Kurds in Syria: From Marginalization to Partnership – 2 

Kurds in Syria: from policies of denial and discrimination to the moment of revolution 

With the establishment of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt in 1958, relations between the state and Kurdish identity entered a new phase, amid the growing prominence of Arab nationalist discourse and the shrinking space for expressing national and cultural particularities. Following the dissolution of the union in 1961, state policies toward the Kurds became more pronounced, culminating in the extraordinary census conducted in al-Hasakah Governorate in 1962, followed by the Ba'ath Party's rise to power in 1963 and the measures that accompanied it, targeting the Kurdish people's identity and civil and cultural rights. The effects of these policies continued throughout the eras of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad until the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. 

From the union to the extraordinary census 

The Kurdish issue in Syria did not begin with the extraordinary census conducted in al-Hasakah Governorate in 1962. The question of recognition of Kurdish distinctiveness and its cultural and political rights had already been raised before then. However, that process represented a pivotal point in the history of Syrian Kurds because of its direct and long-lasting effects on their legal and civil status. 

The census came after the period of union between Syria and Egypt, which began in 1958 and lasted until 1961, and took place amid the growing influence of Arab nationalist movements and state policies that viewed the Kurdish issue through the lens of preserving the Arab character of the state. 

Following the dissolution of the union, Decree No. 93 of 1962 was issued, and the census was carried out in al-Hasakah Governorate in a single day. Residents were required to prove that they had been residing in Syria since at least 1945 in order to retain Syrian citizenship. 

Human rights reports indicate that limiting the process to a single day, while failing to provide residents with sufficient information and adequate time, contributed to widespread consequences affecting the citizenship and legal status of the Kurds. 

The process resulted in tens of thousands of Kurds being stripped of Syrian citizenship. Human rights sources estimate that around 120,000 people lost their citizenship at the time, while subsequent estimates of the number of people deprived of citizenship and their descendants increased over the decades, as the effects of statelessness were passed on to subsequent generations. 

The census produced two main categories of Kurds deprived of citizenship: (foreigners), also referred to as Hasakah foreigners, who were registered in special records, and (unregistered persons), who had no legally recognized status in state records. The impact was not limited to personal documentation; it extended to property ownership, employment, travel, inheritance, marriage registration, and many other civil rights and services 

 A strong state cannot be built by denying identity 

Historian and researcher specializing in Kurdish history and civilization Fawaz Othman believes that the marginalization of the Kurds over past decades was one of the mistakes that weakened the concept of citizenship in Syria. 

Othman says: “A strong state cannot be built by denying the identity of a part of its citizens; rather, it is built by recognizing diversity and turning it into a source of strength. One of the most prominent examples of this was the extraordinary census conducted in al-Hasakah Governorate on October 5, 1962.” 

Othman stresses that the problem was not merely a matter of an identity card or an official document, as the deprivation of citizenship affected multiple aspects of Kurdish life, including education, employment, property ownership, and travel, as well as other civil rights. He considers that addressing this issue in a new Syria must be comprehensive, legally definitive, and conclusive. 

He points out that the census resulted in large numbers of Kurds being stripped of Syrian citizenship and led to the emergence of two categories, the “foreigners” and the “unregistered.” As the problem was passed on to children and grandchildren, the number of people affected grew significantly, with various cumulative estimates putting their number at more than half a million. 

He says: “Citizenship must be restored to everyone who was deprived of it as a result of the extraordinary census, and the legal status of unregistered persons and their children must be regularized. The legal and civil consequences resulting from the deprivation of citizenship must also be addressed in accordance with the principle of equal citizenship. Most importantly, we must recognize that addressing this issue is not a favor granted to the Kurds, but rather the rectification of a historical wrong and the establishment of a sound foundation for Syrian citizenship.” 

From the census to Arabization policies 

With the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party coming to power in 1963, policies restricting recognition of Kurdish identity continued as part of a broader Arab nationalist project. The party-imposed restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in schools and public spaces, prohibited anything written in Kurdish, and placed constraints on various forms of expression of Kurdish identity. 

