"New statements by Mazloum Abdi reveal details of current phase"

To shed light on the most prominent political, military, and service-related files associated with the path of agreement and integration between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government in Syria, along with the developments and challenges at various levels, as well as positions and visions regarding the future of the political process in Syria, our political section editor, Ahmed Mohammed, interviewed the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi.

Due to the importance of the files, their sensitivities, and the issues addressed, ANHA agency leaves the dialog as it unfolded in your hands:

After forming four brigades, what will happen to the remaining number of your forces? Will we witness the formation of additional brigades or battalions, or will we be content with the four existing brigades?

In the military aspect of the January 29 agreement, this is considered the most important side, and we see significant developments achieved in it, with tangible progress in the acceptance of the agreed-upon leaders and forces, among others. Currently, we are in the phase of leadership taking on their roles in military academies, and there is steady progress in this direction.

But there are still issues we are working to resolve, as when the agreement was made, it was not on a specific number, but rather on the level of military formations. And there is a problem related to the numbers, and we are working to resolve it, whether on the military side or in the internal security forces.

An agreement has also been reached to not exclude any employe within the Autonomous Administration, and based on this approach, we are working to reach a solution regarding our leaders and fighters who are outside the military formations, and work is still ongoing in this regard.

According to our observations, the merger process is progressing in several areas, but we are witnessing a setback in the agreement regarding the justice file. What are the reasons? What do you propose and what does Damascus reject? There are many inquiries about the file, what have you agreed upon?
Some issues emerged in this file about two weeks ago, and they were a direct cause of delaying the integration process for a period of time.

The disagreement began due to the absence of a clear mechanism for the Autonomous Administration judges to join the government within the integration process, along with accompanying concerns about not safeguarding their rights and the region's privacy.

The reaction from the judges and the judiciary administration in the region was justified, manifesting in the rejection of exclusion, which contradicts the essence of integration based on consensus. Additionally, the absence of a consensual agreement at the outset led to a setback in this file and halted the integration process, which was reflected in public opinion.

Several meetings were held in Damascus and in the regions of North and East Syria at different levels, following this setback that began about two weeks ago. I also held a meeting with those concerned with the judiciary file to overcome the crisis and prevent it from becoming an obstacle to the comprehensive agreement.

Agreements were reached with the government that included the acceptance of integrating the Autonomous Administration judges and not excluding them, in addition to agreeing on the continuation of some judges from the previous phase (the Ba'ath era) to ensure that citizens' cases do not stop and work continues, thru joint cooperation between the Autonomous Administration judges and the previous judges.

Lists of the names of the Autonomous Administration judges were also handed over, as they constitute the majority, in preparation for enrolling them in government judicial courses and assigning them to the courts. It was agreed to expedite the resolution of this file and open judicial centers in the region, due to the connection of many official services to it. The continued disruption of the courthouse file affects multiple issues, including elections, passport procedures, land registry, and other transactions that require documents issued by the judiciary.

Solving the problem of the courthouse is a gateway to resolving many other issues. Regarding the removal of the Kurdish language from the sign of the courthouse in Hasakah, the government justified it by stating that the courthouse is a sovereign institution within the governorate and that the sign should be in Arabic only. While the region's representatives did not want this dispute to become a new reason to disrupt the integration process.

The recent agreement with the government regarding the judiciary file includes the adoption of bilingual signs in Arabic and Kurdish in predominantly Kurdish cities, such as Kobani, Qamishlo, Derik, Amuda, and Ad-Derbasiya, among others. The current sign in Hasakah will be dealt with for a specified period, and it will be reconsidered later within new agreements.

We consider the popular reactions rejecting the exclusion of the Kurdish language to be justified and strong, especially among the youth, as they reflect the community's sensitivity toward the issue of preserving the Kurdish language. Based on recent developments, and taking into account the public protests and the sensitivity of the judicial file, the issue has been reintroduced and reviewed.

Regarding the education file, according to the agreement, the merger should have included all institutions. Will the certificates for primary, secondary, and higher education be approved?

Regarding the issue of education, there is a problem that has not yet been resolved, which is the matter of having the entire curriculum in Kurdish. But discussions and debates are still ongoing about that. In the January 29 agreement, we did not accept that the reality of the Kurdish language be reduced to the content of Decree 13 only, as it does not meet the needs of the Kurdish language and community.

