New constitutional test for Syria in post-conflict era

As discussions intensify over the imminent convening of Syria’s new parliament, Syrians are closely watching what the next phase will bring. A central question remains whether the new constitution will establish an inclusive social contract capable of addressing decades of exclusion and division, or whether it will reproduce the same approaches that contributed to one of the country’s most severe political and humanitarian crises.

New constitutional test for Syria in post-conflict era
7 June, 2026   04:15

As the Syrian Parliament (People’s Assembly) prepares to hold its first session, scheduled for June 8, debate is growing over the future shape of the Syrian state, the limits of political representation, and the possibility of drafting a new constitution capable of addressing a long legacy of conflicts and divisions that have accumulated over decades.

The Syrian crisis was not the result of a single event or a temporary political phase. Rather, it emerged from a complex historical process shaped by centralized governance, limited political participation, unresolved questions of national identity, and a lack of consensus regarding the structure of the state and its relationship with its diverse components.

As attention turns to the anticipated constitution as one of the most significant milestones of the transitional period, many Syrians are asking a fundamental question: Will Syria learn from the lessons of its previous constitutions, or will it repeat the very factors that led the country toward division and conflict?

Historical roots of political exclusion and State formation

Evidence suggests that following independence, Syria witnessed attempts to build a pluralistic parliamentary system. However, a series of military coups beginning in 1949, followed by years of political instability, gradually ended the emerging democratic experiment and shifted power away from elected institutions toward the military and security apparatus.

These transformations were not merely changes in governance; they marked the beginning of a highly centralized state in which opportunities for political participation and party pluralism steadily diminished. This later influenced the nature of constitutions that granted extensive powers to the executive branch at the expense of other institutions.

Structural transformation and the consolidation of centralized rule

Following the Ba'ath Party’s rise to power in 1963 and the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, Syria entered a new phase characterized by the concentration of authority in the presidency and restrictions on political life. Historians argue that the constitution was not merely a legal document but a framework that redefined the state according to a specific political and ideological vision, reinforcing centralized decision-making and weakening genuine political representation.

Although this approach provided a degree of institutional stability during certain periods, it gradually narrowed the public sphere and weakened mechanisms of accountability and balance, contributing to the accumulation of political and social tensions across broad sectors of Syrian society.

The Kurdish question and constitutional denial

One of the most prominent issues raised in today’s constitutional debates concerns the Kurds, who for decades lacked explicit constitutional recognition of their national existence and cultural identity.

The exceptional census conducted in Hasakah Governorate in 1962 stripped tens of thousands of Kurds of Syrian citizenship, with the consequences later extending to hundreds of thousands of their descendants.

This period was also marked by policies such as the Arab Belt Project, restrictions on Kurdish language and culture, and broader assimilation efforts.

The effects of these policies extended beyond legal and cultural dimensions, deepening the divide between the state and large segments of the population in North and East Syria. They created a profound crisis of trust that persisted for decades. Even after the fall of Ba'athist rule, tensions continued under the governance of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, although Kurds later secured some cultural rights through a decree issued by interim leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, which recognized Kurdish as a national language and permitted its teaching in Kurdish-majority areas.

Violent events and an ongoing conflict with society

The consequences of Syria’s centralized state structure were not limited to the Kurdish issue. They also shaped relations with various political and social forces.

The country witnessed the 1982 Hama events, considered among the bloodiest episodes in modern Syrian history, as well as the Qamishlo protests of 2004. Similar tensions continued to affect broad areas of political and public life in subsequent decades.

Under the state of emergency imposed in 1963, Syria experienced repeated waves of political arrests and restrictions on opposition parties and movements, whether Islamist, nationalist, leftist, or liberal, amid a highly limited space for political activity outside official structures.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power in 2000, Syria experienced a brief period of political openness known as the “Damascus Spring.” Political and cultural forums emerged, calling for constitutional reforms, expanded public freedoms, and a stronger role for civil society.

