Emptying al-Hol Camp: from containing threat to spreading It

Over the past few days, Al-Hol camp has been emptied by factions of the Syrian Interim Government and their foreign members, resulting in the dispersal of ISIS mercenaries and their family members into Syrian society, which is already suffering from chaos and poverty. This development opens the door to a potential resurgence of ISIS across Syrian territory.

Emptying al-Hol Camp: from containing threat to spreading It
17 February, 2026   06:25
AL-HASAKAH

Al-Hol Camp did not explode as security and international reports had warned for years, nor did it witness a dramatic collapse through a large-scale uprising or attack. Instead, it was dismantled by factions of the Syrian Interim Government and foreign elements present there, and effectively emptied of most of its residents. This shift was not merely an administrative change or population transfer; it marked a fundamental transformation in the nature of the threat itself from a concentrated danger that could be monitored within a confined space to a dispersed threat embedded within a fragile society already burdened by war and economic and security instability.

Al-Hol Camp: Background and Structure

Al-Hol camp is located about 45 kilometers east of the city of Al-Hasakah, near the Syrian-Iraqi border. For years, it has been considered one of the most sensitive and complex security hotspots in northeast Syria.

The camp was established in the early 1990s to host Iraqi refugees and was reopened after 2003. During the Syrian conflict, it became a strategically dangerous site after ISIS mercenaries seized control of it and used it as a logistical corridor between Syria and Iraq.

After the Syrian Democratic Forces regained control of the camp in 2015, it was used to shelter displaced Syrians. However, it reached peak notoriety following ISIS’s territorial defeat in al-Baghouz in 2019, when families of ISIS mercenaries were transferred there.

At that time, the population reached approximately 74,000 people, the majority women and children, many from hardline backgrounds, leading the camp to be described as a “ticking time bomb.”

Over the years, an extremist social structure developed inside the camp: recruitment networks for children known as the “Cubs of the Caliphate,” secret religious courts run by ISIS-affiliated women, and incidents of killings and intimidation all of which fueled fears that the camp had become an incubator for the regeneration of ISIS.

Al-Hol Camp in Numbers

According to the latest statistics from early January 2026, the camp housed 6,352 foreign women and children from 42 nationalities, 15,245 Syrians, and 9 individuals of unknown parentage more than 21,000 people in total, almost all of them families of ISIS members linked to the post-Baghouz period.

The Turning Point

In early January 2026, factions of the Syrian Interim Government launched attacks on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo. On January 16, they expanded their attacks to North and East Syria, including the city of Al-Hol, which contains the camp.

On January 20, 2026, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced their withdrawal from managing the camp, citing international indifference toward the ISIS and redeploying their forces to confront other threats.

This decision marked a decisive turning point. The camp fell under the control of factions of the Syrian Interim Government, and the process of emptying it accelerated without a clear plan.

Within just a few days, the camp’s population dropped to fewer than 5,000 residents, with the foreign section almost entirely vacated.

This decline was not the result of an organized international repatriation program returning ISIS families to their countries, nor of a structured rehabilitation plan by the Interim Government. Rather, it occurred in the context of a systematic emptying carried out by the Interim Government’s factions and their foreign elements.

Suspension of International Operations

Amid these developments, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees suspended its activities inside the camp following a security incident. UN teams and non-governmental organizations withdrew from the site, except for water services. This withdrawal could be interpreted as indirect participation by the United Nations in the emptying process, amid complete disregard for the risks posed by these families to a fragile Syrian society already struggling with war and poverty.

Smuggling Operations by Night and Day

The removal of ISIS mercenaries and their family members by factions of the Syrian Interim Government followed multiple routes. Families were transported at night by vehicles to various areas. Some were transferred in groups to camps near the Turkish border in northern Syria. Others were smuggled to Idlib and additional regions, while a portion of the remaining residents was relocated to a new camp north of Aleppo.

The Risk of Spreading ISIS Ideology in Syrian Society

According to Arab media outlets, the camp in the Aleppo countryside to which ISIS families are being transferred differs fundamentally from Al-Hol. It consists of prefabricated buildings, has internet access, and lacks effective oversight.

The core problem does not lie in the evacuation itself, but in the absence of psychological, ideological, and social rehabilitation programs for thousands of individuals who adopted ISIS ideology and spent years in a radicalized environment. Without clear judicial screening mechanisms, many cases have entered society without an assessment of their individual level of risk.

This opens the door to the spread of ISIS ideology within Syrian society and the possible revival of the organization. Dispersing ISIS families in this manner creates several risks: the spread of militants’ relatives across different regions of Syria facilitates renewed communication and the formation of cells that are far more difficult to detect than a single large, monitored concentration.

Moreover, host communities are already suffering from poverty and security tensions, increasing the likelihood of friction, tension, or ideological polarization.

In addition, thousands of children grew up in a rigid ideological environment and received training at the hands of ISIS-affiliated women. In the absence of educational reintegration programs, they represent fertile ground for the spread of extremism and the revival of ISIS.

A Double Standard

The emptying of Al-Hol camp coincided with more than ten U.S. airstrikes in January targeting over 30 locations as part of a campaign covering more than 100 targets. Around 50 ISIS members were neutralized or arrested, and more than 5,700 detainees were transferred to Iraq.

However, developments on the ground reflect a dual strategy. While the United States conducts airstrikes against ISIS sites, it has, directly or indirectly, contributed to dismantling Al-Hol camp and the dispersal of its residents by relinquishing its protection. The practical result has been the redistribution of the threat rather than its elimination.

Arab Media and the Shaping of the Narrative

Arab media outlets, particularly those in the Gulf region, played a negative role in covering the Al-Hol file they portrayed ISIS family members as civilians without culpability. Yet the reality quickly emerged, as some ISIS affiliates were presented as civilians despite evidence of their affiliation with the organization.

An Uncontrolled Spread

For seven years, Al-Hol was a heavy international file managed by a network of security and humanitarian actors. Today, the burden has shifted to the local level, and the challenge has moved from a single, monitorable site to a vast and uncontrollable geographical reality.

This shift does not signify the disappearance of the problem, but rather a transformation in its form from a concentrated threat to a dispersed one, and from international management to local repercussions.

The Al-Hol File Is Not Closed

Ultimately, the emptying of Al-Hol camp was not the end of a complex file so much as its reconfiguration. The issue was not resolved through a comprehensive settlement or systematic rehabilitation; instead, it was transferred from one confined space to a broad geography.

A threat that could at least be partially contained within a guarded location is now dispersed within society without a clear monitoring framework. In the absence of large-scale reintegration programs and amid weak social and economic structures in the areas to which ISIS families have been relocated, the security and ideological repercussions may persist for years and potentially contribute to ISIS’s revival in the near future.

Al-Hol camp did not explode but it has not been closed either. It has disappeared as a place, yet remains an open file reshaping the equation of dealing with ISIS’s legacy in Syria and placing society before a long-term test in managing the consequences of its fragmentation.

ANHA