Syria’s energy infrastructure under pressure: Technical failures or acts of sabotage?

Seven incidents were recorded in the Damascus countryside, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah and Tartous during September and October 2026. They varied in nature, ranging from explosions and fires affecting gas pipelines to damage to oil lines and cases of pipeline tapping and theft, as well as damage to a petroleum products pipeline in the Hadideh area on the Homs–Tartous road.

Series of Incidents Targeting Energy Infrastructure

On September 20, 2026, unidentified gunmen targeted oil tankers transporting oil from the Jazira to the Baniyas and Homs refineries. They also attacked a patrol belonging to the Critical Facilities Security Forces on the M4 international highway between Qamishlo and Hasakah while it was escorting the tankers.

The attack killed a member of the Internal Security Forces assigned to escort the tankers for the Jazira Oil Company and wounded several others.

On September 27, 2026, the Tartous Justice Directorate revealed that an oil pipeline running through the city’s new cemetery had been tapped and quantities of oil stolen.

The directorate announced the arrest of one suspect, who admitted to working with others to access the pipeline by digging and installing the necessary equipment to transfer oil in batches into a tanker. Search operations for the remaining suspects continued.

On September 28, 2026, a fire broke out at a valve on the Jabsa gas pipeline, which runs between the al-Shawwal area and the city of Deir ez-Zor, following the explosion of a sectional valve, according to the Syrian Petroleum Company.

The company said the incident resulted from an “act of sabotage” and halted gas supplies from the Jabsa plant to power stations. Firefighting teams began isolating the pipeline from both ends and bringing the blaze under control.

The company estimated that repairs could take between seven and ten days, with gas supplies expected to decline by approximately 900,000 cubic metres during the repair period.

On September 30, 2026, an explosion occurred in a gas pipeline at a pressure-reduction station at the entrance to the Tishrin Thermal Power Plant in the eastern Damascus countryside. The explosion sparked a fire and damaged gas pipelines and some electrical equipment.

The Tishrin, Deir Ali and Nasiriyah power plants went out of service after the gas supplies required to operate them were interrupted. Two people were also reported injured in the fire.

On the same day, a bus carrying employees and civilian workers was targeted by gunfire on the Masyaf Bridge in the western Homs countryside, killing seven people and wounding four others, according to the Homs Health Directorate.

Subsequent reports indicated that the bus was carrying engineers and workers employed by a private electricity company. The Internal Security Forces launched an investigation to identify those responsible for the attack.

No motive was announced, and no evidence established a link between the shooting and the gas pipeline explosion in the Damascus countryside. The two incidents therefore remain separate in terms of the established facts, despite occurring on the same day and affecting the energy sector in different ways.

On October 1, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir said specialized teams would conduct a technical inspection of the affected power plants and the site once it had cooled down to determine the cause of the explosion and assess the extent of the damage.

The cause of the incident has yet to be established, and it remains unclear whether it resulted from a technical fault, a targeted attack or an act of sabotage.

On October 7, 2026, a crude oil pipeline sustained damage at kilometer 50 near the town of Tal Hamis in Hasakah province’s countryside. The Syrian Petroleum Company described the incident as an act of sabotage.

The company said the incident occurred at 6 a.m. Maintenance and emergency teams isolated the damaged section and began repairs, while the relevant authorities announced that they had identified and arrested the suspects.

On the same day, the Internal Security Forces in Deir ez-Zor announced the arrest of three people caught in the act of stealing oil and sabotaging the al-Jido station, according to Syria’s state-run SANA news agency.

The relevant authorities said legal proceedings against the detainees were ongoing in preparation for referring them to the competent court. The incident adds to the cases of attacks on energy facilities and oil theft in the region, but does not, in itself, establish a link with the other incidents.

On October 15, 2026, a petroleum products pipeline running from Baniyas to Homs was punctured in the Hadideh area, causing a gasoline leak and forcing the closure of the Homs–Tartous highway in both directions.

Oday al-Satouf, media office director at the Syrian Petroleum Company, said the relevant teams had isolated and secured the area, while firefighting crews, excavation teams and technical committees were mobilized to carry out repairs.

His statement did not specify whether the puncture resulted from a technical fault or deliberate action. Determining the cause will therefore depend on the findings of inspections and investigations.

Syria and Regional Energy Corridor Projects

The incidents come at a time when discussions are underway about Syria’s potential to leverage its geographical location to transport energy between Iraq, the Gulf states and the Mediterranean. These discussions coincide with efforts to identify alternative routes for exporting oil and gas and reduce dependence on maritime routes exposed to risks and disruptions.

On July 18, 2026, Syria and Iraq signed two memorandums of understanding to rehabilitate and revive the historic Iraq–Syria oil pipeline, which runs from Kirkuk to Baniyas. A separate memorandum was signed with an international consortium comprising Chevron, UCC Holding and TI Capital to prepare technical and financial studies and establish the implementation framework for the project.

According to the Syrian Energy Ministry, the project aims to achieve an operational capacity of approximately two million barrels of crude oil per day, strengthening Syria’s position as an energy transit corridor to the Mediterranean.

However, the announced agreements concern studies and preparations and do not mean that a new pipeline is ready for operation.

On August 17, 2026, informed sources told local and international media outlets that the Iraqi oil pipeline project through Syria could take approximately four years to complete, with costs of at least $15 billion. The project would require new infrastructure or the reconstruction of existing facilities to meet modern standards.

The sources noted that the project remains at the technical and financial study stage, with a targeted operational capacity of up to two million barrels per day.

On September 29, 2026, Iraq began importing gasoline through Syria’s Baniyas port under a temporary agreement that allows fuel to be transported overland through Syrian territory to Iraq. This comes as shipments of Iraqi oil continue to be transported by tanker trucks through the port to foreign markets.

This illustrates that Syria’s role in energy trade is not limited to future pipeline projects but also includes existing transport operations that rely on ports, tanker trucks and overland routes.

The proposed projects extend beyond the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline. Regional analyses have also explored the possibility of developing gas transportation routes through Syria, including linking Gulf gas sources to Türkiye and European markets, alongside the development of transportation networks and ports. However, these proposals vary in their stage of development, and some remain at the proposal and study stage. They should not all be treated as projects that have entered actual implementation.

Could the Incidents Be Linked to Regional Rivalry?

Strengthening Syria’s position as an energy transit corridor could alter certain economic and strategic interests in the region by providing Iraq and other countries with additional routes to the Mediterranean, generating transit and transportation revenues, and expanding the role of Syrian ports.

This could affect the calculations of countries that benefit from traditional export routes or seek to maintain their influence over energy trade.

Some political analyses circulating among Syrians and observers of Syrian affairs have raised the possibility that regional actors whose interests could be harmed by the expansion of energy corridors through Syria might seek to obstruct projects that would give Damascus and Baghdad new export options.

Questions have also been raised about whether armed groups could exploit the prevailing instability to target infrastructure or pursue security and economic objectives by disrupting energy supplies.

Between Circulating Narratives and the Responsibility of Relevant Authorities

As the incidents continue, questions are mounting over the ability of the relevant authorities to protect oil and gas pipelines and power plants, the effectiveness of preventive maintenance measures, and the transparency of investigations into incidents whose causes remain unresolved.

The importance of publishing the findings of technical and security inspections has also come to the fore, along with the need to establish the nature of each incident—whether it resulted from an operational fault, theft or deliberate sabotage—and disclose any evidence identifying those responsible.

ANHA