In this context, the deprivation of citizenship was no longer the only issue facing Syria's Kurdish community. It became intertwined with other policies affecting language, culture, education, property ownership, population movement, and political representation. 

The Arabization process also affected the names of hundreds of Kurdish villages, towns, and cities in al-Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin regions, where Kurdish names were replaced with Arabic names in official records. Numerous human rights reports documented the issuance of administrative measures during the 1970s that institutionalized these changes in a number of areas 

Arab Belt: demographic change in al-Jazira region 

The Arab Belt project was one of the most prominent measures associated with Arabization policies and the restructuring of the demographic composition of border areas in al-Hasakah Governorate. 

The roots of the project date back to the 1960s, while its implementation began in practice during the 1970s through the establishment of model villages and the settlement of Arab families there, particularly families whose lands had been submerged by the waters of the Euphrates Dam. This was accompanied by the seizure and redistribution of agricultural land in Kurdish border areas. 

The project primarily aimed to establish a population belt along the Syrian-Turkish border, whose demarcation had been shaped by international agreements. Authorities began, during the first half of the 1970s, to settle thousands of Arab families in dozens of model villages. In 1975, approximately 4,000 Arab families were resettled in 41 model villages within the Kurdish region, before implementation of the project in its original form was halted in 1976, without returning the confiscated land to its Kurdish owners. 

Other estimates indicate that approximately 335 Kurdish villages were affected by the project and that the number of Kurds affected in al-Hasakah Governorate exceeded 150,000. These figures vary depending on the sources and the methods used to calculate the number of affected villages and residents. 

The project's effects were not limited to population displacement. They were also associated with land confiscation and changes in the nature of land ownership in the border region, deepening the Kurdish community's sense of discrimination, particularly as the measures came only a few years after the extraordinary census and the resulting deprivation of thousands of Kurds of their citizenship. 

Restrictions on language, culture, and public life 

Alongside measures concerning citizenship and land, Kurds faced restrictions on practicing aspects of their culture and using their language in public life. The teaching of Kurdish was prohibited in public schools, the publication of books and printed materials in Kurdish was restricted, and events and activities associated with Kurdish identity were subject to surveillance and prohibition at various times. 

Celebrations of Newroz, for example, became one of the occasions that witnessed confrontations between participants and security forces. 

Restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural activity also continued. These included the arrest of activists and the banning of gatherings and cultural events, while Kurdish political parties faced difficulties operating legally, forcing the majority of organizations to operate outside the framework of official licensing. Human rights reports documented repeated cases of politicians and activists being arrested and prosecuted in connection with their political or cultural activities. 

The Kurds under Hafez al-Assad 

With Hafez al-Assad's rule becoming firmly established, policies restricting recognition of Kurdish identity continued, alongside a broader system of political repression that affected various segments of Syrian society. 

For the Kurds, the general repression intersected with specific policies affecting citizenship, language, culture, and the political sphere, making the Kurdish issue simultaneously connected to the question of civil liberties and to national and cultural rights. 

The effects of the extraordinary census and the Arab Belt continued to be felt in daily life, while the issue of (unregistered) and (foreigners: the citizens those who doesn’t have any admission from the State) remained among the key issues without a definitive solution for decades. The use of Kurdish in official educational institutions also remained prohibited, and restrictions on forms of expression of Kurdish identity continued. 

At the same time, Kurdish political activity persisted, albeit underground or semi-openly, with politicians and activists subjected to arrest and persecution. This was not separate from the broader reality of Syrian political life, which was itself subject to extensive security restrictions. 

From Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad 

With the transfer of power to Bashar al-Assad in 2000, the Kurdish issue did not undergo a fundamental transformation during the early years of his rule. Restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural activity continued, as did the problem of the (unregistered). 

