Al-Monitor: Is UAE-Israeli agreement worth all this hype?

Republicans and Democrats in America praised the Israeli-Emirati normalization agreement, as some observers went so far as to describe it as a geopolitical earthquake, but Al-Monitor asked in a report: Is the agreement worth all the hype?

One way to view the question, according to Al-Monitor, is to think about what real regional changes looked like in the past, and the "earthquake" must include some regional or even global changes.

Consider the first earthquake in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, as the dramatic visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 not only led to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab country, but also led to Egypt leaving the Soviet orbit and joining an axis supported by America.

It also paved the way for the return of the territories (Sinai) and an end to hostilities with Israel after fighting multiple regional wars, some of which risked direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Consider the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which removed Iran's most dangerous Arab opponent and changed the balance in the country's sectarian leadership.

Iraq has transformed from a Sunni Arab weight parallel to Iran to a state whose leaders are majority affiliated with Iran, and the ensuing wars not only provoked regional concern about the growing Iranian power, but also, separately, the civil conflict that sowed the seeds of the rise of ISIS.

So, yes, the Middle East has faced transformative moments, but the Israeli-Emirati agreement is not one of them.

Of course, dialogue, economic relations, and community participation must be welcomed in the Middle East, especially if it can bypass the cold peace that Israel enjoys with Egypt and Jordan.

It is too early to determine the extent to which the UAE’s engagement with Israel will be broad and whether it can be sustainable, but even if the Israeli-Emirati deal leads to strong bilateral relations, and perhaps additional normalization agreements with like-minded countries such as Bahrain, Oman or Morocco, the exaggeration surrounding this agreement is unjustified because it is unlikely to be a strategic game changer.

For starters, as many have now realized, Israel is not and has not been at war with the Emirates, and the normalization of relations with the latter does not change any basic bilateral or regional dynamics of the conflict. In fact, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv have been improving relations for years through intelligence and defense channels and trade exchanges, and recently through official visits by Israeli officials to Abu Dhabi.

In contrast to the strategic context that preceded the historic treaty with Egypt, Israel is not at war with any Arab country today, and has serious non-state opponents, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, and opponents from non-Arab countries such as Iran, but it no longer has serious enemies from the Arab countries.

Even the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf power, does not pose a threat to Israel, and Israel may consider itself in an optimal strategic location, especially since its Arab neighbors are in a state of chaos, exhausted by internal pressures and conflicts, and are not ready to pressure them to end their occupation of the Palestinian lands, as they simply have other priorities.

Just as the agreement does not reshape the regional alliance against Iran, which has existed for years. Israel and the Gulf states share concerns about the growth of Iranian power since the United States launched the war on Iraq, as perceptions of Iran's increasing influence have grown in the decades that followed.

In fact, the UAE’s motives for reaching the agreement are likely to be less related to Iran and more related to changing the UAE’s priorities. The Emiratis have been communicating directly with Iran since last year to calm tensions since Iran's attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf last summer.

The United Arab Emirates is seeking to end its participation in the disastrous Yemen war, and to shift its focus to Libya, where it is competing for influence with Turkey.

The UAE's regional activity supports its anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance, which also contributed to its blockade of its Gulf neighbor, Qatar.

The so-called "Arab Spring" was another real factor in changing the rules of the game, and it is the main catalyst for the escalation of Gulf countries' interventions in regional conflicts, as all Gulf countries rallied to defeat the popular uprising in Bahrain in 2011 that threatened the ruling monarchy, for fear of facing challenges its survival too.

But then they were divided over attitudes towards regional reform with the continuing uprisings and the arrival of Muslim Brotherhood leaders to power in Egypt. In short, the regional divisions between the Sunni states are complex and extend beyond concerns about Iran, and it is unlikely that the UAE's normalization with Israel will significantly change these rivalries and balances of power are significant. They are also unlikely to prevent Russia and China from increasing participation in the region, including their good bilateral relations with both the United Arab Emirates and Israel.

The Palestinians may be tired of their corrupt and ineffective leadership, but they are also in a state of despair as the region and the world turn their backs to seek just solutions.

If the Israeli-Emirati agreement leads to a real and broader openness to dialogue and cooperation that would help address the terrible social, economic, health and environmental challenges facing the region, then that would be a celebration agreement.

But if these relations reinforce the long-term and largely negative regional trend lines that fuel the conflict, then it is understandable why the enthusiasm in the region may not match the many reactions in Israel or Washington.

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ANHA