At that time, we included a clause in the agreement stipulating the necessity of conducting dialogs with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education to find solutions. And then several meetings were held with the Syrian Ministry of Education, and we reached an agreement, which in my opinion meets the aspirations of the Kurdish people in the region. But so far, these agreements have not been signed by the Prime Minister.

In our latest visits to Damascus, discussions on this topic took place at the highest levels. They do not directly refuse, but they point to some technical and procedural obstacles, which is why the matter has been postponed several times in this regard. However, the issue of the Kurdish language as the medium of instruction is a major concern for us, and I will personally follow up on this matter closely.

I can confirm that, according to what we were told, the announcement regarding the recognition of Autonomous Administration certificates at the preparatory and secondary levels will be made today or tomorrow, for this year and the next. There are also efforts to recognize certificates issued in previous years, in addition to university degrees. There is a delay, but there is progress.

What curriculum will be taught in Kurdish schools in the coming years?
According to the agreement, the Autonomous Administration curricula will remain in place during this year and the next, in order to avoid harming the students and the educational process, until comprehensive Syrian national curricula are issued, and we will work to ensure they are in the Kurdish language.

What about the Afrin students who studied according to the Autonomous Administration curricula? Will they continue to be educated according to it in Afrin? Will we see the opening of schools in Afrin? What about the teachers from Afrin?

I can divide the answer into two parts. The first part concerns the IDPs returning to Afrin. In our recent meetings in Damascus, we tentatively agreed that newly returning students would be able to join the examination process. Students who studied the Autonomous Administration curricula and returned to Afrin will not be deprived of taking the exams, and their certificates will be accepted, as will the certificates of students from Jazira and Kobani. For that reason, this stage requires preparations from the ministry, and discussions and arrangements are still ongoing in this regard.

According to your question, I would like to confirm that there is no distinction between Kobani, Jazira, and Afrin for us, and for the Kurdish language and the educational process, the situation in Afrin will be similar to that in Jazira and Kobani.

We know that the situation in Afrin is different, but we will engage in a long struggle and effort to ensure that education within the educational process is conducted in Kurdish for Kurdish students in Afrin.

Let's turn to Kobani, how do you assess the progress of the integration process there? No concrete steps have been recorded so far, but the continuation of some obstacles and the imposition of new challenges are noticeable. What is the reality of this integration in the city?

there were some villages in Kobani where government forces were stationed during the recent battle, and these are Kurdish villages, like what happened in the town of Jalabiya, where some problems arose. And there are commitments to restore things to normal and return the administration of these areas to the Kobani administration.

On the other hand, there is an issue in Kobani related to the neighborhoods of Serê Kaniyê / Ras al-Ain and Shilok, where the Arab component resides, and they have experienced problems recently. Some issues related to the administration of Kobani have also emerged, and we are currently working on finding a solution to address them.

Meetings have been held recently with the tribes, and there are attempts to reach understandings, especially since Kobani is characterized by a geography where Kurds and Arabs live together.

On another topic related to the appointment of a director for the Kobani area, we do not have a problem with the person himself, but the objection was to the way he was chosen, without giving importance to the opinions of the people of Kobani and without collective agreement. Work is currently underway on this file as well, and recent meetings have been held with officials in Damascus. A specific framework for the administration of Kobani has been reached, and we are awaiting practical steps regarding that.

We are witnessing the return of the people of Afrin to their areas, but many of them are still unable to return due to violations, stemming from fears of strangers in the region. Is there a joint mechanism to monitor and address these violations to limit them?

The truth is that the return of our IDPs from Afrin has been delayed, and certainly, this delay was not on our part. The government, for its part, delayed in taking its measures. In fact, in the first meeting we had with the Prime Minister, we agreed on the return of all the displaced people, and we were given promises outside the framework of the agreements, stating that whether we, as the Syrian Democratic Forces, agreed with the government or not, efforts would be made to return the displaced people to their lands, as the issue of the displaced affects all of Syria.

But unfortunately, the matter has been delayed a lot. The matter is related to Afrin itself, the change that has occurred in the existing authority there, and the armed groups that were spread out and refuse to leave as well.

