Political researcher: Broad national dialogue is essential for drafting sustainable Syrian Constitution

Discussions are increasingly focusing on the importance of drafting a new constitution for Syria, the shape of the state in the next phase, and the mechanisms required to manage diversity while safeguarding rights and freedoms.

In this context, political studies researcher Samer Al-Dahi spoke to ANHA's agency, outlining his vision regarding the principles that the anticipated constitution should include, the lessons learned from previous constitutional experiences, the most suitable system of governance, and the mechanisms for drafting a constitution capable of responding to the needs of Syrian society.

Al-Dahi believes that Syria’s problem does not lie in the absence of constitutional principles, but rather in the lack of mechanisms that make these principles binding and enforceable. He stated:

“A constitution filled with slogans is meaningless unless it addresses the root causes of the crisis. Historically, Syria has suffered from the concentration of power and the absence of effective checks on authority. Therefore, any new constitution must guarantee that such concentration cannot return.”

He added that the most important constitutional principles are not general statements, but enforceable rules, such as preventing the concentration of security and political power in a single hand through constitutional mechanisms like parliamentary oversight of security agencies and preventing their financial and administrative autonomy.

He also stressed the need for a genuine separation of powers, ensuring that the executive branch cannot control the judiciary or legislature. In addition, the military should be institutionally neutralized by preventing its involvement in political life and linking senior promotions to institutional rather than political mechanisms.

Al-Dahi emphasized the importance of administrative decentralization through concrete mechanisms that grant provinces meaningful executive and service-related powers rather than merely symbolic authority. He also highlighted the necessity of guaranteeing judicial independence through a constitutionally protected budget, rather than simply declaring such independence, while underscoring one fundamental principle on which there can be no compromise: the unity of the country.

Regarding lessons learned from previous Syrian constitutions, Al-Dahi argued that Syria’s experience demonstrates that the problem was not necessarily poor constitutional texts, but rather the fact that actual power was stronger than the constitution itself.

He pointed out that, in some periods, constitutional provisions were relatively sound, yet the military and security institutions remained outside the constitutional balance of power. At the same time, excessive centralization detached political decision-making from society.

He continued by noting that Syria’s diversity was never translated into effective institutions; instead, it was addressed through denial or symbolic recognition. As a result, successive constitutions proved incapable of protecting the country because the real centers of power existed outside them. Whenever those centers of power weakened and became increasingly isolated, the country moved closer to severe crises.

According to Al-Dahi, ignoring diversity did not eliminate it; rather, it historically contributed to the accumulation of feelings of marginalization among different groups. He stressed that: “Learning from this lesson does not mean moving toward systems based on quotas or division, but rather recognizing that managing diversity requires more flexible institutional and political tools than those employed by the Syrian state over the past decades.”

Regarding guarantees for the rights of all social components, Al-Dahi argued that the mistake lies in treating “components” merely as a matter of symbolic recognition, whereas in practice it is a question of managing resources and authority in a way that delivers tangible benefits to everyone on a win-win basis. He emphasized that real guarantees are not achieved through constitutional language alone, but through the practical distribution of power.

As an example, he cited administrative decentralization, explaining that it cannot be considered genuine unless provinces are allowed to manage part of their own budgets and services in sectors such as education, healthcare, and municipal affairs. At the same time, the constitution should guarantee equitable development through a national fund administered by the central government, balancing resources between wealthy and poorer provinces according to legal rather than political criteria.

He added: “Local cultures should also be empowered by introducing optional local languages into the educational system within the national framework—a measure that has recently been approved and should be constitutionally enshrined.”

Concerning the most appropriate system of governance for Syria’s next phase, Al-Dahi argued that discussions have focused too heavily on constitutional structures rather than their functions. He stated that the real issue is not choosing between a presidential or parliamentary system, but rather preventing the return of authoritarianism while ensuring stability.

He considers a carefully regulated semi-presidential system to be the most realistic option, whereby the president is elected and granted clearly defined powers, particularly in security and foreign affairs, while the government remains accountable to parliament in matters of the economy and public services. Parliament should also have the authority to dismiss the government without triggering constitutional chaos.

He stressed that function is more important than form, and therefore any political system must prevent the monopolization of decision-making while granting broad powers to local authorities. He also emphasized that decentralization should apply to all provinces and should not be linked to political, ethnic, or sectarian identities, as unequal distribution of powers could create new conflicts rather than resolve existing ones.

Discussing the most suitable mechanism for drafting a new constitution, Al-Dahi argued that the greatest mistake would be attempting to draft a final constitution through comprehensive negotiations among all parties at once, as this often leads either to deadlock or to weak compromise texts.

He believes that a gradual approach is more realistic, especially since the Constitutional Declaration granted the transitional authorities several years to complete the constitution rather than rushing the process.

In this regard, he proposed establishing a temporary parallel council of experts to function as a second chamber of parliament. Membership would be based on expertise, with members appointed by the President of the Republic following parliamentary approval. The council would be tasked with preparing an initial draft within one year, after which the draft would be submitted for a nationwide dialogue involving civil society organizations, professional associations, and local actors across the provinces. He stressed that this dialogue must be genuine rather than merely symbolic, as was the case in previous experiences.

Al-Dahi concluded by stating: “The draft should then be amended in light of the feedback received through this dialogue, without reopening every article for renegotiation. Finally, the text should be presented to the new parliament for review before being submitted to a popular referendum.”

ANHA