On the anniversary of withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon... Will they return again? 

On April 26, 2005, Syrian forces withdrew completely from Lebanon, ending a presence that spanned nearly three decades, beginning in 1976 during the Lebanese Civil War. This withdrawal was part of regional arrangements aimed at containing the conflict and balancing power between the warring factions.

Over the years, this role became entrenched in the political and security structure, transforming into a significant factor in shaping the Lebanese landscape, evolving from a purely military presence to a direct influence on political decision-making.

From tension to political explosion

The year 2005 witnessed a sharp escalation in internal tensions, coinciding with rapid regional and international transformations. The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14th marked a pivotal moment, prompting the Lebanese public to express its anger through widespread protests known as the "Independence Uprising."

This popular movement raised the bar for political demands and pushed for a redefinition of the relationship with Syria within the framework of national sovereignty. Simultaneously, international pressure intensified, particularly through UN Security Council resolutions, most notably Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, thus adding an international dimension to the internal crisis.

The withdrawal process

The Syrian withdrawal process unfolded in successive stages, beginning with the redeployment of forces from various areas within Lebanon towards the Bekaa Valley in preparation for their final departure. These steps were accompanied by intensive international monitoring and close follow-up of the implementation process. On April 26, 2005, the withdrawal was declared complete, bringing to a close a long chapter in Lebanese history and ushering in a new phase marked by distinct political and security realities.

Following the withdrawal, which constituted a profound transformation in the Lebanese political structure and redrawn the map of power, the political landscape became divided among factions holding divergent views on the nature of the relationship with Syria and Lebanon's role in its regional environment. This gave rise to new political dynamics, manifested in shifting alliances and power struggles within a highly tense environment.

The emergence of this division became clearly evident after the assassination of Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, as the Lebanese arena crystallized into two main alignments: the first, the March 14 Forces, which were formed immediately after the assassination and raised the slogan of the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the disclosure of the truth about the assassination, and included prominent parties such as the Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party and other allies in a position opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanon; and the second, the March 8 Forces, which crystallized as a political response to February 14 and expressed a position in support of or allied with Syria at that stage, and included mainly Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and other allies, and raised slogans related to "loyalty to Syria" and confronting international pressures, which is the division that formed the most prominent political framework in Lebanon for many years after the assassination and redrawn the internal balances based on regional and international alignment.

Reshaping political balances

With the end of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, relations between Damascus and Beirut moved to a new stage based on direct diplomatic foundations. The need arose to organize them within a formal framework that reflects the sovereignty of each state while preserving the historical and geographical ties that bind the two countries. The following years witnessed steps in this direction, represented by the exchange of diplomatic representation and the signing of cooperation agreements in an effort to build a balanced relationship based on common interests. This withdrawal also contributed to reshaping Lebanon’s position within this context with the growing role of international actors in following its affairs. The event reflected a general trend towards strengthening the concept of national sovereignty in the region in light of the overlap of regional and international interests.

The renewed discussion about the possibility of Syrian intervention in Lebanon coincided with the escalation of Israeli attacks, backed by the United States, against Iran and its regional proxies, including Hezbollah, and the fall of the Ba'athist regime, which had been allied with Iran and Hezbollah. This could pave the way for a new security, military, and political landscape in the region, based on the potential for an alliance between the Sunni-dominated interim government in Syria, Israel, and the United States, should the appropriate political and military conditions arise, against Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Iraq, and perhaps later against the Iranian regime itself.

Pressures pushing Syria towards a state of war

Certainly, as mentioned previously, some analyses suggest that the new Syrian administration may operate from specific political and religious backgrounds. However, this alone is not a sufficient factor, as other assessments indicate Israeli and American pressure on the interim government, which may push it towards involvement in security arrangements or regional conflicts, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, and perhaps later, Iranian-backed forces in Iraq.

Washington attempted to lure Damascus through statements by US envoy Tom Barrack about annexing Lebanon to Syria, in addition to lifting sanctions on Damascus and encouraging Arab and Western countries to strengthen diplomatic relations with it. However, despite some border skirmishes between the Syrian interim government forces and Hezbollah, the clashes did not escalate.

Israel, for its part, has increased its military and security pressure on Damascus by carrying out airstrikes on several Syrian areas, in addition to issuing threats and statements while simultaneously holding rounds of security and military talks. This suggests that Tel Aviv seeks to establish coordination that could lead to the Syrian government's forces joining the war against Hezbollah.

Damascus, for its part, has not taken a decisive stance on this issue. Although the head of the Syrian government, Ahmed al-Sharaa, denied his forces' intention to enter Lebanon, the government forces have intensified their announcements in recent weeks about monitoring Hezbollah movements and cells in Syria. This could pave the way for such an intervention in the future

Constraints hindering Syrian intervention in Lebanon

The Syrian interim government has numerous military, security, and social considerations that prevent it from militarily intervening in Lebanon or Iraq. The internal situation remains unstable, and such a move would be a risky gamble that could lead to the government's downfall, especially given Hezbollah's military experience and its ability to mobilize its proxies and cells within Syria.

Furthermore, such a war would be inherently sectarian, between Sunnis and Shiites. This would likely lead to cooperation between Shiite forces in Iraq and Lebanon against the government, and could also incite Alawites in Syria to rise up against Damascus.

According to observers, the primary factor shaping the interim government's stance is Turkey's position, which is a decisive influence on the government's foreign policy. There is talk of security and military cooperation between Turkey, Hezbollah, and Iran, and numerous reports have documented the arrival of weapons for Hezbollah from Iran via Turkey. This could exacerbate the Turkish-Israeli rivalry in the region.

The Syrian interim government now faces a delicate choice: either to align with Turkish policy, which might necessitate allowing weapons to pass through Syrian territory to Hezbollah a scenario Israel has already warned against, threatening to target the Masnaa border crossing between Damascus and Beirut, possibly through factions and groups affiliated with the Syrian Ministry of Defense and linked to Turkish intelligence or to engage in the Israeli and American confrontation against Hezbollah and Iranian-backed factions, potentially leading to a dangerous military, security, and social gamble.

ANHA