Trump between unwinnable war and hard to accept deal – Givara Sheikh Nour

Ali Waez, the Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, states that the U.S. President is caught between "an unwinnable war and a hard-to-accept agreement." This phrase not only encapsulates Washington’s predicament in its confrontation with Iran but also offers a lens through which to understand the complexity defining most Middle East issues today. The U.S. gamble on a swift war that would create a new political reality failed to materialize; Iran was not defeated, yet no settlement emerged that reflected the terms for which Washington had originally gone to war.

When the United States decided to engage in the conflict, it wagered that military strikes—combined with economic sanctions—would compel Tehran to accept a new agreement restricting its nuclear program and curbing its regional influence. However, the outcome was different. While Iran suffered losses, it retained its maneuverability and did not lose its key strategic assets in the region. As the conflict dragged on, its political and economic costs mounted, and it became apparent that any potential settlement would require concessions incompatible with the rhetoric Washington had employed prior to the war. Ultimately, military force failed to secure an Iranian capitulation, just as negotiations failed to produce an agreement that met all U.S. demands.

Israel faces a similar dilemma, albeit in a different context. Since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Tel Aviv has achieved significant military successes—most notably eliminating key leaders within Hamas and Hezbollah, inflicting extensive damage on their military and organizational infrastructures, and establishing operational control over vast areas of the Gaza Strip and parts of southern Lebanon. While the military significance of these gains cannot be understated, they have not translated into a clear political victory.

Israel did not wage this war merely to enhance deterrence; it sought to reshape the region's security landscape by eliminating Hamas and Hezbollah as influential military and political forces. However, experience has shown that battlefield success does not automatically lead to the achievement of strategic objectives. Assassinating leaders, seizing territory, and destroying military infrastructure do not necessarily equate to the political elimination of an adversary or the imposition of a new regional reality—which explains why military operations have continued even after major gains on the ground.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Hamas and Hezbollah are not isolated entities; rather, they are integral parts of an influence network built by Iran over decades. Despite the blows Tehran has sustained, it has not been strategically defeated and remains capable of influencing the conflict's trajectory and supporting its allies. Consequently, weakening these forces does not necessarily mean eliminating them; indeed, talk of their total eradication appears more like a political aspiration than an outcome achievable through military force alone.

It is against this backdrop that the stalling of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon can be understood. The primary obstacle is not a lack of mediators or initiatives, but rather the gap between what Israel seeks and what Hezbollah is willing to accept. Tel Aviv pursues security arrangements that would cement the war's outcome and permanently curtail the group's capabilities, whereas Hezbollah rejects any formula that could be construed as an admission of defeat or that would grant Israel lasting political gains. Consequently, the negotiations appear to be an extension of the conflict rather than a path to ending it.

The same applies to negotiations with Hamas. Israel believes that any agreement failing to dismantle the movement's military capabilities merely postpones the next confrontation, whereas Hamas views any settlement lacking a permanent ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal as an admission of political defeat. With both sides holding firm to their maximalist demands, negotiations are transforming into a new arena of conflict rather than a genuine pathway to a settlement.

The common thread across these issues is not a lack of military achievements, but rather the inability to translate them into stable political outcomes. The United States has been unable to impose an agreement that fully reflects its terms; meanwhile, despite its military superiority and the severe blows dealt to its adversaries, Israel has failed to declare a decisive political victory. This is because its objectives extended beyond mere military success, aiming instead to reshape the entire regional balance of power.

Consequently, the true crisis lies not in the stalling of negotiations, but in the widening gap between what military force can achieve and what politics demands. When objectives are raised to the level of seeking total victory in a highly complex region, any agreement falling short of those expectations is perceived as a concession; peace itself comes to be seen as an admission that force—however effective—is insufficient on its own to redraw the regional order.

ANHA