As-Suwayda's Druze: Legacy of resilience and self-determination

Located in southwestern Syria near Damascus, As-Suwayda is bordered by the Damascus countryside to the north, Jordan to the south, Daraa to the west, and the Syrian Desert to the east. Known as "Jabal al-Arab" (Mountain of the Arabs), it served as a refuge for Syria's freedom fighters who resisted French colonial rule. It was the epicenter of the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, led by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, which paved the way for Syria's independence.

 Covering an area of 6,500 square kilometers, As-Suwayda includes notable cities such as As-Suwayda city, Shahba, and Salkhad. The region is renowned for its grape and apple cultivation and is home to numerous Roman archaeological sites, as well as extinct volcanic mountain ranges and caves on its outskirts.

 The population is estimated at around 770,000, with Christians (mostly Greek Orthodox) making up 11%, Sunni Muslims 2%, and the Druze constituting the majority at 87.6%. The Druze, who refer to themselves as "al-Muwahhidun" (Unitarians), follow the esoteric Tawhid faith, rooted in the Ismaili branch of Islam and the Fatimid state of the 10th century. Originating in Western Asia, the global Druze population ranges between 800,000 and two million, primarily residing in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Known for their social, cultural, and political cohesion due to historical persecution, the Druze maintain tightly knit, closed communities while being fully integrated into their respective countries.

 Bedouin tribes are distributed along the northern and eastern outskirts of As-Suwayda in areas such as al-Harouba, Rajm al-Zaytoun, al-Maqous, Barika, al-Mazraa, Najran, al-Mansoura, al-Kafr, Suhwat al-Balata, and al-Shi‘ab. They are also present in significant numbers in the town of Ara, southwest of As-Suwayda, which has a Druze majority.

 Relations between the Druze and Bedouin communities have not been without tension, often due to disputes over grazing lands or individual criminal incidents that occasionally escalated into collective conflicts. The events of 2000, marked by violent clashes between the Druze and Bedouins, resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries on both sides, significantly straining relations for years.

 Long History of Struggle Despite Challenges

 Establishing a foothold in the Levant was not easy for the Druze, who have historically leaned toward independence. They faced numerous hardships, including attempts at extermination that claimed thousands of lives over the past millennium. Notable trials include the "al-Dajjal" persecution (1021–1026) under the Fatimid Caliph Ali al-Zahir, the Antioch persecution (1032) by the Mirdasids and Byzantines, and the Battle of Akkar (1548) against the Ottomans, which resulted in 60,000 Druze casualties and widespread destruction of their villages. Additionally, the Keserwan conflict of 1860 between the Druze and Maronite Christians in Lebanon led to significant Druze migration to Jabal al-Arab in Syria.

 Despite their relatively small numbers, the Druze have played a significant role in Syrian politics. The Druze of southwestern Syria's mountains have been a potent political force, leading the resistance against French colonial rule under Sultan Pasha al-Atrash. During the Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927), Druze military units, led by al-Atrash, liberated Jabal al-Druze from French control without British assistance, continuing their resistance until the French withdrawal in 1946.

 Post-independence,the Druze expected recognition from Damascus for their sacrifices and sought to maintain the autonomous administration they had secured under French rule, along with economic support from the newly independent government. However, the Syrian authorities pursued policies contrary to these demands. During Adib al-Shishakli’s rule (1949–1954), the Druze faced severe persecution, as he viewed them as his most dangerous opponents, famously stating, "My enemies are like a snake: the head is Jabal al-Druze, the stomach is Homs, and the tail is Aleppo. If I crush the head, the snake will die." This oppression culminated in al-Shishakli’s assassination in Brazil on September 27, 1964, by a Druze seeking retribution.

 Ba'ath Continues the Path of Persecution

 After the Ba'ath Party assumed power, policies of marginalization and persecution against the Druze persisted. In 2000, a violent clash erupted in As-Suwayda between the Druze and Bedouins, triggered by actions of certain Bedouin elements linked to regime security forces who violated local social norms. Contrary to the narrative propagated by Damascus, the conflict was not primarily with the Bedouins; all 25 fatalities were caused by regime forces’ gunfire, sparking protests across the city. The regime quickly intervened to suppress these protests through incitement and violent measures.

 This pattern repeated after the Syrian crisis began in 2011. As-Suwayda was among the first provinces to join nationwide protests, but the regime swiftly moved to quell these demonstrations, arresting many of the city’s residents.

 In parallel with the success of the Autonomous Administration model in NE Syria, which ended the Ba'ath regime’s control, protected autonomous regions, and avoided sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, the Druze community in As-Suwayda has pursued a similar path under the banner of “protecting land and honor.” They have established local political parties and armed factions to manage their affairs independently.

