Syrian writer: Comprehensive constitution key to ending violence in Syria

In an interview with ANHA agency, Syrian Kurdish writer Asim Amin addressed the state of rights of religious and ethnic components in Syria, the country’s security situation, and the prospects for a political solution, offering an analytical reading of the current Syrian landscape.

How do you assess the current state of rights in Syria?

In my view as an observer, the current political and military conditions in Syria can be described as a distorted historical birth, one that clashes with the logic of history and the laws of human social development. It is impossible to establish sustainable political or social stability on a legacy burdened with massacres, systematic destruction, and suffering endured by Syrians since 2011.

Ignoring victims’ sacrifices, bypassing accountability, and failing to implement transitional justice constitute structural obstacles to any national revival. A real state cannot be built on the ruins of injustice, and recovery cannot be achieved by denying wounds, but by healing them through effective transitional justice paths.

In the complete absence of genuine state structures, the future of the rights of peoples and religious and ethnic components in Syria faces a real, existential, and complex threat—especially with the rise of hate and takfiri rhetoric promoted by groups claiming “sectarian majority.” Such rhetoric not only spreads hatred but also lays the groundwork for a culture of annihilation and demographic change. Therefore, any talk of political transition that is not based on an inclusive constitution protecting Syria’s diversity as equal partners is merely an illusion.

A state that lacks justice and mutual recognition does not produce stability; it merely postpones explosion. Building on injustice is a continuation of destruction. Restoring Syria from fragmentation and fragility requires belief in equal citizenship, strict curbing of hate speech, and comprehensive justice as the only pillars to break the cycle of violence and create a future inclusive of all, free from exclusion and eradication.

Do you consider the difficulties faced by some components as isolated cases or part of a broader pattern?

As an observer, I believe the deep roots of this issue lie in sectarian and ideological nationalist mindsets that have dominated the scene. One cannot ignore the central role played by the Ba’ath Party and its intelligence apparatus over decades, as this system deliberately cultivated an exclusionary and extremist legacy within the core of Syrian political culture.

This approach turned ideology into a tool for controlling and fragmenting society. This cultural and political legacy, saturated with the denial and betrayal of the “other,” has created fertile ground for today’s violations. The current violence is not merely a product of the moment but rather the outcome of a long “authoritarian conditioning” that prioritized narrow ideologies over inclusive citizenship.

Which parties are primarily responsible for these violations, according to your documentation?

As an observer, I pay attention to major international human rights reports as well as UN reports, which clearly indicate the involvement of multiple parties in serious violations that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These include members of Syrian government and security forces, local and tribal armed groups, and elements linked to extremist factions that have become part of the current power structure, exploiting the security vacuum and chaos.

The security fragility caused by the absence of state presence, overlapping sectarian authorities, and lack of a unified national doctrine has led to continued violence, criminality, and brutality targeting self-protected safe zones and civilians from Syrian communities—including Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians—on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or geographic location, in areas such as Damascus, Suwayda, the Syrian coast, Afrin, Sheikh Maqsood, and the eastern Euphrates region.

Is there a difference in the level of targeting?

Yes, there is a clear variation in patterns and levels of targeting and systematic killings, which rise to the level of war crimes against Syrian communities such as Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians. Some groups are targeted due to political affiliations connected to the conflict, others for ethnic, religious, or geographic reasons.

For example, Kurds face issues related to national identity, demographics, and existential threats. Christians are concerned about decline, while Alawites, despite some links to the current power structure, also experience existential consequences of the conflict. Druze often try to maintain relative neutrality but are not immune to pressures. This diversity in targeting reflects the complex nature of the conflict, where politics and identity intersect intricately.

To what extent are these violations accurately documented, given the difficulty of accessing certain areas?

Documenting violations in Syria faces major challenges, including limited access to conflict zones, the dangers of fieldwork, and pressures on witnesses. Many organizations rely on local sources and informal networks, such as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and other Syrian human rights organizations inside and outside the country. This imposes limits on the comprehensiveness and accuracy of data.

However, digital verification tools have developed significantly, especially in analyzing images and videos, improving documentation. Yet, information gaps remain, particularly in closed areas or where narratives are disputed or politically exploited. Documentation thus remains a complex and incomplete process.

What actions should the international community take in Syria?

The international community faces a real ethical, legal, and humanitarian test in its ability to move from cautious political statements and condemnations to tangible actions that protect civilians. Key steps include strengthening accountability mechanisms, supporting independent human rights initiatives, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure on responsible parties to address the root causes of the crisis.

Supporting comprehensive political solutions and rebuilding institutions capable of ensuring rights for all communities is essential. Empowering civil society becomes a central tool; without it, international efforts will remain limited in impact.

Are there signs of improvement, or do risks continue to escalate?

Current data indicate a state of “fragile stability,” which could potentially lead to new uprisings or civil wars due to the uncertainty and unknown fate faced by Syrians of all communities and backgrounds. Although the intensity of military confrontations has decreased, this does not imply any improvement in the rights or existential conditions of Syria’s communities.

The future of Syria’s political system remains unclear and open to multiple possibilities. Tensions continue, from sharp political and identity divisions to severe economic crises, alongside the absence of transitional justice. At the same time, the risk of a new revolution or civil war persists, sometimes manifesting in less visible forms.

Thus, the situation has not yet reached a stage of recovery; rather, it is in a delicate balance, in a state of waiting that could be disrupted at any moment.

ANHA