Additionally, the government has delayed in taking measures regarding these issues.

The recent issues related to the courthouse in Hasakah also played a role in delaying this process.

And I can confirm that we agreed not to harm anyone in Afrin, and the matter goes beyond international institutions, as the government itself has committed to this, and the Prime Minister personally took responsibility for this matter, which has also been mentioned in the media.

And now, after a significant development in the Afrin file specifically, and after the Syrian government appointed representatives in the regions of Serê Kaniyê and Tal Abyad in recent times, we have had the opportunity to make steady progress in this file.

The first step, since Serê Kaniyê is part of Hasakah Governorate, we will work on restoring normal conditions by removing front lines and points of contact, leaving only the joint security checkpoints, to create an atmosphere of comfort and ease of movement. This point is one of our priorities.

There are also many completely empty villages that were located on the front lines, and we are trying to bring them back to life by returning the residents.
We are currently preparing to send a group of representatives from Serê Kaniyê to the city to assess the situation and prepare it for the return of the displaced to their villages.

There are also families from the Arab community, originally from Gwerian neighborhood in Hasakah, residing in the city of Serê Kaniyê, and we are working on providing a suitable environment for their return to their homes.

As for Tal Abyad, the situation is completely different, and I expect that we will follow the same path there, but its practical implementation may be more difficult. Especially since there are many Kurdish villages there, which have been occupied by some chauvinistic armed groups that terrorize the Kurds and prevent them from returning. One of our current priorities is to resolve this issue to ensure their safe return.

The first step in implementing the agreement should have been the return of the prisoners. What is delaying their return?

Regarding the issue of prisoners and martyrs, indeed this matter is very important for our people and for us as well, and it has become one of our priorities. This issue has caused us a lot of pain, and we must pause to address it. Our people are right to prioritize it, but at the same time, it is an extremely sensitive matter.

The main reason behind the capture of such a large number of our comrades, and this is the first time it has happened to us that our comrades were captured in groups, is that we had made the decision to withdraw from Deir Hafer. Our forces were preparing to withdraw from the designated locations, and we had issued a statement in this regard. This decision was welcomed by the Syrian Ministry of Defense, as well as by the United States and other parties, but in the end, a betrayal occurred, and the forces from both sides confronted each other, and this attack should not have happened.

On our side, we communicated with our comrades and informed them that we had decided to withdraw, and we asked them not to engage in confrontation, as an agreement had been made, which led to our comrades being captured in such large numbers. Our comrades were supposed to be released at that time, and we had agreed on that, but unfortunately, this issue was exploited and used as a pressure tactic against us, and it is still being used to this day. As for me, I do not find this behavior correct; this clause should have been implemented from the beginning, especially since we are in the integration phase.

Our efforts to release all prisoners are ongoing, and indeed, a large number of our comrades, both Kurds and Arabs, have already been released. We are still in contact with the state regarding another group of our remaining fighters and civilians, and communication is ongoing about their numbers. We are working on their release during this week.

In this regard, I would like to talk a little about the issue of prisoners and martyrs, as it has caused discontent among our people. For us, when one of our comrades is martyred, it deeply saddens us, whether their number is few or many. It was supposed not to happen, and none of our comrades were supposed to be martyred, because we had announced our decision to withdraw. Therefore, this matter has pained us and our people.

Regarding this matter, I would like to be clear and transparent with our people: The claims or rumors that our martyr count is in the thousands are not true. We have retrieved the bodies of all our comrades whose martyrdom we have confirmed and whose identities we have verified, and work is still ongoing in this regard. Thus, we have completed the majority of this file, and what remains is at the level of just a few individuals.

Overall, the number of our comrades who were martyred in the recent attacks, in addition to those whose bodies we received, reached about 260 martyrs. They were martyred in Deir Hafer, Raqqa, Tabqa, Deir ez-Zor, Kobani, Derik, the Tishrin Dam, and the Milbiya in the Jazira region. Yes, the number is large compared to the agreement we made, and it shouldn't have happened or any of our comrades should have been martyred. This is what I wanted to clarify to our people.

And after concluding the file on prisoners and martyrs, we will issue a statement on behalf of the Syrian Democratic Forces, revealing to the public the numbers of our martyrs and prisoners in the recent attacks.

