Escalating Intervention undermines political talks between Damascus, NE Syria

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, relations between Ankara and Damascus—despite their publicly declared political hostility during the Baathist regime era—have been marked by a clear convergence in their approach to governance and the structure of the Syrian state. 

At various stages, the policies of both sides demonstrated rejection of any fundamental change to the centralist system of rule and a hardline stance toward the demands of Syrian components for political and administrative rights, particularly regarding the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Kurdish component.

This convergence appeared in more than one political and negotiating phase and became more evident after the arrival of a Turkey-backed transitional government. According to observers, this reflects the continuation of the Turkish pattern of interference in the Syrian file, in parallel with Damascus’s avoidance—whether under the former regime or the current transitional government—of engaging in serious political dialogue with democratic forces and representatives of the components of North and East Syria.

Ankara and Damascus’s Approach to the Components of North and East Syria

Since the formation of the Democratic Autonomous Administration, Turkey has adopted the position that any political recognition of this administration constitutes a “threat to Turkish national security.” Ankara has maintained this characterization despite multiple initiatives presented by the Autonomous Administration to affirm its Syrian character and deny any separatist tendencies.

On the other hand, Damascus—both during the Baathist regime and the transitional government—has maintained a rejecting stance toward any political understanding with democratic forces or the components of North and East Syria. It has refused to discuss proposals related to changing the form of governance or adopting decentralization, despite widespread criticism of the traditional centralist model and its failure to manage Syria’s diversity.

This convergence in positions led to the exclusion of the components of North and East Syria and the Autonomous Administration model from international negotiation tracks, despite the role these components played in fighting ISIS mercenaries and contributing to stability across large areas of the country.

Ankara's Role in Pressure and Obstruction Tracks

According to political and media documentation, Turkey has relied on multiple tools to prevent the consolidation of any Autonomous Administration Model in North and East Syria. This policy began with support for various armed groups since 2012 in areas such as Serê Kaniyê, continued through the period of ISIS control between 2014 and 2019, and culminated in direct military intervention by the Turkish army, launching operations that resulted in control over large areas.

These operations included the occupation of Afrin and the accompanying displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents, followed by expansion toward Serê Kaniyê and Grî Spî, amid accusations of carrying out demographic changes through forced displacement and the resettlement of families of Turkey-backed mercenaries in place of the original inhabitants.

Despite this, this course did not lead to the collapse of the Autonomous Administration model nor to the dismissal of its proposal as one of the possible solutions to the Syrian crisis.

According to observers, pushed Ankara to intensify its diplomatic efforts, taking advantage of its influence with international actors to prevent any official presence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or representatives of the Autonomous Administration in the Geneva, Astana, and Sochi tracks, as well as the Constitutional Committee.

In this context, Turkey repeatedly used a diplomatic “veto” and threatened to withdraw from negotiation tracks if what it considers its “red lines” were crossed—namely, the inclusion of representatives of the Autonomous Administration.

This was accompanied by extensive political and media activity aimed at persuading Western capitals not to include these parties in the political process, as indicated by statements previously issued by the Autonomous Administration and the SDF.

Exclusion of North and East Syria from Geneva and the Constitutional Committee

Since the launch of the Geneva process under United Nations auspices in 2012, the representation of Kurds and the components of North and East Syria has faced repeated obstacles, most notably Turkey’s rejecting stance. This position prevented the issuance of any official invitations to representatives of the region, despite the expansion of its control and its growing role after 2014.

When the Syrian Constitutional Committee was launched in 2019, representation of the Autonomous Administration and the SDF was completely absent, amid Turkish pressure on the United Nations and the sponsoring parties, including Russia and Iran, to prevent the inclusion of any of their representatives. This contributed to undermining the credibility of this track among broad segments of Syrians.

Turkey also sought, according to observers, to confine Kurdish representation within political frameworks acceptable to it, ensuring that issues such as decentralization or constitutional rights for the components of North and East Syria would not be placed on the negotiating table.

Damascus’s Position and the Continuation of the Centralist Approach

The transitional government’s withdrawal from the Paris meeting in early 2025 was not a surprising development. Rather, according to analysts, it was an extension of a policy that Damascus has adopted toward North and East Syria since the beginning of the crisis. Successive governments used similar pretexts—such as accusing the Autonomous Administration of separatist tendencies or of legitimizing foreign presence—to justify rejecting dialogue.

