Researcher: disruption of transitional justice process linked to absence of political will

More than a year and a half after the interim government took power in Damascus, the path to transitional justice in Syria remains stalled, coinciding with the continued acts of killing, violence, and violations in Syria almost daily, in addition to the massacres committed against the Alawites in the coast, the Druze in Sweida, and the Kurds in northeastern Syria.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announced that the toll of violence in Syria has reached 13,592 dead since the fall of the Ba'athist regime in late 2024 until today, including 9,272 dead during the year 2025, 2,354 dead in the last weeks of 2024, and 1,966 dead since the beginning of 2026, indicating the continued deterioration of security.

In this context, researcher at the Euphrates Center for Studies, Lazkin Ibrahim, believes that the main reasons behind the failure to launch a genuine transitional justice process in Syria are linked to the lack of the political will necessary to build an independent and comprehensive process. He added that what has been announced so far is still closer to limited foundational steps.

He pointed out that the interim government has not adopted a comprehensive legal framework that defines the covered crimes, the time period that justice encompasses, the powers of the relevant authorities, and the mechanisms for investigation, trial, and reparation.

Lazkin Ibrahim warned against the dangers of limiting accountability for violations to a single party, considering that this raises concerns about entrenching selective justice that divides victims based on the identity of the perpetrator, instead of recognizing the rights of all Syrians who have been subjected to killing, arrest, enforced disappearance, and displacement by various parties to the conflict.

He mentioned other reasons behind the stagnation of the process, the most prominent being the lack of judicial independence, the multiplicity of centers of power and arms, the continuation of political and security settlements with individuals or groups facing accusations of committing violations, and the insufficient protection of evidence, archives, and mass graves. Additionally, there is the weak participation of the families of detainees, the missing, and survivors, as well as civil society organizations, in designing this process.

Lazkin Ibrahim emphasized that the fundamental problem lies in the fact that justice is still managed from the top, according to the calculations of power and security, and is not a national process in which Syrians participate in shaping its goals and guaranties. He stressed that justice decided from the top will remain limited in legitimacy and unable to build true national trust

The reflection of the absence of transitional justice

Regarding the implications of the absence of transitional justice on societal reconciliation, national consensus, and rebuilding trust, Ibrahim explained that the lack of justice makes the talk of societal reconciliation closer to political rhetoric than to a realistic process.

He added, "It is not possible to ask the victims, the families of the missing, and the survivors of torture and displacement to turn a new page before acknowledging what they have been through, revealing the truth, and determining responsibilities."

He noted that if the crimes remain uninvestigated or unpunished, each Syrian group will continue to carry its own narrative, fears, and sense of victimhood, which will entrench national, religious, sectarian, and regional divisions.

He noted that the weakness of justice drives citizens to seek protection outside state institutions, whether through weapons, tribal affiliations, local communities, or political and military forces. This weakens the chances of national reconciliation and makes trust between Syrians a hostage to the balance of power, rather than to law and citizenship.

He emphasized that rebuilding trust requires equal recognition of all victims, individual accountability to prevent collective punishment, reparations for damages, and reforming institutions that participated in or covered up the violations.

Lazkin Ibrahim emphasized that lasting stability in Syria cannot be achieved without transitional justice, pointing out that it is possible to impose temporary security calm without transitional justice, but it will not constitute sustainable stability. He said, "The authorities may succeed in controlling some areas, reaching settlements with armed groups, or containing local protests and demands."

Ibrahim continued: "However, unaddressed grievances will remain dormant, and at the first crisis, they can turn into armed confrontations or acts of revenge and collective retribution." Stability based on fear, silence, or a balance of armed forces is merely freezing the conflict, not resolving its causes.

Ibrahim saw that there is no real trade-off between justice and stability; justice is one of the most important tools for building stability. When citizens trust that the judiciary is capable of investigating, punishing the responsible, and protecting the victims, the motives for revenge diminish and the legitimacy of the state increases.

He emphasized that delaying justice under the pretext of prioritizing security gives perpetrators of violations more time and influence, encourages the commission of new crimes, and makes addressing the aftermath of the conflict more complex and costly.

He pointed out that the absence of a reliable transitional justice path has led to the continuation of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, revenge, and threats, and has encouraged some parties to settle major crimes through local reconciliations or political mediations and deals.

He emphasized that the absence of an effective judiciary has led the street, armed groups, and local forces to assume the roles of investigator, judge, and executor, which weakens state authority and deepens legal and security chaos.

Ibrahim pointed out that, in addition to the growing suspicions between the authority and the various Syrian components. There are communities that see justice being used against them selectively, and other communities that see their sacrifices being ignored or traded for political settlements. As a result, the issue of violations has become part of the struggle for power, representation, arms, and local governance, instead of being a national entry point to end the war's effects and rebuild the state on the basis of equal citizenship.

He noted that the need for transitional justice increases as the rates of security breakdown rise; it shifts society from the logic of revenge and collective punishment to the logic of law and individual responsibility. He emphasized that justice is the primary means of protecting Syrian components from collective accusations. He said, "Professional investigation determines who issued the orders, who executed them, and who covered them up instead of blaming a specific party. Therefore, justice should encompass the crimes of the previous regime, the violations committed by armed groups and controlling forces, and the new violations during the transitional phase."

He pointed out that ignoring the new crimes means reproducing impunity under a different authority.

Practical steps

Regarding the practical steps that should be taken to launch a comprehensive transitional justice process in Syria, Lazkin believes that the first step should include the enactment of a comprehensive national transitional justice law, after public consultations with victims, families of the missing, women, displaced persons, refugees, representatives of national and religious components, and civil society organizations within a specified timeframe. It should also ensure the independence of the transitional justice body from the executive and military authorities, establish a transparent mechanism for selecting its members, monitoring its work, and publishing its reports.

As for the second step, it is to establish a comprehensive system that does not reduce justice to trials, uncovering mass graves, prison and security agency archives, and preventing tampering with them. This includes criminalizing the destruction or concealment of documents, creating a unified national database for the missing, collecting DNA samples, developing forensic capabilities, regularly informing families of the search results, and establishing a witness and survivor protection program, because many will not testify as long as the accused or their networks retain security or social influence within the new government.

He also emphasized the necessity of establishing specialized judicial circuits for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which could initially be mixed, including Syrian and international judges and experts. In addition to starting a vetting process within the military, security, judiciary, and public administration to exclude those with credible evidence of involvement in violations, while rejecting collective purges based on sectarian or national affiliation or merely previous employment in state institutions.

In the final phase, a national reparation program should be launched, including compensation, restitution of property, rehabilitation of survivors, support for the families of the missing, restoration of services to affected areas, as well as official recognition of the victims and memory preservation. A clear timeline should be published to outline the priorities for investigation, prosecution, revealing the fate of the missing, and institutional reform.

The researcher at the Euphrates Center for Studies, Lazkin Ibrahim, believes that there is no international experience that can be transferred to Syria literally; because the Syrian situation is characterized by the prolonged duration of the conflict, the multitude of parties involved, external interventions, the extensive file of the missing and displaced, and the geographical and institutional division. Therefore, international experiences should be treated as a set of tools and lessons, not ready-made models.

And the most suitable experience for Syria is a composite national model that combines truth, accountability, searching for the missing, reparations, and institutional reform, temporarily benefiting from international expertise, while maintaining ownership of the process in the hands of Syrians.

ANHA