As for the Arab people's stance toward the recent attacks on our forces, this matter is also sensitive. And when we talk about the Arab component, we also have martyrs from this component. In Deir ez-Zor, for example, there are about a thousand families of our martyrs, and not all of them were martyred in Deir ez-Zor; some were martyred in Kobani, Hasakah, Raqqa, and Jazira. We have families of martyrs, wounded, and prisoners from the Arab component, and we still communicate with them. And we should not generalize this issue to everyone. Yes, there are those who worked to spread discord, sought to create problems, slandered us, and stabbed our fighters in the back. On the other hand, there are those who remained with our forces.

In my opinion, the most important thing is to review our mistakes, to take criticism into account, and to examine the reasons for what happened and why we were unable to organize the people there over the course of ten years. There were mistakes in our approach, and we need to work on drawing lessons and insights from them. And over the past ten years, there have been mistakes in the way we dealt with all components, and we are now working on reviewing them and drawing lessons from them.

A meeting was recently held in Damascus, and it was announced that you evaluated the progress of the integration process there. In your opinion, are you closer to an agreement with Damascus today or to a crisis?

At the outset, I would like to say that we participated in this agreement, and from our side, we are serious about implementing it, even though it did not meet all our aspirations and was not at the level we wanted. But in light of the current situation and the war that has been imposed on us, this was the best we could achieve, in addition to providing an opportunity to start anew in order to protect our gains and continue the struggle for the Kurdish cause in Syria.
Therefore, I can say that the agreement serves the interests of the Kurdish people, allowing them to continue their struggle with greater strength and ensuring the continuity of this struggle.

In the last meeting held in Damascus with government officials, I noticed the same thing among the government officials as well. In my meeting with Prime Minister Ahmad al-Shara, we extensively discussed the issues of resolving outstanding problems and how to involve the Kurds in shaping the future of Syria.

In the event that the agreement fails, where is Syria headed?

This agreement must not collapse, as doing so serves no one's interests.

We are approaching parliamentary elections in Syria; will you, as Kurds, participate as a united front, or will we see the Kurds divided?

The Kurds must stand as one speaking with a single voice to the outside world and their political stance must be unified. Furthermore, Kurdish political forces themselves must be united. Even if differences or mutual criticisms exist among them, when in Damascus, they must collectively demand their rights and present their demands as a united front.

As you are aware, a year ago, a conference was held to unify the Kurdish ranks and political stance. At that conference, all Kurdish parties agreed upon a specific set of demands; they must now carry these demands forward into the parliament. To achieve this, it is imperative that they remain united today.

Ongoing meetings regarding this matter are currently taking place. We are hopeful and indeed confident that we will succeed in reaching a shared vision and entering these elections as a united front.

Will we see representatives and officials from the Autonomous Administration as well as members of political parties serving within the Syrian government in Damascus?

In accordance with the agreement signed between us, there must be a Kurdish presence including personnel from the Autonomous Administration with the government ministries, state institutions, and diplomatic missions abroad. The recent appointments of our colleagues to the Ministry of Defense were a direct result of this agreement, aimed at facilitating and overseeing the ongoing process of military integration. However, should matters fail to proceed in accordance with what was agreed upon, this would constitute a major problem.

We were requested to submit a list of nominees; this list containing the names of specific individuals has since been delivered, and we are currently awaiting the results.

Regarding the Syrian Constitution: has this topic been raised with you? Furthermore, will anyone from this region participate in the drafting of the Syrian Constitution? Yes, this subject was addressed in all our meetings, and a demand was put forward for Kurdish representation within the parliamentary committee dedicated to the constitution. To date, however, no special committee for drafting the constitution has yet been formed.

It is anticipated that in the coming period once the parliament is fully constituted and operational a constitutional committee will be established, and the Kurds will certainly be represented within it.

There are parties acting as guarantors of this agreement such as Washington and Paris. Does this support remain ongoing? Furthermore, how do you assess Turkey’s role and its stance regarding this agreement?

The International Coalition has withdrawn from the region; nevertheless, we continue to maintain relations and channels of communication. Among the key topics central to these exchanges is the issue of integration. The agreement itself was concluded in the presence of representatives from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. There is ongoing follow-up regarding this agreement, in addition to existing contacts maintained through bilateral channels between us and the government.