Observers believe these narratives conceal deep fears of any change to the structure of governance that might limit the extreme centralization that has ruled Syria for decades. Damascus has previously and continues to use slogans such as “unity of the state” and “national sovereignty” in its domestic and foreign discourse, despite the reality of multiple zones of influence and foreign interventions.

During the transitional phase, this approach became more pronounced through media and incitement campaigns against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, which were seen as reflecting Turkish influence. This coincided with official statements, including threats of Turkish military action should the March 10 agreement not be adhered to.

Likewise, the so-called “Victory Conference” was held without the participation of representatives of North and East Syria at the administrative, political, or military levels, reflecting the continuation of the same exclusionary approach.

Paris Meeting… A Missed Opportunity

The Paris meeting, scheduled for early 2025, was supposed to mark an important milestone in opening a new dialogue track between Damascus and representatives of North and East Syria, under French mediation. However, the meeting was canceled before it took place, following multiple pressures, including Turkish diplomatic moves toward Paris, coinciding with the withdrawal of Syria’s transitional government.

Politicians believe that what happened in Paris falls within the broader context of exclusionary policies that have accompanied the Syrian crisis since its outset, as the components of North and East Syria have repeatedly been excluded from key negotiating stages, whether in Geneva, the Constitutional Committee, or other forums.

Political figures in North and East Syria consistently affirm, in local forums and public statements, that the cancellation of the Paris meeting was not merely the annulment of a gathering, but rather the squandering of a rare political opportunity that could have opened the door to a negotiating process recognizing Syria’s diversity and laying the groundwork for a more inclusive political solution—at a time when prospects for settlement continue to decline amid ongoing regional interventions and entangled international interests.

Statements by Erdoğan and Hakan Fidan

In a related context, the repeated public statements issued by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reveal consistent features in Ankara’s approach to the issue of North and East Syria, particularly with regard to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

On more than one media occasion and in official statements, both officials emphasized what they described as the “necessity of pushing the SDF to fully integrate into the army of the transitional government and to lay down its arms,” considering this a fundamental condition for any political process acceptable from Ankara’s perspective.

These statements were accompanied by ongoing Turkish insistence on rejecting any independent or special status for the SDF within a national security or military structure. The issue of “integration” was presented as a mandatory entry point—not as the outcome of a comprehensive political dialogue or equal negotiation among Syrians, but as a prior condition that must be implemented before any political progress.

Integration as a Tool of Pressure, Not a Negotiating Path

Observers argue that the Turkish proposal to integrate the SDF into the army of the transitional government does not stem from a comprehensive vision to restructure the military institution on inclusive national foundations. Rather, it is used as a political and security pressure tool aimed at dismantling the existing military structure in North and East Syria without offering political or constitutional guarantees related to rights, the form of governance, or the nature of future partnership.

They note that this discourse intersects with Ankara’s previous positions, which systematically rejected any discussion of decentralization or the administrative and political particularities of North and East Syria—reinforcing the impression that “integration” is being proposed as a substitute for dialogue, not as its outcome.

Alignment of Rhetoric with Turkish Political Conduct

These statements gain additional significance when linked to Turkey’s political conduct in previous negotiating tracks. The official rhetoric on “integration” was accompanied by practical positions, including the rejection of the participation of Autonomous Administration representatives in international negotiations and pressure on international actors to exclude them from any formal negotiating framework.

According to analysts, this parallel between political discourse and diplomatic practice reflects a Turkish approach seeking to reshape the Syrian file in a way that ensures the continuation of Turkish influence and prevents the emergence of any political or military model outside the central control that Ankara considers compatible with its security interests.

Observers believe that the repeated statements by the Turkish president and foreign minister regarding the “integration of the SDF” cannot be separated from a broader context of intervention in the details of the Syrian political process. When combined with diplomatic and on-the-ground pressures, these statements become a key factor in obstructing opportunities for comprehensive national dialogue and reproducing a logic of exclusion rather than negotiation.

The continuation of this approach—whether through rhetoric or practice—keeps the Syrian political track hostage to preconditions and limits the possibility of reaching a political solution that reflects Syria’s pluralism and responds to the aspirations of all components of society.

ANHA