Possibility of Syria joining to "Mecca Agreement” raising many questions

Discussions about the possibility of Syria joining the “Mecca Defense Agreement,” signing a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and reports that Syrian troops could be deployed against the Houthis have reignited debate over Damascus’s role and the limits of its commitments to its allies.

After years during which Syria was a theater for regional interventions, the possibility is now emerging that it could become involved in conflicts beyond its borders before completing the reconstruction of its army.

On October 31, the foreign minister in Syria’s transitional government, Asaad al-Shaibani, announced that discussions were underway regarding Damascus’s accession to the “Mecca Alliance,” which includes Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan. The three countries signed a “Mutual Defense Agreement” in August, under which an attack against one member state is considered an attack against all the other members.

Syria has not officially announced its accession. However, President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s visit to Riyadh on November 4, followed by the signing of a military cooperation agreement between the two countries, strengthened speculation about closer defense ties.

On the seventh of the same month, an Agence France-Presse (AFP) report stated that Damascus had agreed to send approximately 3,000 troops to participate in operations against the Houthis. The transitional government subsequently denied the report, stating through an unnamed government official quoted by the official news agency that cooperation was limited to training, the exchange of expertise, and military consultations.

Although the deployment of troops remains part of unconfirmed reports, raising the possibility nevertheless necessitates a discussion about whether defense cooperation could evolve into participation in the war in Yemen.

The war in Yemen is not about defending Saudi Arabia

According to observers, there is a distinction between helping Saudi Arabia protect its territory from missiles and drones and sending troops to Yemen to fight the Houthis. The former constitutes defensive cooperation, while the latter would mean Syria becoming a party to an internal conflict that previous interventions have failed to resolve.

Based on the facts and the ongoing discussions, the Houthis cannot simply be reduced to an extension of Iran, despite their political and military ties with Tehran. Ultimately, they are viewed as a Yemeni force with a political, social, and military presence, controlling extensive areas, including the capital, Sanaa. Dealing with them cannot be based on the assumption that they are a foreign force whose presence can be eliminated militarily. This, however, does not justify their attacks.

Since the Saudi-led intervention in 2015, the war has failed to end Houthi control or restore unified authority in Yemen. Meanwhile, civilians have paid a heavy price in terms of lives, security, and livelihoods. The addition of forces from Syria would not change the nature of the crisis as a Yemeni struggle over power and the future of the state. However, it could open the door to hostilities with forces that will remain part of the political and military landscape, regardless of how long the fighting continues.

According to Yemeni citizens, what Yemen needs today is not more foreign forces, but rather a regional and international effort to promote comprehensive Yemeni dialogue involving the Houthis and other political and military forces, in order to address disagreements and reach a settlement that preserves the country's unity and ensures the security of its neighbors.

This should also include addressing attacks against Saudi Arabia and maritime navigation through a process that brings escalation to an end rather than expanding the war.

Saudi Arabia, as a key stakeholder in the Yemeni issue, can make settlement and dialogue an essential part of its policy and encourage Yemeni parties to negotiate rather than seek new partners for military operations. This is the predominant position among Saudi intellectuals and political activists.

The same applies to Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and all other concerned countries, which can help bring positions closer, support mediation efforts, and exert pressure to halt escalation, rather than sending their soldiers to a theater where previous interventions have failed to bring the war to an end.

Domestic challenges and concerns over expanding military commitments

These discussions are taking place at a time when Syria’s transitional government is facing security and military challenges within the country, amid continued Israeli incursions into southern Syria, military operations, and violations of Syrian sovereignty. This is happening alongside the absence of an integrated air defense system, raising questions about Damascus’s security and military priorities should it join any regional military alliance.

In this context, Syrian analysts emphasize the need to prioritize the reorganization of the Syrian army, securing the country's borders, and developing defensive capabilities to confront Israeli aggression, while maintaining cooperation with Saudi Arabia without incurring military obligations that exceed Syria’s security needs or open up new fronts for the country.

Any Syrian participation in a military alliance could expose Damascus to regional repercussions, including the possibility of entering into a confrontation with the Houthis and the resulting impact on its relations with Iran and its allies, at a time when the transitional government is seeking to consolidate stability and rebuild state institutions.

Questions about the nature of mutual defense obligations

Regarding the Mecca Agreement, which is based on the principle that an attack against one member state constitutes an attack against all the other members, questions and discussions have emerged among Syrians about the nature of the obligations that would result from Syria’s accession and the extent to which they would include mutual defense commitments. Such commitments would need to ensure that Damascus receives comparable support if its territory is subjected to external aggression, including Israeli attacks.

The questions being raised also concern the forms of military and security support that member states could provide, the mechanisms governing requests for assistance, and whether the agreement is limited to defending the territories of member states when they come under attack or extends to participation in military operations within other countries, potentially placing the government’s army under obligations beyond its own borders.

The above highlights the need to clearly define the scope of any defense agreement, in order to prevent it from turning into an open-ended commitment to participate in regional conflicts or wars involving other parties, while ensuring that military obligations do not fall on one party alone.

ANHA