Steps of Transitional Govt between consolidating power and escalating violence- Part 2

From the first weeks following the collapse of the Baathist regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) moved rapidly to cement its presence in both the political and military arenas, while most Syrian political currents and social components were almost entirely sidelined.

It quickly became clear that these measures carried a hegemonic character, which later affected the political and security structures as well as the situation on the ground across the country.

Military Dominance Through the “Victory Conference”

HTS took its first major step on 29 January 2025 by organizing what it called the “Victory Conference”, attended exclusively by its affiliated armed groups and Turkish-backed factions, without participation from other Syrian political forces or social components.

The conference produced decisions that consolidated the authority of the new government, most notably:

Appointing Ahmad al-Shar’a as Syria’s president during the transitional phase and granting him broad powers including international representation.

Granting him the authority to form an interim legislative council without restrictions.

Dissolving the existing security agencies and army and forming new replacement institutions.

Abolishing the 2012 Syrian Constitution.

Observers considered that these decisions granted al-Shar’a full executive, legislative, and judicial powers despite the absence of clear constitutional foundations, marking a departure from recognized norms for building authority during transitional periods.

Controversial Military Appointments

After the conference, the government carried out sweeping appointments of loyal faction commanders to key positions—including the defense and interior ministries, the chiefs of staff, and commanders of divisions and brigades—despite the fact that several of these figures are accused of violations and war crimes, and some remain on international sanctions lists. Among these individuals were Mohammad al-Jasem “Abu Amsha” and Saif Boulad “Abu Bakr.”

Sensitive posts were also assigned to foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda, raising questions about the credibility of the stated plan to build a new “national army.”

Political Measures That End Pluralism

Politically, al-Shar’a announced—through what his government described as a “presidential” address—the formation of a preparatory committee to select members of a new People’s Assembly without any electoral process, entrenching a centralized presidential system that contradicts the demands of many Syrians for a democratic and decentralized state.

A new government was formed, composed 98% of HTS leaders and commanders. This affected the administration of cities and public institutions, and local sources reported the presence of a “sheikh” in every government institution with near-absolute authority over administrative and security affairs.

The government also announced the creation of the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operating through offices across Syrian provinces to manage political and social life—a step seen as reminiscent of the Baath Party and its former National Progressive Front.

Constitutional Declaration Without Consensus

The decision to dissolve the People’s Assembly and abolish the 2012 Constitution without providing a temporary alternative created a constitutional vacuum that persisted until March 2025, when the government issued a new constitutional declaration drafted without consultation with the diverse Syrian political forces.

Many Syrians and opposition figures believe that the declaration reproduced the Baathist approach by entrenching one-party rule and emphasizing a singular religious and national identity, while concentrating even greater power in the presidency and disregarding democratic principles or political pluralism.

Unprecedented Escalation of Violence After the Regime’s Fall

This period was accompanied by waves of tension and violence across Syrian regions. Between 8 December 2024 and the end of November 2025, 10,923 people were killed due to violent acts and violations committed by the transitional government forces and local actors amid widespread security chaos. The victims included:

8,180 civilians, among them 438 children and 620 women.

1,700 victims, mostly from the Alawite community, killed in a massacre carried out by government forces and allied groups in March 2025.

638 people killed during a government attack on Suwayda in July 2025.

In Homs, violent incidents carried out by members of the Bani Khalid tribe in Alawite-majority neighborhoods resulted in two deaths and ten injuries, according to the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council.

The available evidence indicates that since the first day after the fall of the Baathist regime, the transitional government adopted military, political, and security policies aimed at consolidating complete control over the state, without involving other Syrian components.

This approach created a constitutional vacuum, eroded political life, and resulted in unprecedented power concentration, accompanied by widespread violence and violations that deepened instability and exacerbated internal divisions—making the task of building a just and inclusive state far more difficult.

ANHA