Democratic Union Party (PYD),

Kurdish National Council (ENKS),

Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM),

The Kurdish National Unity Parties.

At the same time, a number of Kurdish political and military figures became central players in the Syrian file, including:

Mazloum Abdi, Ilham Ahmed, Saleh Muslim, Badran Jia Kurd, Foza Youssef.

Foza Youssef.

Other prominent figures in Kurdish politics included:

Abdul Hamid Haj Darwish, Jamal Sheikh Baqi, Mohammad Mousa, Hikmat Khilo, Saleh Kado, Mohammad Ismail, Fasla Youssef.

During the years of conflict, areas in North and East Syria came under the administration of self-governing institutions that adopted a system of co-chairmanship and multi-ethnic representation, while the Syrian government continued to hold People's Assembly elections in areas under its control.

In the parliamentary elections held in 2012, 2016, and 2020, several Kurdish deputies entered parliament through government-backed lists, including:

Hassan Khalil, Omar Osi,

as well as tribal and administrative figures from al-Hasakah and Qamishlo.

However, most Kurdish opposition parties and the Autonomous Administration rejected the legitimacy of these assemblies, arguing that they did not genuinely represent the population of North and East Syria.

The current transitional period: debate over the new parliament (2025–2026)

Following the collapse of the Ba'ath regime and Syria's transition into a new political phase, the issue of Kurdish representation has returned to the forefront, particularly after the agreement reached on 29 January 2026 between the interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

During the recent formation of the transitional parliament, the Higher Committee for People's Assembly Elections announced the selection of:

Kim Hussein Ibrahim, Radwan Othman Sido, Abdul Halim Khadr Al-Ali,

Mahmoud Madi Al-Ali,

to represent the Qamishlo constituency.

In addition, the following were selected for the al-Hasakah constituency:

Ibrahim Mustafa Al-Ali, Omar Issa Hais, Fasla Youssef.

Meanwhile, the following were chosen for Kobani:

Afrhad Anwar Shahin, Shawakh Ibrahim Al-Assaf.

And for Afrin: Rankin Abdo,

Sheikh Saeed Sheikh Zadeh,

 Imad Sido.

However, these appointments were met with widespread rejection from 21 Kurdish parties and movements, including:

The Democratic Union Party (PYD),

The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party,

The Kurdistan Future Movement,

Kongra Star,

The Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM).

These parties and organizations stated that the new parliament does not provide genuine representation for the Kurdish people and argued that the selection mechanism has reproduced centralization and exclusion in new forms.

From “number of MPs” to “The shape of the state”

Kurdish politicians in Syria believe that the Kurdish issue has now gone beyond merely demanding a greater number of seats in parliament. Instead, it has evolved into a broader discussion concerning the structure of the political system, decentralization, constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people, linguistic and cultural rights, and mechanisms for sharing power and wealth.

Kurdish parties emphasize that any parliamentary representation not based on constitutional guarantees and genuine political partnership will remain merely symbolic, even if the number of seats allocated to Kurds increases.

Between the first Syrian conference in 1919 and the transitional parliament currently being formed, political systems, constitutions, and internal political boundaries have changed. However, the question of Kurdish representation has remained one of the most prominent issues in Syrian debates concerning identity, citizenship, and the future of the state.

Reasons behind the gradual weakening of Kurdish representation in the Syrian parliament throughout history

Lack of constitutional recognition of Kurds as a principal component of Syria

Kurdish studies and research centers argue that one of the primary reasons for the weakness of Kurdish representation in Syrian parliaments is the absence of explicit constitutional recognition of Kurds as a major national group in the country. Successive Syrian constitutions presented Syria for decades as an “Arab state” without clearly acknowledging its ethnic and cultural diversity.

As a result, Kurdish representation was treated as the representation of individuals within the ruling system rather than as a political partnership with a community possessing national, cultural, and linguistic rights.

The extraordinary census of 1962 and the derivation of political rights

Kurdish political circles consider the extraordinary census conducted in al-Hasakah Governorate in 1962 a turning point in the trajectory of Kurdish political representation. The census stripped more than 120,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, a number that later grew to hundreds of thousands when their descendants were included.

Studies indicate that this deprived a large segment of the Kurdish population of the right to vote, run for office, and work in state institutions for decades, directly contributing to their weak parliamentary and political presence.

Arabization policies and the Arab belt project in al-Jazira

Kurdish sources also argue that the “Arab Belt” project, implemented in the Syrian Jazira region beginning in the 1960s, altered the demographic and administrative structure of predominantly Kurdish areas by resettling Arab families along the border region and redistributing land and population.

Kurdish political forces maintain that these policies weakened Kurdish political and administrative influence within state institutions, including parliament and local administration, and reinforced a long-term sense of marginalization.

