Astana meetings ... guarantors divide Syria into war fronts

Over the course of four years, 15 rounds of Astana meetings were held regarding the Syrian crisis, but failed to end to the suffering of the Syrians. On the contrary, they were in Russia service, Turkey and Iran in Syria, and legitimized the occupation and intervention.

The Syrian crisis turned into a new phase with launch the Astana, capital of Kazakhstan, to confirm the extent of the complexity of the Syrian crisis.

Astana 1 ... influence-sharing

The first round of Astana meetings was held on January 23-24, 2017, under Russia's auspices, Turkey and Iran, as international and regional parties' military forces and armed groups, at a time, the American role was in retreat awaiting the inauguration of the President-elect Donald Trump and the European and Arab countries were satisfied with supervision only .

The Astana was mere affirmation of the Russian, Turkish and Iranian understandings inside the Syrian territories, and the sharing of influence and roles by seeking to strengthen the cease fire that these parties agreed on on December 29, 2016, as the solutions proposed by the trio were based on Aleppo model, in which Turkey sold the mercenary groups to the regime and its Russian ally.

Those countries tried to apply Aleppo model in other Syrian cities, by handing them over to the Damascus government, as Turkey, in return, got the Russian green light to occupy Jarablus and al-Bab in northern Syria.

At the end of the first-round talks, a tripartite mechanism was announced to monitor full commitment to the ceasefire, prevent any provocations and mechanisms for implementing the armistice, but what they agreed upon did not happen, and the clashes and shelling continued.

Astana 2 ... Dead endeavors

The second round of Astana, held in mid-February, came up with nothing like the previous one. On the contrary, it showed the scale of the complications that block the course of the next step of the tripartite guarantor understanding, which prevented even agreement on a joint final statement.

The second round began to fail from the very beginning, as the so-called (Syrian opposition) delegation supported by Turkey and Gulf countries attended in two batches, late for a day, and Turkey reduced the level of its delegation and disrupted the issuance of a joint statement at the end of the meeting in light of its alliance with Al-Nusra Front mercenaries (currently, Jabhat Tahrir Al-Sham) on the ground.

Despite the Russian announcement that the second round had reached the establishment of a "Firm Mechanism" to monitor the ceasefire, the ambitions from meeting was much higher at the conclusion of the previous one, as the talks revolved around preparing the final touches on the map of the deployment of "Al-Nusra Front" mercenaries in the Syrian territories, In preparation for separating the "moderates" from it with the aim of fighting it later, but this did not happen due to the support of the guarantor parties - Turkey - for the mercenaries of Jabhat al-Nusra.

'Astana 3 ...  committees formed and the firing did not stop'

The third round in Astana, in mid-March 2017, came to confirm that these talks are in vain, as the delegation of the so-called Syrian opposition refused to participate at the onset and was a day late to participate.

As usual, the agreement was renewed between Turkey, Russia and Iran, at the end of this round as well, as the meeting agreed that Iran would formally become a "guarantor" of the ceasefire in Syria alongside Turkey and Russia, to grant legitimacy to Iran presence in the Syrian territory after legitimizing Turkey presence by occupying areas of northern Syria in the previous two rounds.

The final statement of this round indicated that the “guarantor countries” agreed to form committees to monitor the truce and violations, follow up the aid and detainees file, in addition to a committee to draft the Syrian constitution, but nothing has changed on the ground, as the killing, bombing, clashes and starvation went on.

'Astana 4 ... actions opposite of words'

Although this round, which held in early May 2017, in which Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed on a memorandum of understanding to "de-escalate", within four regions in Syria, the Syrian bloodshed continued.

After the delegation of the so-called opposition had decided to boycott the talks, it resumed its participation, but Iran's participation in the signing of the memorandum prompted it to withdraw again.

According to what was agreed upon by the three guarantor countries, the de-escalation zones are in Idlib governorate, north of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and in southern Syria.

After the fourth round from Astana, all the fighting fronts against the Damascus government began to stop with Turkish orders, and thus the forces of Damascus and Russia dispersed to control the four "de-escalation zones", one after the other, respectively, and the mercenaries who refused to sign surrender documents were transferred to Idlib, which controlled by Al-Nusra Front, classified on the list of international terrorism over 90% of its area.

'Astana 5 ... Failed deal'

After the sponsoring countries signed in the fourth round, a MOU to de-escalate, the fifth round, which was held in early July, was concluded without signing documents, and ended with establishing 3 de-escalation zones in Idlib, Homs and Eastern Ghouta was temporarily postponed. The parties to the Astana talks (Russia, Turkey and Iran) were also unable to coordinate the borders of those areas.

'Astana 6 ... fulfils the interests of the guarantor countries'

The sixth round of the Astana meetings, in mid-September 2017, fulfilled the interests of the guarantor countries of the ceasefire and forces the mercenaries to surrender.

After legitimizing Turkey presence, in the Syrian territories it occupied as of August 2016, and it also granted it the status of observation, which is what Turkey had not expected after all its interventions in the Syrian crisis failed to achieve its ambitions in the region.

Turkey took advantage of these deals to occupy Afrin, Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî.

As for Iran, which was fighting alongside Damascus, these meetings granted it the status of an observer and guarantor of the ceasefire.