Numerous political figures and forces in As-Suwayda have called for adopting the self-governance model implemented in NE Syria, while criticizing the role of the nationalist state in leading Syria into its current crisis. Several political and military groups have emerged, most notably the Men of Dignity Movement, founded by Sheikh Wahid al-Balous in 2012 to prevent the regime’s security forces from arresting young Druze men who refused mandatory military service. The movement suffered a significant blow when its founder was assassinated in a bloody bombing in mid-2015.

 Men of Dignity Movement

  The Men of Dignity is one of the largest local factions in As-Suwayda, operating across most of its regions. Established in 2012 by Wahid Fahd al-Balous, it is guided spiritually by Sheikh Rakan al-Atrash and Sheikh Yahya al-Hajjar. The movement has repeatedly intervened to pressure regime forces into releasing detained Druze individuals. It enjoys support from the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party, led by Walid Jumblatt, with reports indicating it has received assistance from the party. In September 2015, Wahid al-Balous and dozens of fighters were killed in a bombing targeting his convoy, with accusations directed at the former Syrian regime’s intelligence services. Balous was known for his staunch opposition to mandatory conscription, famously stating weeks before his death, “Our dignity is worth more than Bashar al-Assad.”

 Military Council in As-Suwayda: Formed on February 24, 2025, in the town of al-Ghariya after the fall of the Assad regime, the Military Council is a coalition of armed groups led by Tariq al-Shoufi. It excludes factions such as the Mountain Brigade, Men of Dignity, and Free Mountain Fighters. The council is characterized by a comprehensive military and administrative structure and has expressed openness to cooperating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It also declared support for the spiritual leader of the Druze community, Hikmat al-Hajari.

 Al-Maqdad Brigades: Active in the villages of al-Mazraa and Arman in As-Suwayda, these brigades are led by local leader Thaer Fayyad. Since their formation, they have notably participated in repelling ISIS mercenaries during attacks on villages in eastern As-Suwayda.

A prominent political entity is the Syrian Brigade Party, formed by a group of opposition figures in As-Suwayda to restore the Druze’s rightful role in Syrian politics, from which they have been deliberately excluded for decades. The party seeks to establish a transitional governing body with full authority to ensure a peaceful and democratic transfer of power and to build a democratic state under a constitutional framework.

 Ba'ath and ISIS Punish the Druze

 Due to the Druze’s stance during the Syrian crisis, As-Suwayda faced a series of attacks by ISIS mercenaries on July 25, 2018, resulting in at least 258 deaths. The Ba'ath regime was accused of colluding with ISIS to target the Druze. Amid deliberate chaos and deteriorating living conditions created by the regime, protests erupted in early 2020 under the slogan “We want to live, no corruption, no marginalization.” These protests peaked in 2022, evolving from denouncing living conditions to chanting for the “overthrow of the Syrian regime” and demanding the implementation of UN Resolution 2254, which calls for a political transition in Syria, the release of detainees, and clarity on their fates.

 Transitional Government Continues Ba'ath’s Path

  During military operations against the Ba'ath regime, As-Suwayda’s military factions supported these efforts, with reports indicating their active contribution, including advancing toward Damascus before the arrival of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other factions. However, since the regime’s fall, these factions have monopolized power, excluding other political and military groups, particularly those with civic, national, and democratic orientations, including As-Suwayda’s forces. Druze political and military entities were not included in subsequent steps, such as efforts to form a unified army, which have yet to yield results, or in national dialogue sessions.

This suggests the transitional government harbors ill intentions toward As-Suwayda’s residents. During this period, the transitional government and its factions tested and pressured the Druze by instigating security issues, both in As-Suwayda and in Druze-populated neighborhoods in Damascus, such as Jaramana and Sahnaya. Despite As-Suwayda’s forces expressing willingness to integrate into the government and allowing the governor and state institutions to operate in the city, the transitional government sought to impose full control over the city and its countryside. From the early weeks following the regime’s fall, social media pages linked to transitional government supporters began inciting against As-Suwayda’s residents and their political, military, and religious leaders, even calling for their excommunication and mobilization against them.

 This escalated into fabricated conflicts with Bedouin tribes, though in reality, the transitional government and its affiliated armed groups orchestrated these crises. On July 14, 2025, government forces and allied groups seized several Druze-controlled villages on the city’s outskirts, according to field sources, local military forces, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

On the same day, the Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hajari called for resisting this “barbaric campaign by all available means.” Israeli intervention, however, forced the transitional government to withdraw its forces. Despite attempts to frame the agreement as a compromise, transitional government leader Ahmad al-Sharaa acknowledged in a televised address that local Druze factions and sheikhs were tasked with managing their regions. Residents reported severe violations, including executions, looting, and arson, during the government forces’ incursion. After their withdrawal, numerous crimes and violations were uncovered, prompting Hikmat al-Hajari to declare As-Suwayda a “stricken city.” Syrian politicians and activists noted on social media that, despite the transitional government’s rhetoric echoing Ba’athist claims about national unity and preventing division, the withdrawal effectively granted As-Suwayda decentralized governance with expanded powers.

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ANHA