However, this period proved short-lived. Political forums were shut down, and a number of prominent activists and intellectuals were arrested and prosecuted between 2001 and 2002, including former parliamentarian Riad Seif, former MP Maamoun al-Homsi, economist and academic Aref Dalila, writer and political activist Habib Issa, and opposition figure Walid al-Bunni.

In June 2005, the Ba'ath Party’s Tenth Regional Congress adopted the concept of a “social market economy” as an alternative to socialist policies. In practice, this neoliberal shift contributed to rising poverty rates, reductions in public services and subsidies, the strengthening of monopolies linked to regime-connected elites, and widening socioeconomic inequalities.

These developments created fertile ground for growing frustration and social discontent, directly contributing to the conditions that led to the 2011 uprising.

In Kurdish-majority regions, tensions related to identity and political and cultural rights persisted. This was particularly evident during the Qamishlo events of March 12, 2004, which began with clashes during a football match before escalating into widespread protests across several cities and towns in northern and eastern Syria. The unrest resulted in deaths, injuries, and hundreds of arrests, becoming one of the clearest examples of the unresolved relationship between the state and the Kurdish community.

Kurdish politicians and intellectuals argue that these events revealed a deeper crisis than mere temporary political disagreements. In their view, they reflected the absence of effective channels for political participation, inadequate representation of Syria’s diverse ethnic and social groups, and the continued reliance on security-based approaches to managing internal disputes.

According to this perspective, these factors contributed to the accumulation of exclusion and mistrust between society and the state, helping pave the way for the mass protests of 2011 and the crisis that continues today, even after the fall of Ba'athist rule and under the current interim government.

The Syrian war: The greatest catastrophe

When protests erupted in 2011, Syria was already burdened by decades of accumulated political and social grievances. The unrest quickly evolved into a devastating conflict that exhausted the country for nearly fifteen years.

According to recent United Nations estimates, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed, while more than 13 million people have been displaced either internally or as refugees. Large parts of the country have been destroyed, and the economy and public services have deteriorated to unprecedented levels. Approximately 16.5 million people still require humanitarian assistance today.

The war also resulted in the state losing control over large territories, the emergence of multiple military and administrative authorities, and unprecedented regional and international intervention in Syrian affairs.

Today, many Syrians view these outcomes not as isolated consequences of war but as manifestations of the failures embedded in the state structure that developed over previous decades, particularly its inability to manage the country’s political, ethnic, and social diversity.

What did previous Syrian Constitutions leave behind?

According to numerous political and constitutional analyses, the problem lay not only in constitutional texts themselves but also in the governing approaches behind them. These resulted in:

Weakening political life and party pluralism.

Marginalizing broad social and ethnic groups.

Failing to provide sufficient guarantees for the peaceful transfer of power.

Transforming political disagreements into security crises.

Eroding trust between the state and society.

Encouraging separatist tendencies and social fragmentation.

Expanding foreign interference in Syrian affairs.

The collapse of significant state institutions during the war.

The displacement and exile of millions of Syrians.

Massive human and economic losses whose effects continue to this day.

The next constitution: A historic opportunity or a reproduction of crisis?

Accordingly, any new constitution that ignores the lessons of the past or reproduces policies of exclusion, marginalization, and denial of Syria’s diversity risks opening the door to new crises, even if military conflict has ended.

Ignoring the demands of Syria’s ethnic, cultural, and religious communities including Kurds, Syriac-Assyrians, Turkmen, and others could perpetuate the crisis of trust between the center and the periphery and hinder efforts to rebuild the state and achieve political stability.

Conversely, a constitution founded on equal citizenship, recognition of diversity, balanced political participation, separation of powers, and respect for rights and public freedoms could mark a historic turning point, enabling Syria to move beyond decades of conflict.

Between the legacy of previous constitutions and the demands of the transitional period, the most important question facing Syrians today remains: Will the new constitution become the foundation of an inclusive social contract that addresses the historical causes of division, or will it simply represent another version of the approaches that led the country into one of the greatest political and humanitarian disasters in its modern history?

ANHA