I would venture to say that these factors collectively constitute what can be described as continued support in this regard.

Turkey exerts a direct and powerful influence on Syria; it is a pivotal regional power, particularly in the areas of North and East Syria possessing significant political and economic leverage, alongside an ongoing military presence.

If we wish to see this agreement reach the stage of full implementation, Turkey must either be a party to it or, at the very least, refrain from acting as an impediment to its realization.

In this context, open channels of communication currently exist between us and Turkey, through which we engage in discussions regarding various security-related matters. We hope that, in the upcoming phase, these contacts will be intensified and that Turkey will assume a constructive role in facilitating the implementation of the provisions of the recent agreement.

In light of the political, social, economic, and human rights deadlock that Syria is experiencing, what do you think are the reasons? And how can Syria achieve stability?

There are attempts by the authorities or government institutions to enter and oversee a new phase that can be called the "post-Baath collapse phase," but so far we cannot say that Syria has reached a clear path it can follow. There are still many economic and social problems, in addition to the divisions that have emerged and deepened over the past fifteen years, including the continued presence of ISIS/Daesh.

Each region has its own uniqueness, and if we look at our region, or Raqqa, or North and East Syria, we find that the current reality is intertwined and complex; remnants of the Ba'ath regime exist alongside the government system and the Autonomous Administration system, and ISIS is still present, in addition to the existence of many factions that have tried to impose their system on the Syrians. Therefore, these factors increase division and affect the overall direction of the political stalemate you mentioned.

The economic situation is the most influential compared to other factors, as it reflects on various other aspects and is the foundation of the state-building process. However, there has been no tangible progress in this regard. According to what we have heard, the investment file is still pending due to obstacles that have not yet been overcome.

The main problem lies in the necessity of the participation of all components of society, in all its spectrums, in the establishment of this state or government. And I expect that the safest way to transition from the current Syria to the new Syria in a healthy and organized manner is to do so with everyone's participation, by allowing fair representation for all groups in the new state institutions.

Are you personally satisfied with the progress of implementing the terms of this agreement?

Now, the majority of my work is focused on the success of this agreement with the government, and therefore, I certainly hope for its success, as my primary work is based on that and involves the interests of our people.

But we are not fully satisfied with the progress of the process, as some steps have been delayed, and there are some issues that should have been resolved immediately, foremost among them the issue of prisoners and displaced persons, along with some other matters that we criticize. However, our struggle continues in this regard, and we will continue this journey.

There are some steps that have been accomplished in the military, security, and some administrative fields, and if compared to the previous year, our situation is better. We haven't reached the end, but there is progress.

There should also be no laxity on these issues, as the danger still exists, and there are several matters that need solutions. In order to achieve a successful outcome thru the success of this agreement, we need popular and political support that enhances the chances of progress and gives us more optimism.

A message you want to convey at the end of the dialog

What I want to say to our people is that, while it is true that we are going through a new phase according to the integration path and the announced agreement, the matter is not just this. What I ask of our people is not to confine themselves to this framework only, but to work on escalating the struggle to ensure the rights and gains of the Kurdish people within the framework of the announced integration.

Our main task is to ensure the continuity of the struggle, as this integration does not mean the end of our struggle over the past 15 years, nor is it a new beginning as much as it is a continuation within a new phase.

Rojava is going through a new phase. In previous periods, our struggle was based on political work within the existing political parties, and since 2012, we have entered a new experience under the umbrella of self-administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces to manage the region. But now, there is a new situation within the framework of the announced agreement to build the new Syrian state by joining this state with our identity.

And in order to ensure our rights and our strong participation in it in the future, we face a difficult path that requires strong struggle. Therefore, we need once again to organize ourselves, reestablish our civil community institutions, restructure our political discourse, strengthen Kurdish unity, and reinforce our relations with all components of the Syrian people on new foundations.

In the context of this renewal and for greater goals, we will renew our framework to ensure the success of the integration process, preserve our gains, and work on the rights that still do not meet our aspirations, thru a clear escalation of struggle to achieve them based on official recognition in Syria.

ANHA