Ba'ath Party dominance and the closure of political space for Kurdish parties

The dominance of the Ba'ath Party and the National Progressive Front over political life since the 1970s transformed the People’s Assembly into an institution largely subordinate to the ruling structure rather than a competitive representative body, according to Kurdish sources.

Because Kurdish parties remained banned and unlicensed for decades, they were unable to participate openly in elections or form independent parliamentary blocs, resulting in limited Kurdish participation constrained within the framework of the ruling authorities.

Security-Oriented approach to the Kurdish issue instead of a political one

Another frequently cited reason is that successive Syrian governments treated the Kurdish issue primarily as a security and border-related matter rather than as a question of political and cultural rights concerning a fundamental component of the country.

This approach led to restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural activities and the persecution of Kurdish parties and activists, negatively affecting Kurdish political participation and parliamentary representation for decades.

Individual representation instead of genuine political representation

Today, Kurdish politicians, blocs, and political forces argue that most Kurdish parliamentarians who entered the Syrian parliament over previous decades represented the ruling authorities or tribal and independent figures connected to the state's official structure rather than serving as genuine representatives of Kurdish political parties and movements.

Extreme centralization in the governance of Syria

These same actors point to the highly centralized political and administrative system that governed Syria for decades as a key factor weakening local Kurdish representation. Damascus retained ultimate authority over appointing governors and senior officials and controlled electoral and administrative processes in Kurdish regions.

According to this perspective, the absence of effective local governance prevented the emergence of political representation reflecting the unique characteristics of regions such as Jazira, Kobani, Afrin, and others.

Divisions among Kurdish parties and forces after 2011

Following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Kurdish parties entered a new phase marked by the rise of the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, political divisions between the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and parties affiliated with the Autonomous Administration, as well as differing positions regarding Damascus, the Syrian opposition, and international actors, negatively affected Kurdish unity on issues of political and parliamentary representation.

Regional influences and Cross-Border conflicts

Historically, the Kurdish issue in Syria has been shaped by regional dynamics, particularly due to the division of Kurdistan and the distribution of Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

This led successive Syrian governments to approach any rise in Kurdish political influence with caution, fearing its impact on neighboring countries or its transformation into a cross-border regional issue. Consequently, this affected the nature of Kurdish political participation within state institutions.

The Turkish Position and Pressures Related to the Kurdish Issue

The position of Turkey toward Kurdish forces in Syria has also played a significant role in recent years, especially following the rise of the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

According to claims made by Turkish and Syrian authorities, the issue of Kurdish representation has become linked to complex security and regional calculations extending beyond Syria’s domestic affairs, affecting negotiations and Kurdish political representation within Syrian state institutions.

Lack of international consensus on Syria’s political future

In addition, ongoing international disagreements regarding the future of Syria’s political system and the nature of governance in northern and eastern Syria have contributed to the instability of the Kurdish representation issue.

Key international actors involved in the Syrian file have yet to agree on a final formula concerning the structure of the state, the extent of decentralization, or the nature of recognition for the Autonomous Administration. As a result, Kurdish participation in Syrian institutions, including parliament, remains tied more to shifting political and military balances than to stable constitutional guarantees.

The Kurdish issue as part of regional power struggles

Ultimately, the Kurdish issue in Syria has become intertwined with broader regional and international struggles for influence. It has at times been used as a political and security pressure card among Damascus, Ankara, Tehran, and other international actors.

According to this perspective, such dynamics have weakened opportunities for reaching a stable domestic settlement that would guarantee an agreed-upon form of Kurdish representation.

Recommendations frequently raised by Kurdish studies centers, writers, politicians, and political forces

Based on reviews of publications from various Kurdish research centers, as well as the views expressed by Kurdish writers, politicians, political blocs, and public opinion within Kurdish society, the following measures are considered necessary to ensure fair Kurdish representation in Syria and guarantee constitutional rights:

Unifying the Kurdish political position and establishing a common Kurdish political reference framework.

Demanding clear constitutional guarantees.

Ensuring constitutional recognition of Kurds as a principal component of Syria.

Guaranteeing national, cultural, and linguistic rights.

Moving from symbolic representation to genuine political partnership.

Strengthening political and administrative decentralization.

Expanding the powers of local administrations.

Building national partnerships with other Syrian communities.

Enhancing Kurdish political and public participation.

Unifying the Kurdish negotiating discourse.

Protecting the Kurdish issue from regional interference.

Supporting Kurdish–Kurdish dialogue.

Strengthening Kurdish representation within state institutions.

Investing in Kurdish education, culture, and media.

Calling for free elections and fair representation.

Rejecting policies of marginalization and exclusion.

Consolidating the principles of justice, equality, and shared citizenship.

ANHA