Turkey-Israel rivalry raises fears of wider conflict in Syria

In the post-Baath era, Syria is emerging as a key arena for the redistribution of regional influence, amid intensifying competition between Turkey and Israel over the shape of the Syrian state and the future security and political arrangements in the region.

The rivalry raises questions that go beyond disagreements over Syria’s future: Why does Ankara seek to expand its influence inside the country? What does Israel want from its military and political presence? Are the two sides simply at odds over Syria, or are they engaged in a broader struggle over leadership of the new regional order? More importantly, who will ultimately pay the price for this conflict?

Hani Al-Jamal, deputy director of a political think tank, says that “Turkey wants Syria to be a state that can be controlled and influenced, while Israel wants a Syria that cannot threaten it and does not allow its adversaries to re-establish themselves on Syrian territory.”

Al-Jamal argues that Syria is no longer merely an arena for an internal war, but has become “an arena for the redistribution of regional influence” between two powers that do not want a full-scale war but are moving toward repeated and dangerous confrontations.

He attributes this to the fact that “the collapse of power after Assad created a strategic vacuum in Syria,” prompting each side to try to fill that vacuum in ways that could shape regional security for years to come.

According to Al-Jamal, Turkey is seeking to expand its political and security presence by supporting the current authorities in Syria, while simultaneously working to constrain Israel’s military presence. He adds that Syria is a highly important issue for Ankara, given its status as a regional power and a key location in the Arab region, as well as Turkey’s interests in issues including refugees, armed militias and military deployments.

He says the Turkish view is that Ankara wants “a stable, centralized Syrian state that it can deal with,” while seeking to retain leverage that would allow it to expand its influence inside Syria, particularly in the north, preserve its economic interests and ultimately resolve the Kurdish issue.

By contrast, Al-Jamal believes Israel is seeking to prevent Syria from becoming a threat to its security, particularly following Israeli and US efforts to reduce Iranian influence in the region.

He adds that Israel is attempting to “reduce and contain Turkey’s growing influence in Syria at present” through military and political repositioning, whether through certain Syrian factions that allow it to do so or by weakening Syria’s military capabilities. He also points to “a continued effort to establish an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory and an airspace that remains open for Israel to operate in at Syria’s expense.”

Al-Jamal does not believe the Turkish-Israeli rivalry is limited to disagreements over Syria’s future. Rather, he sees it as part of a broader struggle over the shape of the new regional order.

“I believe we are facing both dilemmas. Is this a disagreement over Syria’s future, or a direct confrontation between the two sides? I believe it is a dispute over Syria’s future, with Syria itself serving as the direct arena for the clash between Israel and Turkey,” he says.

He adds that Syria represents “a very important strategic depth in the confrontation between the two sides” and is “one of the pillars of the new regional order in the Levant.”

According to Al-Jamal, the rivalry has shifted “from a temporary competition over Syria to a strategic competition between Israel and Turkey,” with Ankara seeking to support the current leadership while building influence at the security, strategic and military levels.

According to Al-Jamal, the competition is not confined to the Syrian arena. He argues that “Syria is merely the place or geopolitical space where the clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv is taking place,” while the rivalry extends to “the position of leadership in the arrangements following the major transformations in the region,” particularly as the roles of traditional powers such as Iran decline.

He points out that “the two sides are not acting as temporary rivals.” Rather, each views the other as a major power seeking to influence the other’s behavior, explaining that “each is trying to engineer the previous regional order.”

Al-Jamal believes Syria represents “the major issue on the basis of which the new regional order will be arranged,” adding that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry is “one of the most prominent manifestations of these major transformations.”

However, the repercussions go beyond the competition for regional influence. Al-Jamal believes Syria will suffer the most from the continuation of this rivalry.

“Unfortunately, Syria will pay the highest price in this confrontation, even if Turkey and Israel, as two blocs, bear the strategic and political costs in the longer term,” he says.

He warns that the rivalry between the two sides will increase risks inside Syria and turn the country into “a permanent and increasingly heated arena of confrontation,” whether directly between Turkey and Israel or through other actors, including radical groups that could become involved in the conflict.

He also points to other regional interventions and influences, saying that “some regional countries, including Gulf states at times, Egypt at others, and remnants of Iranian ambitions,” along with factors linked to Syria’s border with Lebanon, are adding to the complexity of the Syrian scene.

He stresses that the exchange of warnings and messages between Ankara and Tel Aviv points to the possibility that Syria will remain an arena for airstrikes and disruption of military infrastructure. In his view, this would mean “slowing reconstruction and eroding the sovereignty of the new state.”

Al-Jamal believes the costs borne by Turkey and Israel could be lower than those imposed on Syria. Turkey, he explains, could face delays to some of its projects and military and political strain, while Israel could use some tribes or factions opposed to the Turkish presence.

He adds that this could also have repercussions inside Turkey by affecting the shape of upcoming elections and creating domestic pressure points.

At the same time, he believes Israel could also incur costs from the rivalry, including the possibility of clashing with emerging regional arrangements. He points to “the Mecca agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan” and the political and security protection it could provide to some actors.

In response to Israeli efforts to weaken Turkey following the reduction of Iranian influence, Al-Jamal says Ankara could take pre-emptive steps, either by attempting to influence Israel’s domestic scene or by using the Gaza and reconstruction files to establish a Turkish presence close to Israeli interests. Turkey could also support the current Syrian government through training and by allowing Turkish companies to participate in reconstruction.

He also points to Turkey’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with US President Donald Trump’s administration, including the issue of purchasing F-35 fighter jets, arguing that this could elevate Turkish-Israeli relations to a “peer-to-peer” level.

Despite this, Al-Jamal rules out a broad direct confrontation between the two sides in the near term.

“I believe direct confrontations, at least in the near term, are somewhat unlikely, but this relationship will involve sustained, intense direct friction,” he says.

Hani Al-Jamal, deputy director of a political think tank, believes continued rivalry will have a negative impact on Syria. With weak state institutions and the absence of centralized decision-making, Syria risks transforming from a state attempting to restore stability into an open arena for settling regional scores.

ANHA