'Astana 7 ... the Syrians are of no use'

The seventh round of meetings was held on October 30, 2017, but ended without any results, as the parties did not reach any consensus regarding the release of detainees, the exchange of prisoners, and the continuous delivery of aid to the population in the besieged areas.

'Astana 8 ... a Russian attempt to strengthen the grip on the Syrian file'

The eighth round was held on December 21, 2017, and resulted in setting a date for a conference in Sochi, Russia, where Russia sees it as the great sponsor and the strongest main player in the equation of the conflict in Syria.

The sponsors of Astana, focused in this round on converging views on the outlines of the Russian initiative aimed at being an alternative to the Geneva platform, which failed to make any breach due to the difficulty of consensus on a number of files.

'Astana 9 ... Ongoing battles and talk of a constitution'

The ninth round of the Astana track was held on 14 May, and it did not produce significant results, especially the file of detainees, which was among the most outstanding issues in the previous rounds of the meetings in Astana.

At the end of the tour, the guarantor trio issued a joint statement in which Russia, Turkey and Iran affirmed their readiness to continue joint efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and support the implementation of the recommendations of the "Syrian National Dialogue Conference" in Sochi, and Russia began to promote a draft constitution written by Russian experts.

'Astana 10 ... talk of peace and the continuation of killing'

This round was held on July 30, 2018, and the three intervening countries in Syria agreed to "help the Syrians" to restore their normal lives, and to start talks to help the displaced and refugees return, but none of that was achieved, but the killing, destruction and displacement continued.

'Astana 11 ... a new failure'

It was held on November 28, 2018, and this round can be shortened to two sentences: “The fate of the Syrians remained between two parties.” The round did not reach any results, so the parties were supposed to discuss the formation of the Constitutional Committee, but the talks failed at their start due to a disagreement between Russia and James Jeffrey.

'Astana 12 ... a threat of escalation'

And it was held on April 25, 2019, during which the Damascus government hinted to launch a military operation on Idlib, in which mercenaries from all parts of Syria had gathered.

'Astana 13 ... Zero results and disagreements between guarantors'

The 13th round of the Astana process ended with a statement similar to the previous one without concrete decisions regarding progress in the file of the so-called Constitutional Committee, whose implementation contradictory statements were issued by the participating parties.

No progress has been made regarding the detainees' file, as there are clear differences over the solution in Idlib between the participating parties while the statement included the need to return to the Sochi Agreement on the "demilitarized" zone in Idlib and the northern Hama countryside, the Iranian side, along with the Damascus government delegation, view everyone in Idlib as extremists.

The differences between Russia and Iran increased over Russia's participation in the Jerusalem security meeting, and its agreement to the continuation of Israeli strikes on Iranian sites inside Syrian territory.

'Astana 14 ... hostile to the Kurds, northeast Syria'

In the Kazakh capital, Nur Sultan, the 14th meeting of the guarantor states of the Astana process on Syria concluded, without bringing with it any qualitative new except for hostility to the Kurds and the general components of NE Syria.

These guarantor countries, which divided Syria into areas of influence, renewed their claim to adhere to the unity and sovereignty of the Syrian territories, and to "refuse to create a new reality on the ground."

This came in the closing statement, which indicated that "Iran, Russia and Turkey reject all attempts aimed at creating a new reality on the ground, including illegal self-government initiatives."

'Astana 15 ... a loose statement'

On April 23, 2020, the foreign ministers of the guarantor trio held the 15th round of the Astana route.

The meeting came up with a loose statement about the situation in northwestern Syria, as is the custom in most of the recent track meetings, which did not lead to an end to the escalation.

The ministers stressed the need to advance the political process in Syria in accordance with Security Council Resolution No. 2254, issued on December 18, 2015, relating to the ceasefire and reaching a political settlement.

During the 14th and 15th rounds, important field events and developments took place in Idlib and its environs, as the Damascus forces, with air support from Russian forces, continued military operations to grasp more areas.

 In addition, the Damascus government forces took control of a large part of the southern and eastern countryside of Idlib, especially the cities of Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan, in addition to blocking more of the so-called old and new Turkish points in the Idlib region.

'Big risk'

Regarding this, the Syrian opposition figure Ahmed al-Druze said: “The Astana meetings, which have passed for 4 years now, have not departed from the context of the great international conflict and the American retreat in the region and the attempt to absorb Turkey and remove it from NATO, and within this context the Russian and Iranian axes were working to eject Turkey. In exchange for some political and economic gains, some gains were achieved through the Astana meetings in Syria, after major risks. "

Al-Druze believed, "Among the gains is that Damascus has regained the central region of Syria in Homs and Hama, as well as eastern Ghouta and some other areas according to the Astana accords circle, in addition to regaining two parts in southern Syria, with some questioning indications about it."

'The big share was for Turkey'

He added, "On the contrary, the Turkish share of Astana was a large share in the attempt of this absorption, as it was concentrated in Idlib in a large and broad way, and occupied the Afrin and Jarablus region and the area extending from Tal Abyad to Ras Al-Ain, all of these areas have become within the borders of the Turkish state that will not come out." Only with great resistance. "

Al-Druze concluded his speech by saying, "Astana is not white and not black, it is a mixture and a mixture of the two."

(A)

ANHA