Egyptian Researcher: Regime change in Iran is complex, difficult option

Egyptian researcher Ahmed Al-Anani believes that Iran is using all its available tools to pressure the United States and its allies, stressing that the option of changing the Iranian regime is difficult and complex, requiring prolonged and costly efforts. He adds that the recent strikes aim to alter the regime’s internal and external dynamics without resorting to a long-term confrontation.

Egyptian Researcher: Regime change in Iran is complex, difficult option
5 March, 2026   05:15
NEWS DESK

Iran is facing an extremely sensitive phase after losing a number of senior leaders and prominent figures, narrowing the room for maneuver for decision-makers in Tehran and pushing them toward high-risk response options—either calculated escalation or expanding confrontation through indirect arenas to impose new deterrence equations.

Amid mounting pressure that no longer focuses solely on changing Iran’s behavior but extends to targeting the structure of the regime itself, potential repercussions are emerging that could affect state institutions and regional stability as a whole. Scenarios remain open between containment, prolonged attrition, or significant internal unrest.

Iranian Response Options

Ahmed Al-Anani, an Egyptian researcher specializing in international relations, believes that Iran is attempting to use all available tools by targeting U.S. interests and its allies. He notes that the Iranian response, which included Gulf states and even the Sultanate of Oman despite its mediation role between Tehran and Washington, sends a clear message that Iran is continuing escalation and targeting allies.

According to Al-Anani, this approach aims to pressure the President of the United States through Gulf countries, given Tehran’s awareness of their strategic relationship with Washington. The response options, he says, depend on the level of counter-escalation, particularly amid what Iran views as a U.S.-Israeli effort to change the regime—something Tehran considers an existential battle rather than merely a political conflict.

Difficulty of Regime Change

Al-Anani emphasizes that changing the Iranian regime is a complex and difficult option, requiring a process lasting at least four to six months. This would aim to exhaust Iran’s economic, political, and military capabilities, in addition to direct action on the ground through supporting internal opposition.

He considers this path extremely costly for the United States, while Israel may be more prepared for a prolonged war—explaining the clear differences between the two sides. The U.S. administration, according to the researcher, tends to favor “swift wars” followed by pressure to return to negotiations, whereas Israel proceeds with striking the regime’s pillars and tools of influence.

Despite the difficulty of regime change, the strikes could affect the Iranian regime’s dynamics—whether at the level of allies and proxies or internally, where the system could become fragile if protests escalate or the opposition mobilizes.

Possible Scenarios

According to the Egyptian researcher, the situation can be limited to three main scenarios: continued escalation at its current level followed by de-escalation; broader and relatively longer escalation ending with Iran conceding to U.S. demands and possibly facing additional strikes; or the overthrow of the Iranian regime—a scenario requiring extensive ground intervention and direct support for internal opposition.

Al-Anani rules out the third scenario, as well as a very long war of attrition. He anticipates strikes lasting between 30 and 40 days that would exhaust Iran, followed by U.S. talk of negotiations with new Iranian leadership or second-tier figures within the Revolutionary Guard, while excluding ballistic missile and “militia” files, as they are considered existential lines for Tehran.

Iranian Interior and Prospects for Change

Domestically, Al-Anani stresses that minorities must closely monitor developments, manage their relations with the United States carefully, and assess the course of events before taking decisive steps. If external strikes coincide with rising internal protests, a real opportunity to reshape the political scene could emerge.

However, he does not expect political reform to originate from within the regime, which is fundamentally based on security control and repression—whether against Kurds, Baloch, Sunnis, or Arabs in Ahvaz. Instead, he expects further tightening and repression in the coming phase.

Conversely, Al-Anani believes that any genuine weakening of the regime, coupled with broader U.S. intervention, could represent a historic opportunity for opposition forces and components to enact radical change within the system—though such a path would carry high risks for the stability of the state and the region.

ANHA