The events of the Qamishlo uprising on March 12, 2004, were among the most significant turning points in relations between the Kurds and the authorities of the Ba'athist regime during this period. The events began on March 12 following clashes at the city's stadium and subsequently spread to other Kurdish areas. Approximately 36 people were killed, dozens were wounded, and thousands of Kurds were arrested by the security services. 

The 2004 uprising marked a turning point in Kurdish political awareness, prompting broader segments of society to raise demands concerning political and cultural rights and recognition of Kurdish identity, at a time when the authorities intensified their security measures against Kurdish activism. 

During the years preceding the Syrian revolution, arrests and persecution of politicians and activists continued, gatherings and cultural events were banned, and Newroz celebrations were subjected to heightened security measures. On March 20, 2008, security forces opened fire on people celebrating Newroz in Qamishlo, resulting in the deaths of three young men and the injury of others. Similarly, during the 2010 Newroz celebrations in the city of Raqqa, one young man was killed, others were wounded, and many were arrested. 

In 2008, Presidential Decree No. 49 was issued, imposing restrictions on the sale and purchase of real estate in border areas. Human rights organizations considered these restrictions to have had a particularly significant impact on Kurdish residents of the border regions. The measures led to Kurdish protests, which were met by the security authorities with arrests and further restrictions. 

The decree prevented Kurds from purchasing and owning land in the area, while Arabs and Christians were permitted to purchase and own such property. Property acquisition required the exclusive approval of the Ministry of Defense. 

The citizenship issue continues until the revolution 

The issue of citizenship remained one of the most prominent unresolved files in the decades preceding the revolution. According to human rights reports, the number of Kurds deprived of citizenship or rendered stateless increased over time as the effects of deprivation were passed on to their children. Members of these groups continued to face restrictions on property ownership, travel, inheritance, public services, and civil rights. 

With the beginning of the Syrian revolution in the spring of 2011, the authorities sought to contain some of the Kurdish demands. On April 7, 2011, Bashar al-Assad issued Decree No. 49, which allowed those registered in the foreigners' records in al-Hasakah Governorate to apply for Syrian citizenship. However, the decree did not include (unregistered) category, leaving its members outside the scope of the legal measures provided for by the decree. 

This measure marked the first official move, decades after the extraordinary census, toward addressing part of the citizenship problem. However, it did not include all those deprived of citizenship and therefore did not resolve the issue comprehensively. 

From demanding rights to the Syrian Revolution 

When the revolution erupted in Daraa in March 2011 and spread to other Syrian cities and regions, the Kurdish community entered the revolution carrying a heavy legacy of citizenship issues, cultural discrimination, and policies related to land and identity, in addition to the political repression targeting Kurdish activists and parties. 

In the years preceding the revolution, Kurdish demands had evolved from calls for cultural and linguistic recognition and a solution to the citizenship problem into broader political demands concerning citizenship, equality, and recognition of national rights within the Syrian state. 

For this reason, Kurdish participation in the revolution was not spontaneous or born of the moment. Rather, it came after decades of accumulated issues related to identity, citizenship, and civil liberties. However, the Kurds chose their own path in the revolution and launched the July 19 Revolution, liberating the region from the Ba'athist regime and ISIS militants after Syrian factions had turned to serving the agendas of regional powers and shifted toward fighting the Kurds instead of the Ba'athist regime, contrary to what they had claimed. 

Marginalization of the Kurds and the weakening of the concept of citizenship 

Fawaz Othman believes that the relationship between the state and the Kurds over past decades cannot be separated from the concept of citizenship, because depriving a segment of Syrians of their legal, cultural, and political rights weakened the principle of equality among citizens. 

He says that the marginalization of the Kurds over past decades was one of the mistakes that weakened the concept of citizenship in Syria, stressing that recognition of their rights should not be viewed as a grant or favor, but rather as a correction of a historical course. 

Tomorrow: Kurds in Syria: From the Revolution to Partnership in Building the State .

ANHA