Six months after March 10 Agreement, Transitional Govt shows limited steps toward implementation

On March 10, 2025, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Transitional Government signed an agreement comprising eight provisions aimed at regulating relations between the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the government, rebuilding an inclusive political process based on participation, enforcing a ceasefire, and integrating civil and military institutions within the framework of the state.

Since its publication, the agreement has highlighted the importance of assessing the degree of commitment from both parties, taking into account current political and field developments, to evaluate the feasibility of its implementation.

Article One: Political Representation and Participation

The agreement guarantees the right of all Syrians to fair representation and participation in the political process and state institutions, based on competence and without religious or ethnic discrimination. Following the signing, initial meetings were held on March 19 and April 12, during which joint committees were established to discuss mechanisms of representation and participation.

However, the Transitional Government has pursued unilateral measures such as convening a “National Dialogue Conference,” forming a government, announcing a constitutional declaration, and launching preparations for parliamentary elections. These steps indicated its unwillingness to embrace the principle of equal participation for all components, sparking objections from representatives of North and East Syria as well as other communities, including the Druze and Alawites.

Article Two: Guaranteeing Kurdish Rights

The agreement affirms recognition of the Kurdish community as an integral national component and guarantees them full constitutional and citizenship rights. Yet, in practice, serious challenges emerged: the North and East Syria delegation reported arrests in Aleppo, Damascus, and on main highways, targeting individuals on ethnic grounds or due to cooperation with the SDF. Such actions undermine the principle of equality and recognition of Kurdish rights.

Furthermore, a Kurdish delegation—emerging from the “Conference on Kurdish Unity of Position and Ranks in Rojava Kurdistan” held in Qamishlo—submitted clear proposals for securing Kurdish rights in the constitution.

Nevertheless, Damascus displayed no seriousness in engaging with the delegation or opening a genuine dialogue. The government also continues to reject demands from other groups such as the Druze and Alawites, reflecting the absence of a comprehensive and fair vision of constitutional rights for all Syrians.

Article Three: Nationwide Ceasefire

The agreement stipulates a nationwide ceasefire. Initial meetings on March 19 and April 12 emphasized the importance of ensuring peace. However, field realities reveal persistent tensions, with Transitional Government forces attacking checkpoints of the Internal Security Forces affiliated with the Autonomous Administration.

 Turkey and the Transitional Government, attacked several sites including the Tishreen Dam, Internal Security Forces’ checkpoints in Aleppo, and areas around Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh—predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo. Military mobilizations were also reported in Deir ez-Zor countryside, along with the August 31 assault on Tal Tamr countryside, and strikes near the Tishreen Dam just two days before September.

Article Four: Integration of Civil and Military Institutions in North and East Syria into the Syrian State

The agreement stipulates the integration of all civil and military institutions in North and East Syria—including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields—into the structure of the Syrian state. Despite official meetings in Damascus on June 1 and proposals from the North and East Syria delegation regarding security cooperation, reconstruction, and the formation of joint task rooms, the Transitional Government pursued unilateral measures, directing efforts toward “dismantling the SDF and security forces and absorbing them individually.”

Administratively, the only partial cooperation observed was between the Ministry of Education and the Education Authority of the Autonomous Administration regarding the management of national exams (middle and high school levels) under the old system.

Statements from North and East Syria representatives highlight the Transitional Government’s shortfall in fulfilling this article and its lack of political will for genuine consensus. In his latest statement on August 4, SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi said: “Integration means partnership. A new Syria will be built on a new partnership among all components. It cannot be imposed by force. The people of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa support integration into the Syrian state but insist on preserving their institutions, which should be managed by their own people.”

Article Five: Return and Protection of Displaced Persons

The agreement calls for the return of displaced Syrians to their towns with guaranteed protection. Despite discussions in coordination meetings, no significant steps have been taken to ensure the safe return of displaced persons, especially in Turkish-occupied areas such as Afrin, al-Bab, Manbij, Tal Abyad, and Serekaniye.

Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration expedited voluntary return convoys from camps in North and East Syria to areas under Transitional Government control, the latest being a convoy from Mahmoudli Camp, north of Tabqa.

Article Six: Support for Counterterrorism Efforts

The agreement underlines joint efforts to confront terrorism and address security threats. On July 25, the Transitional Government issued joint statements with U.S. and French representatives, calling for support in combating terrorism and strengthening social cohesion in North and East Syria. However, discrepancies in practice remain, as the Transitional Government continues to exclude North and East Syria from security operations and military structures.

In an earlier statement last month, SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi pointed to attempts by the SDF to establish joint operation rooms against ISIS, which have yet to materialize.

Article Seven: Rejection of Division and Hate Speech

The agreement commits both parties to rejecting any calls for partition, sectarianism, or hate speech that incites division among Syrian communities. Yet, according to North and East Syria representatives, divisive rhetoric and hate speech persist in certain areas under Transitional Government influence.

Article Eight: Executive Committees to Implement the Agreement Before Year-End

The agreement set a clear timeline for implementation, with the formation of joint executive committees tasked with carrying out its provisions before the end of the year. Between March 19 and June 1, a series of coordination meetings were held in both North and East Syria and Damascus. However, the Transitional Government later refused to take part in follow-up negotiation rounds, including the planned Paris meeting on August 9, claiming that certain meetings did not represent a “comprehensive national framework.” This refusal disrupted the work of the executive committees and hindered progress according to the agreed timetable.

Currently, negotiations between representatives of North and East Syria and the Transitional Government are stalled, with growing Turkish pressure further deepening the crisis. The absence of a clear schedule for upcoming meetings leaves the prospects for national dialogue uncertain.

Overall Assessment of the Transitional Government’s Commitment

Despite occasional positive signals in official statements, the Transitional Government’s actual commitment remains limited—if not entirely absent—in most provisions. Its unilateral actions, centered on centralization and sidelining the Autonomous Administration—such as announcing a new constitution, forming a provisional government, holding parliamentary elections, and continuing arrests targeting specific communities—underscore its pursuit of a centralized agenda. This contradicts the spirit of the March 10 Agreement, which was intended to open space for genuine national consensus.

Statements by the Autonomous Administration and Syrian political figures highlight the contrast between international support for dialogue and inclusivity—such as declarations from the French and U.S. foreign ministries—and the Transitional Government’s avoidance of key negotiation rounds. Turkey’s interference, whether through official visits or political support for the Transitional Government, further complicates the implementation process and weakens the chances of building an inclusive Syria for all communities.

a.k

ANHA