Syria sinks into fragmentation, violence as political solution becomes urgent

Today, Syria is experiencing a complex reality that combines escalating security violations with severe economic and social pressures, alongside ongoing political tensions and confrontations that heighten citizens’ sense of insecurity and instability.

Syrian journalist and specialist in Syrian political and social affairs, Dr. Majd al-Qallani, does not view what Syria has witnessed in the recent period as a transient rise in crime or a temporary security lapse. Rather, he sees it as a structural shift in the nature of the conflict and daily life, whereby the country is gradually entering a state of authority fragmentation managed through violence.

In his remarks to ANHA agency on Syria’s reality, he argues that this transformation is governed by three realistic approaches.
The first is the erosion of the monopoly on force, when the ruling authority fails to impose a unified law and equal accountability, instead presenting mercenaries as heroes and liberators. Weapons thus shift from being a security tool to an instrument for entrenching rule, and crime becomes part of unspoken political balances. Violence, in this context, is no longer an exception but a means of rearranging influence, considerations, and interests.

The second, he explains, is the politicization of identity. The invocation of sectarian and regional affiliations does not occur spontaneously; rather, it is used as a mechanism for mobilization, incitement, and mutual deterrence. The bombing of the Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque in Homs stands as a clear example of what may be termed the planting of fear sending political messages through bloodshed. This opens the door to a logic of collective revenge and dismantles any inclusive national discourse.

The third approach, he says, is impunity as a de facto policy. The absence of accountability not only encourages the repetition of violations, but also legitimizes generalization and collective punishment, transforming individual grievances into a collective narrative that can be politically exploited.

He adds: “From this perspective, we can say that Swedia has experienced both the cost of withdrawal and the cost of self-defense. Syria today is being managed according to a logic of containing explosions rather than resolving them. This means that violence will remain a tool of mutual pressure, and trust in any comprehensive national project will continue to erode and decline.”

He notes that the recent protests in Syria’s interior and coastal regions were not isolated events detached from the broader Syrian reality, but rather reactions to a growing sense of lack of protection, absence of guarantees, and erosion of trust.

Al-Qallani points out that the demands raised ranging from “ending violations” and “releasing detainees” to “proposing decentralization as a formula for safety” reflect the transition of sectors previously considered outside the protest sphere into a state of political anxiety. He explains that the problem was not the protest itself, but how quickly it turned into confrontations, revealing the fragility of civil peace and the readiness of the popular base to ignite at the first shock.

He also notes that the deployment of forces and heavy machinery presented a superficial image of restored control, but in essence reinforced a logic of coercive deterrence at the expense of reassurance and trust-building, thereby deepening feelings of insecurity rather than containing them.

In the same context, he adds: “The official narrative reinterpreted the events as the actions of outlaw groups a familiar discourse that reproduces the former regime’s method of tailoring facts into ready-made narratives based on demonizing the opponent and stripping them of any social extension, instead of addressing the real underlying causes on the ground. Politically, this scene reveals that fear is no longer confined to a specific identity or region, but has become a cross-cutting sentiment among all components. This drives any group that feels a decline in protection to seek special guarantees, whether through demands for decentralization, self-rule, or local security arrangements based on the logic of bearing arms.”

From a security perspective, such scenes of controlled or limited chaos constitute the most suitable environment for remnants of old networks, extremist groups, and forces that see the continuation of political deadlock as a direct interest allowing them to reposition themselves and expand their influence.

Socially, the deeper danger lies in entrenching a logic of collective suspicion, whereby individuals are reduced to their narrow identities. This pushes various components including Druze, Kurds, and Christians to seek protection formulas outside the framework of the state, a path that threatens what remains of the shared national fabric.

Al-Qallani affirms that advocating for democratic decentralization as demanded by Swedia, echoed in North and East Syria, and now emerging as a social and political demand among Alawites is not a project of fragmentation. Rather, it is a rational attempt to redistribute power within a single state, provided it does not turn into “armed cantons or a cover for new repression.”

He believes that if the current reality continues without genuine political correction, Syria is effectively heading toward one of three highly costly trajectories:

The first is slow fragmentation, in which undeclared zones of influence become entrenched, each with its own security, economy, and discourse, without a formal declaration of separation. This model may appear less bloody in the short term, but it is extremely fragile and prone to explosion with any major incident. This is what the internal policy of the de facto authority in Damascus has produced in recent months, as state resources have been plundered and denied to other governorates such as Swedia and the northeastern Euphrates canton.

The second trajectory is the reimposition of a security grip, an option that provides superficial stability but reproduces the very causes of explosion, since deferred grievances do not disappear but accumulate. This option is difficult because it requires international political consensus, a roadmap, and coordination among controlling states (“the United States, Israel, Turkey, and Britain”). In this context, Israel has carried out strikes against gatherings of tribal and Bedouin militias on their way toward Swedia.

The third, and most difficult to achieve, is re-establishing the national social contract through a political process that guarantees equal citizenship, an independent judiciary, genuine accountability, and clear political and administrative decentralization that recognizes the rights of all components foremost among them the national and cultural rights of the Kurds within the framework of a single, democratic Syrian state.

Al-Qallani expresses regret over what he calls the “de facto authority” in Damascus producing a hardline Salafi religious current that calls for democracy from the framework of numerical majority, detached from the concepts of citizenship, freedom, and political justice.

He emphasizes that Syria does not need further security management of the crisis, but rather a political decision that redefines the state as a protector of rights rather than an organizer of fear and terror a state of citizens, not a collection of groups seeking political or social protection outside its framework. He warns that any delay in adopting this path will inevitably mean that alternatives will be imposed from abroad, at a higher cost to all Syrians.

Al-Qallani concludes: “The practices of the de facto authority in Damascus since the moment it assumed power from the complete monopolization of political decision-making, to concluding international agreements without national authorization, squandering what remains of the country’s resources, and dealing with occupied territories through formalistic and illusory treaties can only be read as a submission approach to political ambitions. This entrenches the loss of sovereignty rather than restoring it, and deepens the crisis of legitimacy instead of resolving it.

ANHA