In major crises, fate of nations is not decided solely on the battlefields, but also within them – Kivara Sheikh Noor

In major crises, fate of nations is not decided solely on the battlefields, but also within them – Kivara Sheikh Noor
29 March, 2026   06:30

With escalating regional and international tensions and ongoing wars, a fundamental question arises: Why do some nations withstand pressure, while others disintegrate rapidly? The answer does not begin with the balance of military power, but rather with the nature of the relationship between the state and its society. External conflict, however intense, remains a test of the internal capacity for cohesion.

A state does not confront crises with its armies alone, but also with the trust of its citizens. This trust, when present, transforms into something akin to an internal strategic depth, enabling it to curb shocks, manage tension, and minimize its cost. However, when it erodes, any external pressure quickly becomes a catalyst for internal destabilization.

Here, democratic integration emerges as a practical, not theoretical, condition for building this cohesion. It is not seen as an abstract ideal, but as a realistic mechanism for engaging the various components of society within a just framework of rights and responsibilities, thus fostering a sense of shared destiny rather than dependence on it. This integration is based on a shift towards building democratic republics (in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran) founded on negotiation, reconciliation, and free citizenship. In this framework, democratic society and the state are integrated into a single entity that guarantees the rights and freedoms of diverse identities, without implying separation from the unity of the state.

In the Iranian case, this challenge is clearly evident. The state possesses considerable regional influence, yet it simultaneously faces a growing rift with segments of its society, manifested, for example, in the waves of protests of recent years. This rift not only signifies internal tension but also narrows the margin for maneuver in any protracted confrontation, because resilience is not solely built externally but is nurtured internally. The more open and participatory the domestic front, the greater the state's capacity to endure and manage conflict.

This pattern is not unique to Iran. In Iraq, both before and after 2003, sectarian and political divisions became a constant drain on resources, rendering the state more vulnerable to security and regional pressures. In Syria, the absence of a comprehensive national consensus since the beginning of the crisis in 2011 led to a rapid slide into open conflict. The challenge lay not only in the scale of the conflict but also in the lack of an internal structure capable of containing it.

Turkey is not immune to this equation. Should any regional escalation widen, the decisive factor will be its internal capacity to broaden its base of political and social cohesion, particularly concerning the Kurdish issue. Genuine political openness and enhanced participation can transform diversity into a source of strength, while continued tension without a just resolution could make it a drain on resources at a critical juncture.

As for Syria's future, any talk of stability will be meaningless unless it is based on a comprehensive political settlement that reshapes the internal front on the foundations of recognizing pluralism and equal citizenship. Without this, any calm will remain fragile and liable to collapse at the first test.

The conclusion is clear: external power cannot be separated from internal cohesion. A state lacking solid political legitimacy and a minimum of trust between itself and its society finds itself fighting on two fronts simultaneously (external and internal).

Building a strong internal front is not achieved through slogans, but through concrete policies, by expanding political participation, enshrining equality before the law, and managing pluralism as a reality to be embraced, not exploited. This is what transforms stability from an imposed state to a sustainable one.

Ultimately, states may succeed in imposing temporary calm by force, but they cannot produce long-term resilience without a satisfied social base. True resilience lies not only in the ability to retaliate, but also in the ability to endure without disintegration. In times of crisis, the internal not the external becomes the first and last line of defense.

ANHA